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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
COMMUNICATION AT SUPERFUND SITES AND  
THE REIFICATION OF DIVISION:  
TOWARD A CONVERGENCE-BUILDING MODEL OF RISK COMMUNICATION 
 
This case study evaluates government communication practices at Superfund 
sites. I describe agency communication practices in Superfund communities, paying 
particular attention to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Seven Cardinal Rules 
of Risk Communication and its role as a model for federal agencies engaged at these sites. 
Situating the study within a theoretical milieu that includes sensemaking and symbolic 
interactionism, I examine whether current practices deepen divisions among stakeholders, 
reducing the possibility for communicative convergence.   
 
I implement textual analysis and narrative inquiry to examine written and spoken 
communication about the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant National Priorities List 
Superfund site. Through crystallized analysis of media coverage, public comments, focus 
group transcripts, and local blogs, I address the following research questions: 
  
RQ1: How does the enactment of accepted agency risk communication practices 
affect relationships among stakeholders, specifically: 
 
• how do stakeholders (including federal agency personnel) characterize 
past and present agency risk communication practices, and 
• how do stakeholders (including federal agency personnel) characterize 
each other in relation to these communicative practices? 
 
RQ2: What are the related implications for improving agency risk communication 
approaches? 
 
The study concludes with recommendations for improving existing agency risk 
communication guidelines, as well as the creation of a new communication model to 
promote convergent communication at Superfund sites. 
 
KEYWORDS: Risk communication, Superfund, Participatory Communication, 
   Stakeholder Communication, Communication Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anna Goodman Hoover 
 
 
April 30, 2013 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMMUNICATION AT SUPERFUND SITES AND  
THE REIFICATION OF DIVISION: 
TOWARD A CONVERGENCE-BUILDING MODEL OF RISK COMMUNICATION 
 
 
By 
 
Anna Goodman Hoover 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chike Anyaegbunam, Ph.D. 
Director of Dissertation 
 
Timothy L. Sellnow, Ph.D. 
Director of Graduate Studies 
 
April 30, 2013 
Date 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is dedicated to my darling daughter Evelyn. 
Keep asking questions. 
Doctrina Lux Mentis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This dissertation would not have been possible without the guidance and support 
of a number of people. Upon stepping into my first communications classroom, I could 
not have imagined that the professor, Dr. Chike Anyaegbunam, would become not only 
my Dissertation Chair, but also my colleague and friend. I am indebted to him for his 
wisdom, kindness, and patience. I likewise thank the members of my committee -- Dr. 
Tim Sellnow, Dr. Dan O'Hair, and Dr. Lisa Gaetke -- for contributing their expertise, 
time, and enthusiasm to this project. It has been my privilege to learn from each of you. 
I owe debts of gratitude to the good friends and colleagues who have read 
portions of this work: Sarah Riley, Michael Arrington, Pamela Cupp, Lizeth Fowler, and 
John DeAtley. Their feedback has been deeply appreciated, as have the insights of the 
governmental staffers, NGO representatives, and community members who have 
provided data and served as sounding boards throughout this process. Lindell Ormsbee 
and Stephanie Jenkins of the university’s Superfund Research Program Research 
Translation Core also provided tremendous support along the way. These individuals 
have challenged my assumptions and expanded my perspective, and I thank them for that.  
Finally, and most importantly, I thank my beloved family and friends for their 
patience, love, and support during this adventure. For more than forty years, my parents 
have encouraged me to expand my horizons through constant learning. For the last 
thirteen of those years, I have shared the journey with my dear husband, John, and for 
nearly five of those years, we have been unexpectedly, remarkably, and miraculously 
accompanied by our darling Evelyn. To this wonderful family, I offer my deepest 
gratitude and everlasting love. 
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ iii 
List of Tables .................................................................................................................... vii 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................. viii 
Chapter One: Introduction .................................................................................................. 1 
Statement of Purpose ....................................................................................................... 8 
Organization of Dissertation ......................................................................................... 10 
Chapter Two: Background and Rationale ......................................................................... 13 
A Brief History of Risk Communication ...................................................................... 13 
Approaches to Risk Communication............................................................................. 19 
Risk Communication as a Research Translation Challenge ...................................... 20 
Policy Approaches: Binaries in Risk Communication .............................................. 22 
Applying Stakeholder Theory to Risk Communication ............................................ 27 
Moving Toward a Participatory Perspective ............................................................. 31 
The Politics of Superfund Sites ..................................................................................... 39 
The Regulatory Framework for Superfund Site Risk Communication ..................... 41 
The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant .......................................................................... 45 
Posing the Problem........................................................................................................ 49 
Chapter Three: Methods ................................................................................................... 51 
Epistemological Paradigm............................................................................................. 51 
Sensemaking in Risk Environments .......................................................................... 52 
Symbolic Interactionism ............................................................................................ 56 
Research Design ............................................................................................................ 57 
Constant Comparative Analysis ................................................................................ 58 
Narrative Inquiry ....................................................................................................... 61 
Crystallization ............................................................................................................ 63 
Data Collection .............................................................................................................. 66 
Selection and Sampling ............................................................................................. 66 
Data Analysis ................................................................................................................ 73 
Coding ....................................................................................................................... 74 
Challenges for Qualitative Research ............................................................................. 77 
Transferability versus Generalizability ..................................................................... 78 
Reliability and Validity ............................................................................................. 79 
Credibility versus Objectivity .................................................................................... 81 
v 
 
Researcher Reflexivity .............................................................................................. 82 
Chapter Four: Results ....................................................................................................... 87 
Talking about the PGDP ............................................................................................... 87 
The Government ............................................................................................................ 89 
Capacity: The Number and Diversity of Actors ........................................................ 90 
Commitment: Adversarial Binaries ........................................................................... 97 
Expectations: Retrospective Sensemaking .............................................................. 101 
The Public ................................................................................................................... 105 
Capacity ................................................................................................................... 106 
Commitment ............................................................................................................ 110 
Expectations............................................................................................................. 111 
Delays .......................................................................................................................... 115 
Capacity ................................................................................................................... 116 
Commitment ............................................................................................................ 117 
Expectations............................................................................................................. 119 
Secrecy, Deception, and Manipulation ....................................................................... 122 
Capacity ................................................................................................................... 123 
Commitment ............................................................................................................ 125 
Expectations............................................................................................................. 127 
Competing Risk Perceptions ....................................................................................... 131 
Capacity ................................................................................................................... 133 
Commitment ............................................................................................................ 135 
Expectations............................................................................................................. 139 
Chapter Five: Toward a New Model .............................................................................. 144 
Synthesizing the Evidence .......................................................................................... 144 
Implications ................................................................................................................. 148 
Adapting Seven Cardinal Rules to Increase Sensemaking Capacity ....................... 148 
Operationalization ................................................................................................... 151 
Implementation: Toward a New Convergence Model ................................................ 156 
Linking Risk Communication Approaches ............................................................. 161 
Limitations .................................................................................................................. 163 
Future Directions ......................................................................................................... 165 
References ....................................................................................................................... 167 
Appendix A: Focus Group Protocol ............................................................................... 183 
vi 
 
Appendix B: IRB Approval Letter for Focus Groups ..................................................... 199 
Vita……………………………………………………………………………………...201 
 
vii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 3.1. First-Cycle Coding.  ..........................................................................................75 
Figure 3.2. Second-Cycle Coding. .....................................................................................76 
Figure 3.3. Third-Cycle Coding. ........................................................................................77 
 
 
 
viii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 4.1.Traditional Communication Process Model.  .................................................157 
Figure 4.2. Convergence-Building Communication Model. ...........................................159 
1 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
In the mid-1980s, several high-profile environmental crises pointed to the need 
for government agencies to communicate better with the public about the environmental 
and health risks of exposure to specific contaminants (Perrow, 1984; Shrivastava, 1987; 
Weick, 1988; National Research Council [NRC], 1989). From this need, the field of risk 
communication emerged, with scholars and practitioners developing strategies for 
disseminating information to and receiving information from risk-bearing communities. 
One of the first and most enduring products of this field is the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency's [U.S. EPA] Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication (Covello 
& Allen, 1988). These guidelines, which appear in various forms across numerous best 
practices documents, include: "1) accept and involve the public as a legitimate partner; 2) 
plan carefully and evaluate your efforts; 3) listen to the public's specific concerns; 4) be 
honest, frank, and open; 5) coordinate and collaborate with other credible sources; 6) 
meet the needs of the media; and 7) speak clearly and with compassion" (U.S. EPA, 
1988).  
For almost a quarter of a century, these rules have guided the development and 
implementation of scores of stakeholder communication efforts by U.S. EPA and other 
federal agencies engaged at hazardous waste sites (ATSDR, 1994; Tinker, 1996; 
Keystone Center, 2005). The approach delineated by the Seven Cardinal Rules and 
similar governmental best practices guides represents an enormous advance from the 
sparse risk communication efforts that preceded them (Covello & Sandman, 2001). 
However, further evaluation is needed concerning the long-term impacts of this 
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framework on relationships among agencies, community members, and other 
stakeholders. 
While U.S. EPA, specifically, has based its risk communication efforts on the 
Seven Cardinal Rules, these guidelines also have provided a model of public 
communication for other federal agencies, including the Agency for Toxic Substances 
and Disease Registry [ATSDR] (ATSDR, 1994; Tinker, 1996) and the U.S. Department 
of Energy [U.S. DOE] (Keystone Center, 2005). That these three organizations 
essentially use the same framework for communicating with riskbearers has been 
particularly important in Superfund communities, which bear significant environmental 
and health burdens that sometimes require both individual and community-level actions 
to mitigate. In addition to being guided by the Seven Cardinal Rules, federal agencies 
often contract strategic issues management or public relations consultants to help craft 
risk communication primers and conduct training for employees (Keystone Center, 2005; 
Center for Risk Communication, 2012). As a result, agency communicative policies and 
procedures tend to be based on guidelines drawn from the best practices literature, 
including Seven Cardinal Rules.   
Superfund communities present particularly challenging environments for 
enacting the Rules. In these settings, citizens often find themselves embedded within a 
complicated and confusing network of similar but disconnected governmental activities 
and communication efforts. By federal law, U.S. EPA investigates, designates, and 
oversees environmental cleanup activities associated with Superfund sites, while ATSDR 
investigates and reports about potential public health impacts related to contamination 
(U.S. EPA, 2011). Because of its role in the production of nuclear energy and waste 
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products since the Cold War, the U.S. Department of Energy itself is responsible for the 
cleanup of some 21 Superfund sites, constituting "the world's largest nuclear cleanup" 
(U.S. DOE, 2011). Further, a 1997 report to Congress indicated some level of 
environmental contamination at all ninety-six of the agency's nuclear facilities (de 
Saillan, 2008). 
Despite increased U.S. DOE attempts to engage local communities directly in risk 
communication, both the large scale of the agency’s environmental management efforts 
and numerous revelations about its prior waste mismanagement (Bruce & Becker, 2007; 
Taylor, B. C., Kinsella, W. J., Depoe, S. P., & Metzler, M. S., 2005) have contributed to 
high levels of distrust among many community stakeholders (Flynn, Slovic, Mertz, & 
Toma, 1990; Slovic, 2000). Even as U.S. DOE attempts to engage its publics, implement 
more inclusive processes, and provide assistance to affected communities, stakeholders 
tend to remain dubious of motives and desired outcomes (KRCEE, 2011). As Gaetke, 
Gaetke, and Bowen (2008) put it, "people who have been affected by Superfund sites are 
often, legitimately, not inclined to trust offers of help from strangers, particularly from 
outside of their communities" (p. 279). Further, across the U.S. DOE complex, 
community members have indicated that they are greatly concerned about both their 
inability to help set site-related priorities and the community’s perceived lack of 
influence on U.S. DOE decision making in general (Battelle, 2003).  
Among the sites that U.S. DOE currently is remediating is the Paducah Gaseous 
Diffusion Plant [PGDP], a National Priorities List (NPL) Superfund site in western 
Kentucky. Currently, the PGDP is the only operating uranium enrichment facility in the 
United States (Kaoutzanis, 2011). Initially charged with producing fuel for the military-
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industrial complex, the PGDP transitioned in the 1960s to focus on uranium enrichment 
for electricity-generating commercial reactors (USEC, 2010). The PGDP was owned and 
operated by U.S. DOE until 1992, when operations were leased to the United States 
Enrichment Corporation [USEC]. Although USEC continues to manage enrichment 
activities, U.S. DOE retains responsibility for PGDP site clean-up and environmental 
management.  
 In 1988, technetium-99 and trichloroethylene contamination from the plant were 
discovered in nearby private drinking wells. Subsequently, U.S. EPA launched an 
investigation that resulted in the PGDP's addition to the Superfund National Priorities 
List in 1993 (U.S. EPA, 2007).  In fulfilling its oversight duties at the facility, U.S. EPA 
works closely with such state agencies as the Kentucky Energy and Environment 
Cabinet’s Department for Environmental Protection and Division of Waste Management, 
as well as the Cabinet for Health and Family Services’ Radiation Control Branch. The 
Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife is directly affected by PGDP activities 
through its lease of the wildlife management area surrounding the plant. In addition, U.S. 
DOE established a Citizens Advisory Board, or CAB, in compliance with community 
right-to-know laws to "facilitate the flow of various kinds of technical information from 
experts to community residents and to open channels of commentary between them" 
(Heath & Palenchar, 2009, p. 316).  
 Since the PGDP's addition to the NPL, U.S. DOE has conducted numerous site-
related information campaigns and community meetings; however, local stakeholders 
have continued to express strong distrust of the agency while voicing concerns about the 
goals of PGDP-related engagement projects (KRCEE, 2011). In one recent study, focus 
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group participants were asked to rate their preferred levels of public engagement in 
PGDP-related matters, as well as perceptions of their actual engagement. To gauge 
stakeholder opinion, researchers utilized the Arnstein Ladder (1969). This tool assesses 
perceived and desired participation levels via an eight point scale ranging from non-
participation to citizen power, as follows: 
1. Manipulation 
2. Therapy 
3. Informing 
4. Consultation 
5. Placation 
6. Partnership 
7. Delegated Power 
8. Citizen Control 
 
 Although participants in seven focus groups indicated that their preferred level of 
PGDP-related engagement with agencies would be partnership, they placed their actual 
engagement levels between being informed and being consulted, marking a full two-point 
difference on the eight-point scale (KRCEE, 2011). Importantly, the KRCEE (2011) 
study also noted that stakeholder groups who perceived themselves as experiencing the 
lowest levels of participation on the Arnstein Ladder desired higher participation levels 
than other groups, leading the investigators to ask, "[D]o higher ideal levels of 
engagement negatively influence perceptions of real-world engagement activities, or do 
unsatisfactory past experiences increase the desire for achieving a higher ideal level of 
involvement" (p. 111)? 
This "Arnstein Gap" (Bailey, Blandford, Grossardt, & Ripy, 2011) between 
experienced and desired levels of public participation, along with the lack of community 
trust, both in the agency's waste management practices and in the veracity of its risk 
communications, raises the question of whether more than twenty years of risk 
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communication activities derived in part from U.S. EPA's Seven Cardinal Rules have 
improved U.S. DOE's relationship with the community or if, in fact, these guidelines 
might have contributed to further deterioration of already-damaged relationships. The 
Rules have informed the design and implementation of numerous federal communicative 
actions for more than two decades; however, as Weick (1988) notes, while action can 
facilitate mutual understanding "action [also] affects events and can make things worse" 
(p. 306). In practice, has adhering to the Rules reified existing divisions between agencies 
and their stakeholders? Do the Rules implicitly marginalize community concerns as less 
valid than technical assessments of risk?  
Paducah provides a fascinating case for addressing these important questions. 
Through the years, complex relationships among federal and state governmental 
agencies, community stakeholders, myriad activist and advocacy groups, and the media 
have presented opportunities for both communication and miscommunication. Individuals 
and groups have spent decades making sense of the PGDP, of its role(s) in the 
community, and of the potential consequences of the plant's physical presence in the 
region. These sensemaking activities have contributed to a process known as 
"enactment," which results in an "enacted environment" (Weick, 1988, 1995). 
Weick (1988, 1995) describes enactment as an ongoing, iterative process through 
which people shape their environment, which then constrains the very people who 
created that environment. In describing the enactment perspective, Weick (1988) states 
that "when people act, they bring events and structures into existence and set them in 
motion" (p. 306). Three mediating factors potentially constrain this important process. 
Capacity limits enactment through the number and diversity of potential actors, as when 
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fewer individuals are available to jointly make sense of a situation or all individuals 
interacting share a similar perspective; commitment affects enactment through the 
formation of "blind spots" in the "tenacious justification" of particular positions, as when 
individuals hold tightly to beliefs in spite of evidence to the contrary; expectations 
constrain capacity through the creation of assumptions that become "self-fulfilling 
prophecies," as when an individual's negative past experiences inform negative reactions 
to a new situation, thus creating challenges for interactions that further deteriorate in the 
new situation (Weick, 1988).  
 In short, numerous stakeholders -- ranging from residents in contaminated areas to 
plant employees to CAB members to environmental activists to local government and 
economic development leaders -- have disparate stakes in and distinct, often competing, 
perspectives about PGDP-related issues. The various stakeholder groups receive 
information about the site from numerous other site-related actors, generating frequent 
and often conflicting messages from which sense must be made. Further, each 
stakeholder group and the individuals who comprise it have differing levels of technical 
knowledge and emotional investment in the plant and its activities. However, current risk 
communication paradigms pit broad-brush characterizations of "technical hazard" against 
"community outrage," often missing distinct but important nuances among stakeholders 
in favor of a binary view that places agencies on one side of risk communication and 
community stakeholders on the other. 
Through a sensemaking lens, this case study examines the ways in which agencies 
and their multiple stakeholders describe each other, as well as the ways in which 
individuals with disparate stakes perceive previous agency risk communication and 
8 
 
community engagement efforts. Using a qualitative multi-method analytic process, this 
study brings together models and theoretical concepts from the risk and participatory 
communication fields to inform strategic issues management practices for federal 
agencies. The findings support the development of a new communication model that 
balances the lived experiences of those affected directly by environmental exposures with 
the technical knowledge of agency personnel. 
Statement of Purpose 
 
More and more, federal agencies are seeking to adapt long-standing, prescriptive 
risk communication guidelines to create collaborative paradigms that promote shared 
understanding. If sensemaking is an interactive, situated process in which individuals 
work together to create shared meaning (Blumer, 1966), then it stands to reason that to be 
successful, new risk communication approaches should feature collaborative 
sensemaking activities involving stakeholders with diverse perspectives. To develop 
these approaches, however, we first must identify where current models might be 
problematic to ensure appropriate adaptation of existing practices.  
This study seeks to improve our understanding of the long-term impacts of past 
and current federal risk communication activities on stakeholder relationships through a 
case study of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant National Priorities List Superfund 
site. Specifically, I attempt to identify constraints that agency risk communication 
policies place upon enactment, including the role that specific communicative practices 
could be playing in provoking or sustaining adversarial relationships. I do this by 
analyzing written and spoken communication from multiple datasets to explore the ways 
in which agency risk communication policies and practices could be affecting stakeholder 
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relationships. For clues, I examine how multiple stakeholders, including both community 
members and agency personnel, characterize previous and ongoing federal risk 
communication activities. I further seek to identify instances in which these perceptions 
of risk communication experiences influence stakeholder perceptions of other actors, 
both from agencies and within the community. 
Thus, I analyze written and spoken communication from several quarters to 
address the following research questions:  
RQ1: How does the enactment of accepted agency risk communication practices 
affect relationships among stakeholders, specifically: 
• how do stakeholders (including federal agency personnel) characterize 
past and present agency risk communication practices, and 
• how do stakeholders (including federal agency personnel) characterize 
each other in relation to these communicative practices? 
RQ2: What are the related implications for improving agency risk communication 
approaches? 
Exploring these questions will improve our understanding of whether and how the 
risk communication framework currently used by federal agencies working at Superfund 
sites could be creating new or reifying existing divisions between government entities 
and community stakeholders. After identifying the nature of the existing framework's 
impacts on relationships, I propose stakeholder-centered amendments to The Seven 
Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication, establishing a new model for federal agency 
interactions with riskbearing communities at Superfund sites. The practical issue of 
promoting communicative convergence is central to these recommendations.  
10 
 
Building a collaborative framework for risk communication requires deepening 
the current understanding of risk as a socially- and linguistically-constructed 
phenomenon. As Murdock (2010) argues, improving contemporary risk communication 
requires "a research effort that is resolutely interdisciplinary, that mobilizes expertise 
from outside the communications and risk communities, and that is matched by a policy 
response that ‘joins up’ hitherto separate domains" (p. 174). By deepening our 
understanding of how current federal risk communication practices create, reify, and/or 
challenge stakeholder perceptions, I identify spaces in which convergence may be 
possible, leading to policy recommendations for a collaborative, empowering model of 
risk communication that can be implemented jointly by agencies and risk-bearers. 
Organization of Dissertation 
 
In achieving the goals set forth for this study, I have organized the dissertation in 
five distinct chapters.  
In Chapter One, I briefly introduce both the problem and the scene. I provide a 
cursory overview of federal risk communication at Superfund sites and introduce the 
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant as the site of study. Finally, I provide the goals and 
research questions for the study. 
Chapter Two presents the study’s background and rationale. I begin with an 
examination of the history of risk communication, followed by an analysis of four distinct 
approaches to risk communication: research translation, policy-oriented, stakeholder-
based, and participatory. The chapter then discusses the particular political dynamics and 
challenges for Superfund site communication before describing the history of the PGDP 
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and its status as a National Priorities List site. I close the chapter by explicating the 
challenges that this study addresses. 
In Chapter Three, I provide an in-depth discussion of study methodology. I 
discuss the epistemological paradigm of the researcher, including overviews of 
sensemaking and symbolic interactionism. The chapter provides a detailed description of 
research design, including discussions of constant comparative analysis and narrative 
inquiry, as well as the role of crystallization in bringing these different analytical forms 
together. I describe data collection through a discussion of selection and sampling, as 
well as detailed descriptions of each of the four datasets. In the data analysis section, I 
provide details regarding coding activities. I then discuss specific challenges for the 
study, including the ways in which qualitative research specifically addresses traditional 
social scientific constructs like generalizability, reliability, validity, objectivity, and 
researcher reflexivity. 
In Chapter Four, I provide study results, specifically identifying five cross-cutting 
themes found in the datasets: 1) The Government; 2) The Public; 3) Delays; 4) Secrecy, 
Deception, and Manipulation; and 5) Competing Risk Perceptions. I discuss the ways in 
which each theme relates to enactment, specifically how it informs and is informed by 
sensemaking constraints for capacity, commitment, and expectations. Each thematic 
section closes with a narrative vignette intended both to exemplify and to enhance the 
preceding constant comparative analysis. 
After briefly synthesizing the evidence in Chapter Five, I delineate the study’s 
implications for future risk communication efforts at Superfund sites. Specifically, I 
make recommendations regarding the rhetorical adaptation, operationalization, and 
12 
 
implementation of Seven Cardinal Rules and other best practices-oriented risk 
communication guides specifically for use at Superfund sites. I also suggest a 
convergence-promoting model for Superfund site communication that incorporates 
elements of research translation, policy, stakeholder-based, and participatory approaches. 
The dissertation closes with discussions of study limitations and future directions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Anna Goodman Hoover 2013 
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Chapter Two: Background and Rationale 
A Brief History of Risk Communication 
 
Risk communication came into its own in the late-1970s and early-1980s, an 
event-driven outgrowth of risk management (Murdock, 2010). These years saw a slew of 
domestic and international environmental crises, including illnesses related to toxic 
chemicals at New York's Love Canal, the partial nuclear meltdown at Pennsylvania's 
Three Mile Island facility, the tragic death of thousands in Bhopal, India, following a 
Union Carbide pesticide plant's leakage of methyl isocyanate, and massive contamination 
from the Chernobyl nuclear plant accident in the then-Soviet Union. With each of these 
events, it became increasingly clear that both government and industry officials needed to 
inform the public about existing and emerging environmental and health risks (Perrow, 
1984; Weick, 1988; NRC, 1989; Heath & O'Hair, 2010).  
As Murdock (2010) states, the field’s earliest iterations "saw [risk 
communication] as a technical practice in which experts attempted to allay public 
concerns by underlining the statistical improbability of risks becoming crises and 
affirming that effective preventative and emergency controls were in place" (p. 160). 
Horlick-Jones and Farre (2010) refer to this approach as a "deficit model" in which 
communication efforts were "driven by an attempt to explain scientific facts about risk 
issues to what were seen as uncomprehending lay audiences: to ‘fill up their heads’, as it 
were, with authoritative knowledge" (p. 132). Thus, an increasingly concerned public’s 
perceived information needs drove the development of a paradigm in which experts 
provided probabilistic risk information to a homogeneous public. According to Heath and 
O'Hair (2010), "The logic of this scientific (actuarial or epidemiological) approach is that 
14 
 
as people understand the causes, randomness/predictability of, and effects of risks, certain 
measures can be taken on a personal and societal level to alter the occurrence, impact, 
and magnitude of the damage" (p. 15). 
As implied by this initial expert-source-to-lay-receiver model, risk 
communication began as what Heath & O'Hair (2010) call "a discipline whereby experts 
could be brought together with lay audiences to explain and compare risks" (p. 9). 
However, it soon became apparent that this approach was inadequate. Subsequent 
evolution of the field was driven in part by the continued erosion of public confidence in 
risk management and in part by what Murdock (2010) describes as "the emergence of 
new lobbying and campaigning groups that articulated popular fears around nuclear 
power and environmental degradation" (p. 160). As the concerns of non-technical 
stakeholders were brought into starker relief, the unidirectional model was increasingly 
found wanting. According to Sellnow and Sellnow (2010), "The general tenet of 
communication studies [is] that simple exposure to information does not translate to 
understanding" (p. 115); this tenet became a key component of the risk management 
dilemma. Technical information about risks seemed to influence neither attitudes about 
nor behaviors related to those risks, and both governmental agencies and industry were 
left asking what was "wrong" with their efforts.  
Recognizing that better risk communication models were needed, the National 
Research Council (1989) weighed in on the side of communicative bidirectionality when 
it released Improving Risk Communication. Sometimes referred to as the Orange Book, 
the report highlights the challenges that lay audiences experienced in trying to make 
sense of probabilistic hazard assessments, as well as the lack of attention technical 
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experts paid to lay concerns that could not be incorporated into such assessments (Slovic, 
1999; Thompson, 2012).  The seminal NRC (1989) publication specifically called for risk 
communication approaches to include "democratic dialogue," to be "interactive," and to 
incorporate the public’s "concerns, opinions, or reaction to risk messages" (p. 21). Often, 
the implementation of these suggestions by government agencies has focused on the 
development and implementation of what essentially are standard operating procedures 
for the conduct of risk communication.  
One of the first and most enduring products in this genre is the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency's [U.S. EPA] Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk 
Communication (Covello & Allen, 1988). Released just prior to the NRC report, the 
Rules establish a laundry list of guidelines for U.S. EPA risk communicators to follow. 
As Tinker (1996) notes, "The Cardinal Rules were designed to serve as guidelines for 
federal efforts to define communications objectives, organize and manage decisions, and 
measure performance in health risk communications planning, implementation, and 
evaluation" (p. 201) 
The U.S. EPA (1988) rules are: 
1) accept and involve the public as a legitimate partner;  
2) plan carefully and evaluate your efforts;  
3) listen to the public's specific concerns;  
4) be honest, frank, and open;  
5) coordinate and collaborate with other credible sources; 
6) meet the needs of the media; and  
7) speak clearly and with compassion   
 
By acknowledging the existence of public concerns, this approach represents an 
improvement over the sparse risk communication efforts that preceded it (Covello & 
Sandman, 2001). However, as Heath and Nathan (1990) point out, the Rules still reflect a 
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model that "features experts as sources, messages as information about risk, channels as 
media reporters and editors, and receivers [as] an amorphous public..." (p. 16). According 
to Boholm (2009), such approaches indicate that "the role of the [risk communicator] is 
to steer laypeople’s (incorrect) mental models toward convergence with the scientific 
(correct) model" (p. 339). In essence, such critics claim the Rules continue to reflect a 
more or less persuasion-based approach to risk communication. 
With high-profile events like Three Mile Island, Bhopal, and Chernobyl keeping 
environmental crises in the news (Kasperson, Kasperson, Pidgeon, & Slovic, 2003), it 
stands to reason that U.S. EPA would be at the forefront of best practices development. 
As Horlick-Jones and Farre (2010) note, "[T]he use of risk communication as a 
regulatory, policy and operational tool has become increasingly important for 
institutional attempts to optimize resource allocation, and to inform and influence the 
behaviour of target audiences" (p. 131). Thus, once a set of guidelines had been 
developed, numerous other agencies subsequently looked to the Rules for creating their 
own policies, procedures, and activities. Among the governmental organizations that 
followed U.S. EPA’s lead were the US Department of Energy (Keystone Center, 2005) 
and numerous agencies within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(ATSDR, 1994; Tinker, 1996).  
Examples of other government agencies utilizing the Seven Cardinal Rules 
abound. For example, early adaptations are evident in a U.S. Public Health Service 
[USPHS] Report on Risk Communication and Education, generated by a Subcommittee 
of the Environmental Health Policy Committee (Tinker, 1996).  Within its report, the 
subcommittee defined health risk communication as "the purposeful exchange of 
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information about the existence, nature, form, severity, or acceptability of risks" (p. 201). 
The subcommittee bounded the discipline as involving "individuals, groups, 
communities, or institutions;  the level, significance, or meaning of health or 
environmental risks; assessments, models, and procedures on which risk estimates are 
made; and decisions, actions, or policies aimed at managing or controlling health or 
environmental risks" (p. 200). Tinker (1996) makes clear the linkage between US DHHS 
and the Cardinal Rules by stating that most Public Health Service agencies "either were 
familiar with or had applied in varying degrees the model standards of risk 
communication developed by EPA" (p. 201). 
In addition to US DHHS usage of the guidelines, a recent risk communication 
primer created for U.S. DOE makes clear how the Rules have permeated other federal 
efforts. The primer, created by the Keystone Center (2005), states: 
Do not make assumptions about what people know, think, or want done about 
risks. Recognize that people’s values and feelings are a legitimate aspect of 
environmental health issues and that such concerns may convey valuable 
information. When people are speaking passionately they are responding to their 
emotions. It is both ineffective and often inappropriate to simply follow with data. 
Show respect by developing a system to both acknowledge and respond promptly 
to concerns raised by community residents without becoming 'technocratic.' (p. 
22) 
 
From the Department of Health and Human Services to the Department of Energy, it is 
clear that U.S. EPA's groundwork provided the foundation on which many subsequent 
federal risk communication policies have been built. 
According to Sellnow and Sellnow (2010), the years since the Rules creation have 
seen "risk management and crisis planning [evolve] far beyond any linear form of 
communication where subject matter experts establish standards and priorities for risk 
management" (p. 113). Instead, stress increasingly has been placed on communicative 
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bidirectionality, with many groups -- both outside and inside government -- calling for 
risk communication to feature "collaborative decision making that includes risk bearers, 
including those who can be affected by a crisis" (Heath & O’Hair, 2010, p.7).  
While Seven Cardinal Rules and related government risk communication 
guidelines certainly represent improvements over the earlier unidirectional information 
dissemination model, this approach also carries with it its own difficulties, many 
centering on the inherent normatization of scientific risk and the continued 
conceptualization of communication almost exclusively as message transmission 
(Stratman et al., 1995; Boholm, 2008; Endres, 2009; Stratman et al., 1995). As Palenchar 
(2005) states,  
Some risk communication studies and prescriptions take an atheoretical approach 
… Such prescriptions, while important, do not address issues of conflict and 
negotiation, or see risk from the perspective of concerned members of the 
community who often believe they have reason not to trust any statement 
regarding risks. (p. 5) 
 
In fact, Heath and Nathan (1990) have criticized the Rules as "a linear, source-oriented 
model that relies on paternalistic and platitudinous suggestions" (p. 16). In other words, 
while such rules as "accept and involve the public as a legitimate partner" and "listen to 
the public's specific concerns" appear to be more concerned with stakeholder perceptions 
than previous risk communication efforts, these guidelines in fact mask what essentially 
is a continuation of the source-receiver model without providing substantive ways in 
which publics can become invested in the communication process.  
In contrast, some have argued that evolving models of risk communication should 
include a more active role for riskbearers. As Heath and O’Hair (2010) put it, "This logic 
suggests that infrastructures within a society arise or are specifically created to discuss, 
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challenge, and make decisions relevant to risk and crisis tolerance, mitigation, and 
communication" (p. 7). Dunsby (2004) explicitly connects these processes to risk 
management success by stating, "Typically, Americans are wary of investing their trust in 
a group of experts; thus, for a method to have legitimacy, it must be supported by a 
system of accountability that enables the public to judge the entrance of subjectivity or 
bias into the process" (p. 285-286). Through such discourse, the field of risk 
communication has changed substantially during the last three decades, transitioning 
from a positivistic approach that privileged scientific knowledge to a more nuanced 
approach that attempted to acknowledge non-scientific perspectives to a more recent 
focus on dialogue and collaborative decision-making processes (Renn, 1992; Palenchar & 
Heath, 2007). 
Approaches to Risk Communication 
 
Heath and O'Hair (2010) describe risk communication as an area in which 
"science, policy, management philosophy and culture meet, collide, and reinforce one 
another in what can be an unhappy confluence" (p. 7).  To understand the challenges risk 
communicators face in sorting through potential processes and outcomes, it is helpful to 
begin by examining what each of these distinct perspectives brings to the field. From the 
scientific perspective, for example, risk communication can be thought of as a problem of 
research translation. Risk communication policy, in contrast, sees a challenge for dealing 
directly with publics regarding technical hazards. Management studies might see risk 
communication as benefitting from the application of stakeholder theory. Finally, the 
recognition of culture's role in risk communication speaks to a need for participatory and 
action-based approaches. Each of these perspectives points to different underlying 
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assumptions about the ultimate goals of risk communication, ranging from 
straightforward information dissemination to some level of bidirectionality to 
partnership-building to citizen empowerment (Chess, Salomone, Hance, & Saville, 1995; 
Heath & O'Hair, 2010). 
Risk Communication as a Research Translation Challenge 
 
One dominant perspective on risk communication relates directly to uncertainty 
management. As Heath, Bradshaw, and Lee (2002) note, "[S]cientific uncertainty about 
the likely occurrence and health/safety effects of a hazard can shape the risk perceptions 
of key publics—from regulators to affected citizens" (p. 321). Thus, many risk managers 
see risk communication primarily as a tool for providing risk-related information, 
packaged in an appropriate manner, to specific audiences most affected by the risk, 
reflecting a positivist-empiricist approach that relies on the transmission model of 
communication (Boholm, 2009). Embedded largely within this perspective, the earliest 
iterations of risk communication were rooted primarily in the need to provide affected 
populations with relevant scientific information, often to allay fears. As Heath, 
Bradshaw, and Lee (2002) note, "The more confident (or certain) individuals are that they 
can predict and communicate about a risk, the more control they perceive they have over 
the outcome" (p. 322). Armed with this information, some risk communicators inherently 
see their work as a form of research translation.  
At its base, research translation is defined as the timely and efficient transfer of 
basic science research findings into improvements in public health outcomes (Cochrane 
et al., 2007). Lomas (1993) views research translation as a three-step process 
incorporating the diffusion of information through traditional means, the targeted 
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dissemination of information from source to recipient, and the implementation of findings 
by the recipient. In terms of risk communication, the media might be considered the 
traditional means of communication, targeted dissemination might involve specific 
riskbearing populations, and implementation of findings might be the consideration of 
probabilistic hazard assessments in decision-making. Parrott (2008), however, asserts that 
the mere application of research findings -- or, in our case, risk assessment data -- is not 
sufficient for gauging success; rather that "the most important criterion is 
whether…findings are implemented in ways that function as pathways to improve lives" 
(p. 1).  
For such improvements to occur, it is essential that agency personnel have access 
to the most up-to-date information possible and that this information be transmitted by 
sources that encourage the acceptance of probabalistic hazard assessments. Information 
recipients are more likely to base decisions on findings if the recipients "speak with 
innovators and with each other [and]…select ideas that they would like to try out" 
(Berwick, 2003). Berwick further argues that individuals "learn about innovations best 
from local and social interactions with early adopters, [thus] organizations that foster 
such social exchanges may see faster dissemination of changes." 
In a U.S. DOE risk communication primer produced by the Keystone Center 
(2005), the scientific concerns of risk management are clearly paramount. In the 
document, risk communication is described as involving "multiple messages related to 
the types and levels of the risk, or to the concerns, opinions, or reactions to risk messages, 
or to the legal or institutional arrangements for risk management" (p. 18). 
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Horlick-Jones and Farre (2010) point out that a key challenge for the research 
translation approach to risk communication is its embeddedness in "'deficit' thinking, the 
idea that lay audiences would ‘behave sensibly’ if only they were in possession of the 
technical facts"; despite numerous studies pointing to the contrary, this model "continues 
to figure strongly in areas as diverse as health promotion, emergency planning, and 
innovation associated with controversial technologies" (p. 132). The research translation 
perspective is associated with additional challenges, as well, including low science 
literacy and numeracy levels and the existence of competing data. As Heath, Bradshaw, 
and Lee (2002) note, "Information requires interpretation to become knowledge" (p. 325); 
in a similar vein, Heath and O’Hair (2010) warn against "data dumps that provide huge 
amounts of information in ways that make it difficult to access" (p. 19). Further 
complicating issues, a great deal of research indicates that information provided by 
government agencies frequently is not trusted by citizen recipients (Fessenden-Raden, 
Fitchen, & Heath, 1987; Frewer, Howard, Hedderley, & Shepherd, 1996; Kunreuther, 
Easterling, Desvousges, & Slovic, 1990; McCallum, Hammond, & Covello, 1991; Slovic, 
Flynn, & Layman, 1991; McComas, 2003; KRCEE, 2011). Thus, the mere provision of 
information through standard research translation approaches will be inadequate for 
addressing many risk-related situations. 
Policy Approaches: Binaries in Risk Communication 
 
According to Boholm (2009), the practice of risk communication "is usually 
defined as the intentional transfer of information about the assessment, evaluation, and 
management of risk, often integral to governmental steering and policy implementation" 
(p. 337). However, as Heath and O'Hair (2010) point out, a policy perspective also 
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recognizes that, in risk communication, "[f]acts blend with values and policy preferences" 
(p. 18). Thus a second approach to risk communication builds upon the research 
translation paradigm while explicitly recognizing that risk perceptions are not necessarily 
tied to scientific facts.  
Heath and Nathan (1990) note that "risk communication must be founded on 
correct principles and political realities" (p. 15). Thus, the policy perspective 
acknowledges that risk communication is problematized by public perceptions that 
question expert credibility (Heath & O'Hair, 2010). Policy-oriented approaches, 
therefore, implicitly situate persuasion as a valid form of risk management. As Horlick-
Jones and Farre (2010) put it, whether specific activities reflect "top-down," "two-way," 
or "consultation and engagement" designs, the processes ultimately "seek to influence the 
behaviour of target audiences and gather information useful for the organization" (p. 
134).   
As indicated in a U.S. DOE risk communication primer (Keystone Center, 2005), 
one goal of this policy-oriented approach is increasing public trust of experts, since "with 
community trust, tomorrow’s problems can be averted today" (p. 41). This utilitarian 
motivation for bidirectional risk communication is clearly delineated in the 
aforementioned USPHS risk communication study (Tinker, 1996), which acknowledges 
that if "government agencies do not understand and deal effectively with public 
perceptions of health risks, public alarm about the risks and hostility toward the agencies 
increase" (p. 198). As Tinker (1996) argues, in such situations "agency credibility suffers 
and the public becomes skeptical or indifferent to the information about health risks 
provided by agency experts" (p.198). 
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Many of the established best practices for risk communication, including Seven 
Cardinal Rules, fall into this second bidirectional paradigm, which is founded in large 
part upon the premise that risk is a function of technical hazard and community outrage 
(Sandman, 1993; Covello & Sandman, 2001). This framework helps explain how 
multiple risk vocabularies hinder risk-related sensemaking. Sandman (1993) 
distinguishes between hazard and outrage as two very different sensemaking strategies. 
The first privileges scientific and technical expertise, while the second relies more 
heavily upon lived experiences. This divide can be exacerbated by contradictory 
messages that lead to confusion among stakeholders about exactly whom to believe. Such 
conflicts can make it difficult to achieve entente, or "a shared sense of reality" (Sellnow 
et al., 2009, p. 10), through which disputes can be mediated. As Sandman (1993) puts it, 
"[T]he overarching problem is that the public cares too little about the hazard, and the 
experts care too little about the outrage" (p. 6).  
In such situations, it becomes necessary to seek convergence, which Sellnow, 
Ulmer, Seeger, and Littlefield (2009) define as "some degree of agreement" (p. 14). 
According to Sellnow et al. (2009), such convergence should be "the primary objective in 
risk communication" (p. 12). More than two decades ago, the National Research Council 
(1989) attempted to bridge the divide between hazard and outrage by calling for a switch 
from the dominant one-way model of risk communication to the development of dialogue 
among disparate stakeholders.  
When Sandman (1993) states that "[a]s long as the outrage goes unmanaged, the 
public is unlikely to notice that the hazard is well-managed" (p. 7), he recognizes that 
public concerns often are marginalized in the sensemaking processes of technical and 
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scientific experts. Likewise, Sandman’s call for technical and scientific experts "to listen 
better, to hear that outrage is high and take action to reduce it" (p. 9) is a plea for greater 
intersubjectivity in the process of defining, responding to, and learning from risk and 
crisis situations. 
 While the hazard/outrage paradigm can be useful for helping individuals involved 
in contentious situations understand that there are multiple perspectives regarding what 
constitutes risk, linguists and semioticians have long pointed out that such binaries are 
rooted in an immature view of cultural phenomena (Jackobson & Halle, 1986). As 
Sasseure (1983) asserts, a perspective that assumes this type of either/or stance defines a 
concept not by what it is, but by what it is not. In this case, risk perceptions that are not 
rooted in hazard must be rooted in outrage.  
 Derrida (1976) elaborates further upon the nature of linguistic binary oppositions, 
noting that the two terms are inherently linked as primary and secondary concepts.  The 
first term in the binary, depicted as dominant and normative, is privileged, while the 
second term, depicted as other-than-the-norm, is marginalized. In this case, technical 
hazard is normatized, while the more emotionally-rooted outrage is aberrant, effectively 
defining community members' responses to risk-laden situations as less valid or 
important than statistical risk assessment.  Discussing such oppositions, Ellingson (2009) 
notes that binaries ignore the universe of possible reactions that exist between the binary 
terms, explaining that "when we limit possibilities to only two, one will inevitably be 
valued over the other. It is not possible to view the world in terms of equal opposites; one 
side is always already privileged" (p. 71). Clarke (2005) goes even further, stating that 
"[f]ascism has many faces, and insisting upon binaries is one" (p. 21). 
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The binary perspective promoted within the hazard/outrage model ignores that 
multiple roles are played by individual stakeholders within risk-laden situations.  A 
technical expert might live near a contaminated site, be the spouse of a plant employee, 
and/or serve on local civic boards.  These multiple commitments problematize the 
simplistic hazard/outrage categories.  Simply drawing a figurative line and placing one 
set of people on the hazard side and another set on the outrage side without recognizing 
the subjective and mutable nature of the boundary itself -- not to mention the power 
dynamics related to who draws the boundary in the first place -- is a distinct shortcoming 
of the paradigm. However, as Ellingson (2009) points out,  "Dichotomous thinking 
remains the default mode of the academy" (p. 6).  
 Unfortunately, the language of Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication 
codifies this division, positioning agency personnel distinctly on the side of hazard and 
affected community members on the side of outrage.  Although one aside in the Rules 
makes mention of multiple "publics", for the most part the guidelines address a fairly 
homogenous group, with the caveat that "[r]egardless of how well you communicate risk 
information, some people will not be satisfied" (Covello & Allen, 1988). The power of 
the binary is clear in this instance, as there is no corollary stating that, regardless of how 
well a community member communicates her perspective about risk, some "experts" will 
not be satisfied.  Similarly, the statement that "[i]f people are sufficiently motivated, they 
are quite capable of understanding complex risk information" (Covello & Allen, 1988) 
lacks a balancing statement indicating that sufficiently-motivated scientists are quite 
capable of understanding the complex value judgments that lead to community members 
assessing risk through lenses other than statistical probability.  
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By imbuing agency personnel with a binary view of relations before contact has 
been made with specific communities, Seven Cardinal Rules and similar best practices 
guides contribute to a distinct set of preconceptions about the ability of stakeholders to 
understand and respond to hazard-related information. In addition, the Rules could be 
perceived as inadvertently establishing an adversarial us/them mindset prior to agency 
personnel entering the field. As Weick (1988) notes, an enactment perspective would 
recognize that such processes create situations in which "action tends to confirm 
preconceptions" (p. 307).    
Applying Stakeholder Theory to Risk Communication 
 
Organizational management studies offer yet another lens through which to view 
risk communication. Specifically, stakeholder theory can help practitioners understand 
both the informational and the process needs of riskbearing parties.  As the last three 
decades have seen stakeholders become an increasing focus for organizations, the 
development of corporate social responsibility models (Carroll, 1979; Wartick & 
Cochran, 1985; Clarkson, 1995), the creation of stakeholder theories (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001), and the generation of focused methods for 
identifying and classifying stakeholders (Ballejos & Montagna, 2008; Chung, Chen, & 
Reid, 2009) have moved to the center of management studies. Shared by all of these 
research areas is the importance of stakeholder satisfaction for achieving organizational 
goals.   
In practice, the maintenance of stakeholder relationships is a key issue for 
management, whether corporate or governmental.  As Preston (1995) argues, "It is the 
responsibility of managers, and the management function, to select activities and direct 
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resources to obtain benefits for stakeholders" (p. 85). However, situations requiring risk 
communication flip this paradigm on its head; rather than maximizing stakeholder 
benefit, agencies must attempt to minimize stakeholder harm. Thompson (2012) notes 
that "to mention risk is to imply that people have reason to avoid or at least to be mindful 
about the subject at hand... [therefore] they could have something to lose with regard to 
the topic under discussion" (p. 637). Such topics can raise stakeholder concerns that cut 
across public-private and corporate-nonprofit sectors, with the mediating role of 
information transfer from organization to stakeholder at the crux of the relationship. 
For an organization, successfully planning and executing information exchanges, 
whether risk-related or not, first requires determining exactly who the organization's 
stakeholders are.  Many criteria for making this decision have been offered through the 
years, primarily focusing on how stakeholders support organizational functioning.  
Preston (1995) notes that one of the earliest characterizations was put forth in the 1960s 
by the Stanford Research Institute, which identified stakeholders as "those groups 
without whose support the organization would cease to exist" (p. 72).  Preston (1995) 
further refines this designation, noting that stakeholders have "legitimate interests in 
procedural and/or substantive aspects of [organizational] activity" (p. 67).  More recent 
classification efforts have attempted to create stakeholder typologies.  For example, while 
Clarkson (1995) posits that stakeholders are "persons or groups that have, or claim, 
ownership, rights, or interests in [an organization] and its activities, past, present, or 
future" (p. 106), he distinguishes between primary stakeholders, whose role is essential to 
organizational survival, and secondary stakeholders, who are not essential to 
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organizational survival but whose actions, nevertheless, can affect, or be affected by, the 
organization. 
Whether considered primary or secondary, stakeholders share a need for access to 
accurate, timely, and relevant information, particularly in high-risk situations. Managers 
therefore must make deliberate determinations about how to fulfill information needs.  As 
Johnson (1996) notes, information is "a strategic asset to organizations that should be 
systematically incorporated in the planning of upper management" (p. 131).  In today's 
technology-driven world, it is easier than ever to make information available and widely 
accessible via the internet (Lopes, 2008; Chung, Chen, & Reed, 2009); however, in 
environmental risk situations, unidirectional dissemination only fulfills part of the 
organization's responsibilities. As the Keystone Center (2005) notes in its risk 
communication primer for the U.S. Department of Energy,  
Those responsible for ensuring safety to the public face two key challenges. The 
first is to communicate risks in a manner that acknowledges the emotional content 
and provides information to assuage concerns. The second is to engage the public 
so that they become effective partners in addressing and overcoming risks. 
Communication and engagement are key elements of effective stakeholding. (p. 
4) 
 
Such a vision of governmental-stakeholder relations aligns with Quinn and Jones 
(1995) work, which emphasizes the need for managers to be guided by "agent morality" 
in their dealings with stakeholders, situating organizational goals within a framework of 
moral principles.  Within this paradigm, managers must constrain their actions in relation 
to four ethical concerns.  According to Quinn and Jones (1995), honoring agreements, 
being truthful, avoiding harm, and respecting autonomy must supersede all other motives. 
As Basu and Palazzo (2009) note, organizations rely upon three primary approaches to 
addressing social concerns: stakeholder-driven, which examines the needs of external 
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stakeholders; performance-driven, which looks to expectancy matching for evaluating the 
effectiveness of specific actions; and motivation-driven, which evaluates the relative 
roles of intrinsic and extrinsic factors in influencing stakeholder relations.  These 
disparate approaches are key for determining the level of direct organizational 
engagement with stakeholder needs. 
While many scholars and practitioners see effective management of stakeholder 
relations as a function of social responsibility, others see more utilitarian imperatives.  
Evan and Freeman (1996) assert that "[t]he very purpose of the [organization] is…to 
serve as a vehicle for coordinating stakeholder interests" (p. 254).  According to Davis 
(1973), organizations must be perceived as responsible to be granted legitimacy.  Thus, if 
an organization is perceived as irresponsible in its management of the essential function 
of coordinating stakeholder interests, legitimacy can be directly threatened and trust 
subsequently damaged. Additionally, failure to meet expectations can lead the 
organization to lose control of its external relationships (Swanson, 1995). These twin 
issues of past responsibility and perceived legitimacy are among the most highly 
contested subjects for risk communicators. 
 The extant stakeholder literature has important implications for describing how 
organizations manage and should manage the sharing of risk-related information with 
stakeholders.  Of particular importance are the ways in which organizational identity 
orientation influences perceptions of stakeholder legitimacy, promoting or constraining 
an organization’s willingness to share information with its stakeholders.  Further, the 
ways that organizations approach corporate social responsibility directly affect their 
potential for successfully matching stakeholder information needs.  Given that meeting 
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stakeholder expectations is key for both organizational legitimacy and success, it is 
important to delineate explicitly the relationships between perceived stakeholder 
information needs and organizational willingness to meet those information needs. 
Johnson and Hoover (2013) have argued elsewhere for a coorientation approach 
to matching stakeholder information needs. Coorientation models first arose within social 
science to depict the ways in which mutual benefit affects psychological balance (Heider, 
1946). Later, the field of public relations adapted coorientation approaches to help 
understand organization-stakeholder interactions. When discussing the relationship 
between stakeholder information needs and organizational willingness to meet those 
needs, Johnson and Hoover (2013) identified four states: satisfaction, in which high 
information needs are met by a strong organizational willingness to meet those needs; 
apathy, in which low needs are balanced with a lack of enthusiasm for information 
provision; inundation, in which stakeholders do not perceive strong needs for information 
but the organization provides vast amounts; and adversarialism, in which stakeholders 
desire information greatly but the organization is unwilling to provide it. All too often, 
the history of risk communication – particularly at Superfund sites – has exemplified one 
of the latter two imbalances. 
Moving Toward a Participatory Perspective 
 
Fischhoff (1995) has described the evolution of risk communication as a shift 
from unidirectional and information-driven activities to something more akin to 
partnership development. While marking a distinct improvement for stakeholder 
relationships, it is possible that governmental risk communication efforts need to go one 
step further, embracing even more collaborative approaches. As Fischhoff (1995) states, 
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"effective risk communication can fulfill part of the social contract between those who 
create risks (as a byproduct of other activities) and those who bear them (perhaps along 
with the benefits of those activities)" (p. 144). To meet this challenge, it is increasingly 
important for risk communicators to examine the potential contributions of participatory 
approaches for the field. 
Risk communication does not happen in a vacuum. Rather, as Boholm (2009) 
points out, "Understandings of risks, like other experiential phenomena, are informed by 
socially and culturally structured and historically conditioned conceptions and 
evaluations of the world, what it is like, what it should or should not be like" (p. 340). 
Unfortunately, information-centric approaches to risk communication can miss this key 
point of social construction.  As Heath and O'Hair (2010) note, "The problem [of risk 
communication] results from the need to engage others, to bring discourse to bear on 
shared subjectivity, the probative force of analysis of the objective and real, to give 
effective voice to the concerns that arise from observed and perceived uncertainties" (p. 
23). Similarly, Sellnow and colleagues (2009) state that multiple parties involved in the 
risk discourse "can and should begin the debate by recognizing and respecting the 
opinions of those who hold a different frame of reference" (p. 10). 
 The inclusion of both complementary and competing voices in risk-related 
discussions reduces the opportunities for blind spots to develop. The addition of more 
voices from multiple backgrounds increases the capacity for dealing with a risk-laden 
situation. The myriad perspectives brought to the fore decrease the possibility of actors 
becoming trapped in a single set of expectations. Thus, participatory approaches directly 
address Weick’s (1988; 1995) identified constraints on sensemaking. 
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To adopt a participatory approach to remedying challenges for risk 
communication is to bring the stakeholders themselves explicitly to the center of 
decision-making processes.  As Heath and Nathan (1990) note, risk communication, at its 
core, is about much more than information sharing; rather, communicating about risk 
often involves "a rhetorical struggle by parties to decide what levels of risk and regulative 
or legislative control are appropriate" (p. 17). The privileging of scientific expertise that 
dominates the research translation and policy perspectives stands in stark contrast to the 
work of Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson (2005), who have criticized "magical notions of 
scientific objectivity" in environmental communication and who consequently have 
advocated for non-dualistic approaches.  
 In other words, by promoting stand-alone research translation and hazard/outrage 
approaches, governmental risk communication policies could inadvertently be deepening 
relational divides and further damaging trust rather than bringing stakeholders together to 
create mutually-acceptable solutions for complex risk-related challenges.  As Palenchar 
(2005) points out, "Well beyond any communication model that might adequately rest on 
what has often been called sharing information, the sides -- and there are many -- engage 
in a marketplace of opinion through advocacy" (p. 3). In practice, this conflict often plays 
out in public meetings where, as Boholm  (2009) points out, communication about risk 
"evolves as one long debate between conflicting social constructions of the risk objects 
and the values at stake" (p. 344). Explicitly recognizing the power dynamics at play, 
participatory approaches mandate and operationalize stakeholder roles in jointly defining, 
prioritizing, and solving situated, risk-related challenges.   
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Given the central role of communication in such processes, a valuable starting 
point for developing new models is participatory communication research, which 
"emphasizes the building of trust and rapport among all parties, along with the 
empowerment of individuals and communities, toward truly collaborative decision-
making processes [and] outcomes that resonate with community values, culture and 
perspectives about the future" (Anyaegbunam, Hoover, & Schwartz, 2010).  
Rooted in action research, participatory communication evolved largely in the 
international development realm and is built upon an iterative approach to social science 
that includes both researchers and participant-subjects (Lewin, 1946). Although 
development research in the mid-twentieth century began largely as an extractive process 
in which researchers from outside a community developed research questions and 
methods, took data away from the community, and analyzed those data elsewhere, 
Lewin's (1946) concept of mutual action and reflection began making its way into 
development practice by the mid-1970s.  The earliest attempts toward more participatory 
processes came with the advent of Rapid Rural Appraisal [RRA], which allowed the 
gathering of non-survey data from a community; however, RRA still relied upon analysis 
from outside the community (Brown et al, 2002).  Development communication 
continued to evolve through the creation of Participatory Rural Appraisal and 
Participatory Learning and Action, both of which included community members in data 
analysis but neither of which was specifically rooted in communication science.  
Participatory Rural Communication Appraisal and Community-Based Participatory 
Communication [CBPC] then emerged, moving communicative processes to the forefront 
of community-based research (Beltran, 1993; Anyaegbunam, Mefalopulos, & Moetsabi, 
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2004; Anyaegbunam, Hoover, & Schwartz, 2010; Ommani, 2011). These participatory 
approaches have much to offer the field of risk communication. 
As Palenchar (2005) notes, risk-related decisions involve "the engagement of 
concerned and interested parties," a process he describes as "primarily communicative" 
(p. 5).  Fischoff (1995) further explains that while community members may not bring 
scientific expertise to the table, they do "have some insight into where they go, how 
deeply they breathe, what they eat and drink, how long they shower, when they wash 
their hands, and so on" (p.  143). Such lived experience can be key for identifying 
exposure pathways, possible solutions, and potential roadblocks for implementation. 
Whereas risk communication efforts typically are oriented toward more 
traditional goals of informing and persuading, participatory approaches utilize 
communication as a dialogic process that can empower community members in decision 
making. As Boholm (2009) notes, an important critique of information dissemination 
models for risk communication lies in their  treatment of context as a variable in, rather 
than a constitutive element of, communication. One clear example of the context-as-
variable perspective is included in a risk communication primer written for U.S. DOE 
(Keystone Center, 2005), which states:  
When planning the best way to communicate and engage the public, it is 
important to not only identify problems by their level of complexity, but also to 
understand the different lenses through which stakeholders view problems and 
possible solutions. To expand on this distinction, a technical definition of risk 
could be written as:  
[Probability of a Hazard × Impact of the Hazard Occurring]  
[but a] definition of perceived risk has additional factors to the technical 
definition, and would look as follows:  
[Technical Risk × Nature of the Hazard × Context of the Perceiver].  
(p. 14) 
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In contrast, participatory approaches emphasize context by foregrounding 
community values that ultimately impact the prioritization of challenges and 
identification of solutions.  Thus, participatory communication not only allows but 
encourages stakeholders to give voice to their perceptions of reality and, ultimately, to act 
based on these realities (Dagron, 2001; Carey, 1989). In this way, participatory 
communication is closely aligned with Community-Based Participatory Research 
[CBPR], a methodology already recognized by both U.S. EPA and the National Institute 
of Environmental Health Sciences as an important pathway for investigating 
environmental health and environmental justice research questions (U.S. EPA, 2013). 
CBPR has been described variously as: 1) "inquiry with the participation of those 
affected by an issue for the purpose of education and for effecting change" (Green & 
Mercer, 2001), 2) "an approach that incorporates formalized structures to ensure 
community participation" (Wallerstein & Duran, 2010), and 3) a methodology that 
"equitably involves all partners with a research topic of importance to the community 
with the aim of combining knowledge and action for social change to improve 
community health and eliminate disparities" (Kellogg Foundation, 2013). As such, CBPR 
approaches have appealed in recent years specifically to agencies addressing localized, 
contextually-driven environmental concerns. 
This existing familiarity of governmental entities, and particularly U.S. EPA, with 
CBPR is important for the application of participatory approaches to risk communication 
problems. As discussed earlier, some within federal agencies continue to see risk 
communication challenges as, essentially, gaps in scientific research translation. Often, 
such perspectives stand in direct contrast to the views of individuals who would support 
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multi-stakeholder participation in risk communication efforts and decision-making. 
However, Wallerstein and Duran (2010) argue that community-based, participatory 
approaches are key for addressing gaps in current research translation models. 
Specifically, by engaging populations who are directly affected by research outcomes -- 
or, in this case, by high-risk environments or situations -- agencies can: 1) improve 
external validity and "fit" by engaging stakeholders in context-based adaptation; 2) bring 
balance to power dynamics by creating space for "hybrid knowledge" that joins scientific 
and cultural insights while also encouraging co-learning and joint decision-making; 3) 
promote sustainability through capacity building; and 4) increase trust through the 
creation and maintenance of formalized partnerships (Wallerstein & Duran, 2010). Each 
of these translational benefits has clear implications for risk communication. 
Participatory methodologies directly involve individuals who represent numerous 
stakeholder groups.  These participants join together for projects in which mutual 
teaching and co-learning can occur. Participatory projects involve community members, 
organizations, government officials, and researchers, all of whom work together to 
develop and achieve mutual goals (Anyaegbunam, Mefalopulos, & Moetsabi, 2004).  As 
Anyaegbunam , Schwartz, and Hoover (2010) have noted, "Done properly, [participatory 
communication] research benefits both community participants and government agencies 
by creating bridges that allow all parties to gain knowledge and experience" (p. 4).With 
its emphasis on the establishment or repair of trust and rapport among disparate 
stakeholders, participatory communication is ideal for helping heal the contentious 
legacies of environmental mismanagement by and inadequate or nonexistent risk 
communication from potentially responsible parties. 
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As Boholm (2009) asserts, "Today, it is often noted that [communicating about 
risk] involves a melee of actors engaging as experts and laypeople, decision makers and 
stakeholders, regulators and politicians, citizens and NGOs" (p. 336). Within this 
sometimes cacophonous setting, participatory communication approaches address the call 
of Sellnow and colleagues (2009), who believe that risk discourse should begin with 
"both sides...recognizing and respecting the opinions of those who hold a different frame 
of reference" (p. 10).  As Anyaegbunam, Hoover, and Schwartz (2010) have noted 
elsewhere, participatory approaches emphasize "the building of trust and rapport among 
all parties, along with the empowerment of individuals and communities, toward truly 
collaborative decision-making processes that achieve outcomes that resonate with 
community values, culture, and perspectives about the future" (p. 4).  
By helping communities become active decision-making partners in promoting 
culturally-appropriate, value-matched solutions to shared challenges, participatory 
approaches can help redress generations of power imbalances (Anyaegbunam, 
Mefalopulos, & Moetsabi, 1999; Wallerstein & Duran, 2006).  As Palenchar and Heath 
(2007) assert, "Community residents who live near or work at potentially hazardous 
manufacturing facilities are neither spurious nor false in their reasons and desires to be 
safe and healthy; they are and should be sensitive to the fairness and equality of risk 
distribution and the resulting environmental and aesthetic implications" (p. 121). 
Incorporating participatory communication methods into risk communication models can 
help bring balance to the field, offering an action-based alternative to what Heath and 
Nathan (1990) call "the linear, paternalistic information model of risk communication" 
(p. 17).  The resulting shift toward inclusion and multiperspectivity directly addresses 
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several communicative contexts that Boholm (2009) has identified as contributing to 
polarization, including   
the ontology of risk, that is, how the nature of risk is understood to be constituted 
in the real world; an asymmetric distribution of power, where some agents have a 
mandate to make decisions affecting others; and the practical rationality of the 
actors, deriving from their motives for communicating, their intentions and plans 
as embedded in practical life. (pp. 343-344) 
 
Heath and Nathan (1990) argue that "[r]isk communicators must treat trust as a 
multidimensional construct intimately linked with how much control an audience sees 
itself being able to exert over sources of information and assessment" (p. 19). Alongside 
trust-building, participatory endeavors provide opportunities for multiple stakeholders 
with varying commitments to work together toward creating more appropriate and 
targeted information for the broader groups that they represent. As Sellnow and Sellnow 
put it, "The dialogue that is essential to risk communication provides a foundation for 
understanding the needs, message preferences, levels of preparation, and overall response 
potential of complex or diverse audiences" (p. 124). This is particularly true in Superfund 
communities, which may have long histories of conflict among various parties. Gaetke, 
Gaetke, and Bowen (2008) advise that in such situations, "[T]he content should reflect 
the needs and interests of the affected parties at each site rather than imposing on these 
parties our views of what they need to know" (p. 280). 
The Politics of Superfund Sites 
 
While risk communication is a challenging endeavor under the best of 
circumstances, layers of complexity are added at the nation's Superfund sites. These 
hazardous waste sites fall under the oversight of the US Environmental Protection 
Agency's Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, which conducts investigations 
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and has the authority to add sites with the most pressing needs to the National Priorities 
List [NPL]. Clean-up and engagement at NPL sites are assigned to U.S. EPA personnel 
from the appropriate regional office (U.S. EPA, 2013). Among Agency personnel who 
might be asked to provide risk-related information and/or public participation activities 
for NPL site stakeholders are Remedial Project Managers and Community Involvement 
Coordinators.  
In addition to U.S. EPA, other federal and state agencies also play important roles 
at Superfund sites. For example, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 
a branch of the Centers for Disease Control, "work[s] closely with local residents in 
assessing community needs and concerns and then respond[ing] to those needs by 
providing timely and accurate information" (Tinker, 1996, 2009). Such agencies as the 
U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Department of Defense sometimes find themselves 
listed as potentially responsible parties (PRP), tasked with cleaning up sites contaminated 
through Cold War production of nuclear and other waste products (U.S. DOE, 2011). Yet 
another federal agency that sometimes has a presence at Superfund sites is the National 
Institutes of Health’s National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, which funds 
through its Superfund Research Program numerous extramural university and industry 
grants related to mitigating the health and environmental effects of contamination.   State 
environmental protection and waste management offices, as well as state public health 
agencies, also actively develop projects at Superfund sites, at times even engaging in 
legal battles with federal facilities PRPs (deSaillan, 2008).  
Specific federal environmental laws require potentially responsible parties like 
U.S. DOE to inform stakeholders about risks related to operations and waste (Palenchar, 
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2008). As a result, U.S. DOE, U.S. EPA, and ATSDR frequently see their 
communication initiatives overlapping, as U.S. DOE attempts to meet specific statutory 
public information requirements at each of its Superfund cleanup sites.  These 
requirements derive largely from the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 
1986 (SARA), which contained within it the Emergency Planning and Community Right-
to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA). EPCRA provided specific guidance for the 
establishment of community advisory boards and local emergency planning bodies to 
work with agencies on site-related issues (Palenchar, 2008; Heath & Palenchar, 2009).  
Thus, federal agencies have been statutorily compelled to begin transitioning from 
traditional communication practices based on either a unidirectional source-receiver 
model (Shannon, 1948) or a nominally bidirectional model incorporating a feedback loop 
(Weiner, 1948) toward more stakeholder-inclusive, dialogic approaches to risk 
communication.  The myriad governmental players, complicated legal framework, and, 
numerous confusing or even conflicting messages make Superfund sites a particularly 
difficult environment in which to engage in risk communication. 
The Regulatory Framework for Superfund Site Risk Communication 
 
 To begin understanding the unusual challenges of communicating about risk at 
Superfund sites, it first is necessary to untangle the knot of statutory roles and 
obligations. Both the Superfund program and the Superfund National Priorities List were 
established by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act [CERCLA] of 1980. This landmark piece of environmental legislation charged U.S. 
EPA (2009) with oversight of  
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[l]ong-term remedial response actions...that permanently and significantly reduce 
the dangers associated with releases or threats of releases of hazardous substances 
that are serious, but not immediately life threatening. (para. 2)   
 
CERCLA -- along with numerous other federal, state, and local laws -- was 
enacted partially in response to such high-profile environmental crises as Love Canal, 
Three Mile Island, and Bhopal (Belke, 2000; Palenchar & Heath, 2007). According to 
Gaetke, Gaetke, & Bowen (2008), "The legislation provided for the prohibition and 
regulation of closed and abandoned hazardous waste sites, provided legal liability for 
those who allowed releases of hazardous wastes, and created a trust fund to pay for 
cleaning up waste sites when a responsible party could not be located" (p. 279). The 
Superfund process established by CERCLA involves identification of a hazardous waste 
site, followed by cycles of U.S. EPA investigation, hazard assessments, and public 
comment. Sites that are deemed priorities after investigation are placed on the NPL (U.S. 
EPA, 2010). 
During the 1980s, additional environmental crises contribute to the growth of risk 
communication as a field; however, the statutory impetus for improved federal and 
industrial risk communication came with the enactment of the Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorization Act [SARA] of 1986. In part a response to the 1984 Union Carbide 
tragedy in Bhopal, India (Shrivastava, 187), SARA contained within it the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 [EPCRA] (Heath, Bradshaw, & 
Lee, 2002; Palenchar, 2005; Heath & O’Hair, 2010). Heath and O’Hair (2010) note that 
this legislation helped "set the foundation for the concepts of community right to know 
and risk democracy" (p. 7).   
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As Heath, Bradshaw, and Lee (2002) note, "The community right-to-know 
portion of the SARA Title III was a direct result of a public cry for control of the risks 
associated with the chemical industry" (p. 319). Among SARA’s stipulations, U.S. EPA 
received instruction to convene local emergency planning commissions and other citizens 
advisory groups that were to serve as forums for dialogue among public stakeholders, 
industry, and agencies. Unfortunately, Heath Bradshaw and Lee (2002) find that "much 
of the power granted by the Act has been abdicated by its executors" leaving evidence 
that these advisory groups "have a way to go in gaining the trust of local residents before 
becoming an effective vehicle for two-way symmetrical or democratic risk 
communication" (p. 319). As Heath and Nathan (1990) point out, SARA and EPCRA 
were intended to take initial steps toward making average citizens "full partners" in 
environmental risk management.   
SARA was not the only piece of legislation to mandate public meetings or 
advisory groups. As one risk communication primer created for U.S. DOE (Keystone 
Center, 2005) explains, "government agencies are often required to conduct public 
hearings by law, for example, under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and 
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)" (p. 31). As McComas (2003) notes, the 
public meetings promoted through these acts "manifest democratic notions of political 
equality and popular sovereignty, referring to the equal right among citizens to exert 
influence over political actions, as well as the belief that, since government derives its 
authority from citizens, it must respond to the needs of its citizenry" (p. 164).  
In practice, however, such meetings often have fallen short of the lofty 
expectations. Describing a "typical" public meeting, McComas (2003) depicts a scene in 
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which "an audience [is] seated before a panel of experts or officials in some sort of 
meeting hall, auditorium, or municipal board room [where] a brief introduction precedes 
a presentation, followed by questions or comments from the audience (although some 
public meetings do not allow audiences to ask questions)" (p. 166). Such a structure 
presents a highly asymmetrical power relationship. As a result, some researchers contend 
that public meetings do not align with the democratic principles on which they are 
premised and that they actually can damage relationships among those involved 
(Heberlein, 1976; Checkoway, 1981; Kasperson, 1986; McComas, 2003). Despite the 
inherent problematics, U.S. EPA alone has conducted thousands of public meetings since 
the implementation of SARA and EPCRA (McComas, 2003). 
Heath and Nathan (1990) assert that despite U.S. EPA’s efforts to position risk 
communication as "a subdiscipline committed to open, responsible, informed, and 
reasonable discussion of risks" the reality is that risk discussions take place "in an 
intensely political atmosphere [where] risk messages blend technical health assessments, 
personal and social consequences, and ethics" (p. 15). The subsequent evolution of 
statutory risk communication is reflected in Fischhoff’s (1995) Developmental Strategies 
of Risk Management, which depicts the development of risk communication through 
eight guiding philosophies: 
• All we have to do is get the numbers right 
• All we have to do is tell them the numbers 
• All we have to do is explain what we mean by the numbers 
• All we have to do is show them that they’ve accepted similar risks 
• All we have to do is show them that it’s a good deal for them 
• All we have to do is treat them nice 
• All we have to do is make them partners 
• All of the above 
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While the first six of these philosophies have been implemented in risk 
communication through the years, arguably the last two are still in the nascent stages of 
their development, particularly as they relate to long-term risk communication activities 
at the nation’s Superfund sites. 
The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant 
 
Located in western Kentucky, the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, or PGDP, is 
the only operating uranium enrichment facility in the United States (Kaoutzanis, 2011). 
Opened for operations in 1952, the plant initially produced fuel for the United States 
Department of Defense for use both in military reactors and in the production of nuclear 
weapons. In the 1960s, this mission expanded to include uranium enrichment for 
electricity-generating commercial reactors, eventually transitioning fully to this function 
(United States Enrichment Corporation [USEC], 2011). Owned and operated by the 
United States Department of Energy until 1992, PGDP operations currently are leased to 
the United States Enrichment Corporation, or USEC; however, U.S. DOE continues to 
manage PGDP activities related to site clean-up, infrastructure, hazardous wastes, and 
environmental restoration. The combined efforts of U.S. DOE and USEC currently 
employ approximately 1200 individuals at the site (KRCEE, 2011). 
The PGDP is located in McCracken County, Kentucky, approximately three miles 
south of the Ohio River. The plant’s footprint covers 740 acres that are bounded by a 
security fence. The fenced area is ringed by an uninhabited buffer zone of approximately 
640 acres, which in turn is surrounded by a 2100-acre wildlife management area that U.S. 
DOE leases to the Commonwealth of Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife 
46 
 
Management (U.S. EPA, 2011). Beyond the wildlife management area are residential, 
business, and agricultural properties. 
In 1988, U.S. DOE sampled private drinking wells on properties adjacent to the 
plant and discovered traces of the radioactive isotope technetium-99, as well as the 
industrial degreaser trichloroethylene.  In addition, polychlorinated biphenyls, or PCBs, 
have been found in surface water on U.S. DOE property, as well as downstream of the 
facility in Big Bayou and Little Bayou Creeks, both of which run through the surrounding 
West Kentucky Wildlife Management Area.   
With an estimated 1,400 individuals obtaining drinking water from private wells 
within four miles of the facility (U.S. EPA, 2011), U.S. DOE created a Water Policy to 
provide municipal water to affected residents at the agency’s expense (U.S. EPA, 2009). 
In 2006, the Paducah Sun newspaper (Walker, 2006) reported that "121 plant-
neighboring households and businesses…have received free municipal water from DOE 
since 1994 because of an estimated 10 billion gallons of contaminated groundwater" (p. 
1A).  
In 1993, the PGDP was proposed for inclusion on the U.S. EPA Superfund 
National Priorities List, or NPL (U.S. EPA, 2009). The PGDP was added to the list in 
1994 following a period of investigation and public comment (U.S. EPA, 2009). 
Consequently, U.S. EPA provides regulatory contamination oversight in partnership with 
such state agencies as the Kentucky Energy and Environment Cabinet’s Department for 
Environmental Protection and the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services’ 
Radiation Control Branch. The Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife also is 
involved with PGDP activities due to its lease of the wildlife management area 
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surrounding the plant. After almost two decades of clean-up activities, in 2009 U.S. DOE 
reported to Congress that it expects remaining cleanup costs at the site to be between $9.5 
and $16.4 billion (Paine, 2010). 
In compliance with federal law and community right-to-know provisions, U.S. 
DOE established a Citizens Advisory Board, or CAB, to "facilitate the flow of various 
kinds of technical information from experts to community residents and to open channels 
of commentary between them" (Heath & Palenchar, 2009, p. 316).  The PGDP CAB 
(2011) describes its mission as "provid[ing] informed recommendations on major issues 
regarding environmental restoration, waste management, and related clean-up activities 
to DOE." The CAB also asserts that "[t]he Board's membership is carefully considered to 
reflect a diversity of viewpoints in the affected community and region [and is] composed 
of people who are directly affected by DOE site clean-up activities" (PGDP CAB, 2010). 
In reality, eleven of twelve 2009 CAB members held bachelor degrees, while half held 
graduate degrees (PGDP CAB, 2009). In contrast, Kentucky’s Council on Postsecondary 
Education (2007) reports that less than one-fifth of the population of McCracken County 
has earned bachelor degrees, with almost 20% lacking even a high school diploma. This 
disparity presents a potential site of dissension for CAB relations with the community at 
large. 
Numerous events since the PGDP’s inclusion on the NPL have affected public 
perceptions of the site and, at times, have strained relationships among the many 
stakeholders. The siting and contents of waste disposal, for example, have been points of 
contention between U.S. DOE and the Kentucky Department for Environmental 
Protection, with legal action threatened variously by each party, even as plant neighbors 
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have filed suit to recoup lost property values (Short, 2002; de Saillan, 2008). As Gaetke, 
Gaetke, and Bowen note, "People, who have suffered harm to their health, their life 
expectancies, their property, and the very quality of their lives, are typically and 
understandably interested in pursuing compensation for that harm from the parties who 
are responsible" (p. 279).  
In addition, several residents directly blame PGDP-generated contamination for 
the illnesses and deaths of friends and family members; however, a community health 
assessment conducted by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry did not 
find conclusive support for these assertions, driving some in the community to question 
the study’s veracity (KRCEE, 2006; KRCEE, 2011). With newer, more efficient 
technologies emerging for uranium enrichment, the economic threat of plant closure also 
has loomed over the region for more than a decade (KRCEE, 2011). Further, confusion 
over a 2006 U.S. DOE-funded cost-benefit study to determine government expenditures 
could be reduced by federal purchase of adjacent residential properties generated 
confusion and anger in the community (KRCEE, 2006). More recently, a study of future 
stakeholder visions for the site following plant closure identified high levels of 
community distrust of U.S. DOE (KRCEE, 2011). 
Today Paducah is a community of stakeholders simultaneously trying to make 
sense of the environmental risks of continued plant operations and the economic risks of 
plant closure (KRCEE, 2011). The PGDP’s NPL status statutorily mandates the 
involvement of multiple federal- and state-level government agencies at the site, and both 
health and environmental advocacy citizen groups have been active in site-related 
matters. Stakeholders, therefore, have been the targets of numerous risk communication 
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activities from multiple sources for nearly a quarter of a century, making Paducah a 
strong case study for understanding the long-term dynamics of federal risk 
communication policies at Superfund sites. 
Posing the Problem 
 
This study seeks to understand the impact of past and current U.S. DOE risk 
communication practices on stakeholder relationships at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion 
Plant National Priorities List Superfund site. Specifically, the study seeks to understand 
the constraints that agency risk communication policies place upon enactment, including 
the role that specific communicative practices could be playing in provoking or 
sustaining adversarial relationships. Thus, I analyze written and spoken communication 
from several quarters to address the following research questions:  
RQ1: How does the enactment of accepted agency risk communication practices 
affect relationships among stakeholders, specifically: 
• how do stakeholders (including federal agency personnel) characterize 
past and present agency risk communication practices, and 
• how do stakeholders (including federal agency personnel) characterize 
each other in relation to these communicative practices? 
RQ2: What are the related implications for improving agency risk communication 
approaches? 
Exploring these questions will improve our understanding of whether and how the 
risk communication framework currently utilized by federal agencies working at 
Superfund sites could be creating new or reifying existing divisions between government 
entities and the community.  After identifying the nature of the existing framework's 
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impact on relationships, I propose stakeholder-centered amendments to The Seven 
Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication, presenting a new model for federal agency 
interactions with riskbearing Superfund communities. 
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Chapter Three: Methods 
Epistemological Paradigm 
 
Because this study seeks to reveal existing phenomena to improve communication 
practice, it responds to calls for social science research that focuses on understanding 
rather than prediction (Blumer, 1966). Specifically, this study uses intentional analysis, 
which "focuses on a concrete experience itself and describes how that particular 
experience has been constructed" (Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 204). How have agency 
personnel's and stakeholders' communicative structures "been synthesized to constitute" 
specific meanings (p. 205), and what can we learn from that process that will help us 
improve our in- and inter-group communicative abilities?  
The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant case, like so many in the environmental 
risk/environmental health arena, does not present itself as an object of clear-cut risk, 
health, media, interpersonal, or participatory boundaries. Rather, the community and its 
challenges are lodged within a complex, interdisciplinary context that encompasses 
communication, sociology, psychology, and high levels of scientific and policy-related 
uncertainty. Therefore, this study is informed by theoretical perspectives that can 
improve our understanding of complicated communicative phenomena without 
constraining the pursuit of heuristically provocative theoretical avenues. For these 
reasons, the study is built upon the complementary metatheoretical perspectives of 
sensemaking and symbolic interactionism. 
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Sensemaking in Risk Environments 
 
Sensemaking is the process through which human beings interpret and derive 
meaning from their lived experiences. Highly contextual in nature, sensemaking is tied 
directly to role structures and social interaction. It exists in the sphere of perpetual 
enactment and is rooted in the impacts that past experiences have on the 
conceptualization of the possible. 
According to Blumer (1966), sensemaking is an interactive, situated process 
based on three primary tenets: 1) humans ascribe meaning to things and act on the basis 
of these ascribed meanings; 2) these meanings emerge from social interactions among 
individuals; and 3) individuals utilize an "interpretive process" to manage and modify 
meanings (Blumer, 1969). Not only do individuals "take the cue for their identity from 
the conduct of others" (Weick, 1995, p. 23), they also "create and maintain 
intersubjectively binding normative structures that sustain and enrich their relationships" 
(Weick, 2001, p. 106). Within these jointly-created and maintained structures, people 
determine what constitutes risk, how to respond to crises, and what can be learned from 
past experience. Such meaning-negotiation processes constitute the business of life. 
In the course of human interaction, each individual assumes and enacts specific 
roles. These roles are defined and interpreted by others, then reflected back at the actor in 
an iterative process. The complexity of the process increases with the complexity of 
situational factors. According to Blumer (1966), 
In the flow of group life there are innumerable points at which the participants are 
redefining each other's acts. Such redefinition is very common in adversary 
relations, it is frequent in group discussion, and it is essentially intrinsic to dealing 
with problems. (p. 538)  
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Indeed, Nicholas and Hardy (2006) have found that communication is key for such issues 
as role assignment and group membership status, both of which are highly salient in the 
frequently conflict-riddled interactions of agency representatives and community 
stakeholders. 
As Blumer (1966) describes, role definition involves "conveying indications to 
another person as to how he [sic] is to act," while interpretation is the process of 
"ascertaining the meaning of the actions or remarks of the other person" (p. 537). 
Meaning is developed not only through independent assessment of how one is or should 
act, but also through reflection about how others perceive one is or should act. In his 
analysis of sensemaking in crisis situations, Weick (1995) asserts that "sensemaking 
begins with a self-conscious sensemaker" (p. 22) who regularly plays out prescribed roles 
that help maintain structure.  
When situations threaten roles, structure can disintegrate, leading to what Weick 
(2001) calls a "cosmological episode" in which "people suddenly and deeply feel that the 
universe is no longer a rational, orderly system" (p. 105). Bryant and Miron (2004) argue 
that the complex negotiations of sensemaking "create…temporary relations that are in 
constant flux despite the relative stability of the basic institutional framework that 
governs social relations" (p. 679). Deterioration of relations can decrease the stability of 
role frameworks, which can lead to loss of meaning, which can lead to further 
deterioration of role frameworks and on and on.  
These processes all occur through constant, day-to-day social interaction. As 
Blumer (1966) writes, 
human group life takes on the character of an ongoing process - a continuing 
matter of fitting developing lines of conduct to one another…through the dual 
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process of definition and interpretation… The participants in [human interaction] 
have to build up their respective lines of conduct by constant interpretation of 
each other's ongoing lines of action. (p. 538)  
 
This process of interpretation contributes to the fluidity of meaning, which is then 
supported or challenged through subsequent human action.  
According to Weick (1995), people shape their environment, which then 
constrains the very people who created that environment. This concept is known as 
enactment, and it relies upon a two-step process. In the first step, preconceptions drive an 
actor to devote selective attention to specific experiences, while the second step sees the 
actor interpreting these experiences through the lens of the preconceptions that initially 
drove her or his attention to that experience, thus reinforcing those existing beliefs 
(Powers, 1972; Weick, 1988). This cycle creates an iterative enactment structure in 
which, as Weick (1988) puts it, "action tends to confirm preconceptions" (p. 307). 
Three mediating factors for enactment are capacity, commitment, and 
expectations. Capacity constrains sensemaking through the number and diversity of 
potential actors. According to Weick (1988), "[P]eople see those events they feel they 
have the capacity to do something about" (p. 311). Individuals with a limited range of 
experiences upon which to draw, therefore, can recognize and respond to only a limited 
number of challenges. Thus, homogeneous groups that share the same set of experiences 
necessarily have a smaller range of responses in their sensemaking repertoire. As Weick 
states, "Accuracy in perception comes from an expanded response capacity" (p. 311). It 
follows, then, that the involvement of more individuals with varied expertise broadens the 
range of possibilities for sensemaking.  
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Commitment, the second mediating factor, constrains enactment through the 
formation of "blind spots" in the "tenacious justification" of particular positions. Weick 
(1988) explains that "tenacious justification can produce selective attention, confident 
action, and self-confirmation" (p. 310). Thus, the desire to see one’s self – and to be seen 
by others – as correct determines how an individual experiences, interprets, and 
rationalizes a given situation or set of circumstances. As Weick states, "Once a person 
becomes committed to an action, and then builds an explanation that justifies that action, 
the explanation tends to persist and become transformed into an assumption that is taken 
for granted" (p. 310). 
Finally, expectations constrain capacity through the creation of assumptions that 
become "self-fulfilling prophecies" (Weick, 1988). As Weick (1988) explains, "People 
who act in an organization often produce structures, constraints, and opportunities that 
were not there before they took action" (p. 306). Assumptions drive interpretations, 
which drive actions, which drive assumptions. For Weick (1988), "the crucial 
assumptions focus on themes of competence, importance, and value" (p. 313). Clearly, 
these themes are central to risk communication outcomes. 
In addition to the three primary constraints on enactment, past experiences can 
either enhance or hinder the perception of what is possible. When situations are familiar, 
individuals have a repertoire of coping tools available to them; however, when situations 
are entirely new or novel, responses become more problematic. Because it is "the feeling 
of order, clarity, and rationality" that sensemaking seeks (Weick, 1995, 29), the process is 
inherently backward-looking. As Weick (2001) puts it, "The basic idea of sensemaking is 
that reality is an ongoing accomplishment that emerges from efforts to create order and 
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make retrospective sense of what occurs" (p. 106). Thus, meaning negotiations in the 
present can be impacted greatly by the processes and outcomes of meaning negotiations 
that took place in the past. 
Symbolic Interactionism 
 
Griffin (1991) notes that symbolic interactionism [SI] is more of a metatheoretical 
perspective than a formal theory. SI relies upon sensemaking's interpretive approach to 
understanding phenomena, taking as its basic unit of analysis the meaning-making 
process between two or more individuals or meaning-making communities. Rather than 
focusing upon a specific cognitive state or message content, SI focuses on these 
constitutive interactions that (re)create meaning (Blumer, 1966). As Ellingson (2009) 
puts it, "[M]eaning resides not in people or in data, but between them" (p. 56). 
Since symbolic interactionism posits that meaning is constructed through all 
human interaction, the metatheory provides a framework for both micro and macro level 
research. Thus, boundaries are not prescribed but can be drawn and re-drawn to 
accommodate specific studies. Given that the system state of environmental cleanup is 
marked by high levels of scientific, political, and personal uncertainty, this fluidity of 
boundaries is an important asset for examining the PGDP case.  
Rather than generating hypotheses, symbolic interactionism lends itself to the 
formulation of research questions. Essentially, an SI lens assumes that individuals 
communicating about environmental and economic risk jointly construct the very reality 
of that risk within their community. This study reveals the ways in which current federal 
agency risk communication practices inform that process, with a specific focus on how 
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different stakeholders perceive both each other and government communication 
processes.  
Butler-Kisber (2010) directly links symbolic interactionism to methodological 
choices, noting that "the nature of interaction, the importance of context and the need to 
understand interaction as a process rather than a product [has] forced researchers to turn 
to qualitative approaches to…get rich and deep understandings of the particular" (p. 4). 
As Blumer (1966) states, "Symbolic interactionism covers the full range of the generic 
forms of human association...embrac[ing] equally well such relationships as cooperation, 
conflict, domination, exploitation, consensus, disagreement, closely knit identification, 
and indifferent concern for one another" (p. 67). All of these communicative situations 
are evident in the Paducah case and can, I believe, be explicated clearly through a 
symbolic interactionist position embedded within a qualitative research approach. 
Research Design 
 
To generate as rich a description as possible of the impacts of federal risk 
communication practices within the Paducah community, I conducted textual analyses of 
four extant datasets: 85 articles published in the local Paducah Sun newspaper during 
calendar year 2005; public comments captured by the Kentucky Research Consortium for 
Energy and the Environment [KRCEE] during a 2007 Property Acquisition Study that 
analyzed potential purchase of private land in the Water Policy District; focus group 
transcripts from the KRCEE’s 2008-2011 PGDP Stakeholder Future Vision Study, which 
worked with local constituencies to help identify publicly acceptable uses for the site 
following the plant’s permanent closure; and a total of nine blogs written by a local 
stakeholder and environmental activist during the KRCEE Future Vision Study. As 
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Fursich notes (2009), textual analysis is "a type of qualitative analysis that...focuses on 
the underlying ideological and cultural assumptions of the text...to discern latent 
meaning...and implicit patterns, assumptions, and omissions..." (p. 240). The use of 
textual analysis involves a three-step process: 1) identification of elements, 2) 
construction of provisional categories, and 3) meaning deconstruction through the 
identification of cultural biases at play (Stern, 1996). By conducting textual analysis of 
each dataset, I first broke the texts into their constituent pieces, identified and categorized 
emergent themes related to these pieces, and subsequently evaluated the ways in which 
these elements inform the broader discourse. Specifically, data were analyzed using 
constant comparative analysis (Strauss, 1987) and narrative inquiry (Butler-Kisber, 
2010). These complementary analyses were synthesized using an approach known as 
crystallization (Ellingson, 2009). Extensive descriptions of these analytic techniques 
follow. 
Constant Comparative Analysis 
 
To conduct the data analysis itself, I implemented constant comparative methods 
(Strauss, 1987). Butler-Kisber (2010) describes constant comparative analysis as "a 
thematic form of qualitative work that uses categorizing, or the comparing and 
contrasting of units and categories of field texts, to produce conceptual understandings of 
experiences and/or phenomena that are ultimately constructed into large themes" (p. 47). 
Constant comparative analysis is iterative, involving cycles of data coding, the inductive 
creation and revision of categories, the repeated comparison of data to extant literature to 
initial conclusions and back to the data, the collection and categorization of additional 
data as needed, and the restructuring of categories and conclusions as warranted (Strauss 
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& Corbin, 1990; Charmaz, 2000; Ellingson, 2009). Ellingson (2009) describes constant 
comparative analysis as an approach "using theory to explain and contextualize findings 
rather than using findings to test the theory" (p. 55); however, she also notes that 
"[p]atterns help us to digest information, and as long as we do not labor under the illusion 
that a set of patterns constitutes a singular, valid reality, we benefit from systematic 
overview of phenomena" (p. 59). Such an approach is particularly suited to this study, 
given the need to compare findings and conclusions both within and across datasets to 
recognize the broader communicative phenomena influencing -- and being influenced by 
– the risk communication situation. As Clarke (2005) notes, when informed by a 
symbolic interactionist metatheoretical lens, this type of methodological approach 
increases "the capacity for critical analysis...through open coding such that actions, 
situated perspectives, symbolism(s), and the heterogeneity of discursive positions and 
their relations can be discerned and creatively grasped" (p. 8). 
Ellingson (2009) delineates key assets of constant comparative methods when she 
notes that "[s]ystematic inductive analysis…lends itself to traditional research report 
forms that facilitate documentation of patterns through literature reviews, explanation of 
method, careful explication of themes or categories buttressed with data examples, and a 
discussion of theoretical and practical implications of analyses" (p. 57). Because of the 
systematic nature of the analytic approach, Ellingson (2009) cites constant comparative 
methods as "a way to introduce qualitative research in disciplines characterized by 
statistical research" (p. 59). This connection is particularly important to make in risk 
communication, which involves numerous participants from such fields as engineering 
and toxicology. As Ellingson (2009) notes, the potential for convergence between these 
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contrasting scientific perspectives exists in part because the use of constant comparative 
analysis "enables researchers to articulate concrete arguments, to make claims and 
support them with data and with connections to relevant research literature" (p. 60). 
Although constant comparative analysis is, perhaps, one of the more accessible 
qualitative methods for quantitative scientists, Clarke (2005) argues that conducting such 
analyses within a symbolic interactionist framework is inherently a deconstructive act, 
since "[o]pen coding connotes just that -- data are open to multiple simultaneous 
readings/codes [and] there is no one right reading"; instead, he notes, "[a]ll readings are 
temporary, partial, provisional, and perspectival -- themselves situated historically and 
geographically" (p. 8). As Ellingson puts it, "[M]eanings of words are not fixed or 
predetermined, nor can they be assumed to be equivalent among people" (p. 32). 
Constant comparative analysis therefore implicitly recognizes the situatedness and 
partiality of the researcher. Rather than seeking to identify a single truth that exists on its 
own, this type of analysis attempts to produce what Clarke (2005) calls "distinctive 
analytic understandings, interpretations, and representations of particular social 
phenomenon" (pp. 8-9). This perspective can be reinforced by "acknowledging the 
embodiment and situatedness of knowledge producers" (p. 20), thus embracing the 
process’s inherent postmodern leanings. As Ellingson (2009) points out, such "social 
constructionist and postmodern frameworks go a long way toward opening up [such 
analyses] to be combined with other forms of analysis and representation, because they 
highlight the partiality and culturally specific nature of all knowledge" (p. 56). 
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Narrative Inquiry 
 
In addition to the more common social scientific methodological approach 
provided by constant comparative analysis, I also employed the arts-informed method of 
narrative inquiry. Chase (2005) describes narrative inquiry as "an amalgam of 
interdisciplinary analytic lenses, diverse disciplinary approaches, and both traditional and 
innovative methods [that revolve] around an interest in biographical particulars as 
narrated by the ones who live them" (p. 651). According to Butler-Kisber (2010), 
narrative inquiry "is ongoing, iterative, and fluid in an inward and outward motion from 
the first day in the field...transcribing field notes and interviews into field texts to 
construct a ‘chronicled account’ of what is taking place." (p. 69). A narrative approach 
thus allows researchers to analyze how accounts are constructed (Riessman & Speedy, 
2007).   
Having spent more than four years working on matters related to the Paducah 
Gaseous Diffusion Plant, I have generated a wide array of personal notes, field notes, 
analytic memos, and written and recorded reflections regarding my site-related thoughts 
and experiences. The extensive materials and datasets I have collected throughout this 
study provide the data for the study's narrative segments, informing both the form and 
content of the analyses. As Butler-Kisber (2010) describes it, "[Narrative inquiry] has 
become a hallmark of qualitative inquiry and a basis for how researchers shape their 
studies, carry out the work, and represent it" (p. 79). Ellingson captures the process by 
stating that "[n]arratives enable qualitative researchers to show rather than tell, and such 
narratives enhance a number of different formats" (p. 65). Put slightly differently, 
narratives provide a space for feeling in addition to thinking (Frank, 1995). 
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According to Butler-Kisber (2010), "Narrative inquirers who live the story with 
their participants are interested in improving individual and social conditions" (p. 66). 
My desire to improve risk communication practice in Superfund communities contributed 
directly to my selection of narrative inquiry for this study. A specific episode of 
miscommunication that occurred while I was in the field particularly lends itself to 
narrative analysis and, as such, provided a complementary lens through which to view 
communicative phenomena at the site. Because the incident occurred during a focus 
group and subsequently was the topic of numerous blogs by one of the focus group 
participants, this incident spans two of the four datasets and is integral to my construction 
of the Paducah case.  
Palenchar and Heath (2007) note that "[p]eople think and act in terms of 
narratives, providing form and content to connect and give meaning to events" (p. 126). 
Contrasting blogs and field notes provide important data for understanding how 
individuals differentially construct the same event. These varying constructions provide 
important clues for how enactment is constrained for different individuals who might be 
present at the same place and time but who interpret a situation very differently. 
Because I was a participant in the events, my narrative analysis necessarily 
contains an element of autoethnography through which I provide context and, as Ellis and 
Bochner (2000) put it, "make [my] own experience a topic of investigation in its own 
right" (p. 733). As Palenchar and Heath (2007) argue, "In the marketplace of ideas there 
are many different stories interpreting any one event [and] the acceptance of one 
narrative or interpretation leads to the elimination or muting of the alternatives" (p. 126). 
Using my own extensive field notes as a reference, I compare and contrast the narrative 
63 
 
that I constructed with the blog narrative, examining how each consequently mutes the 
other’s perspective. As Ellingson (2009) recognizes, "the lines between narrative 
ethnography and autoethnography shift continually" with a focus on "social roles and 
interactions that imply relationships between the author and others" (p. 12). By exercising 
this form of narrative inquiry in this study, I acknowledge both the constructedness of my 
analyses and the situatedness of my interpretation of events.  
Crystallization 
 
The implementation of these different but complementary analytic approaches 
contributes to a mixed-methods strategy based in Ellingson's (2009) assertion that 
researchers need to "maximize the benefits of contrasting approaches...while also being 
self-referential to their partiality" (p. 10). To bring together the constant comparative and 
narrative analytic tools, I employed a methodological framework known as crystallization 
(Ellingson, 2009), which  
combines multiple forms of analysis and multiple genres of representation into a 
coherent text...building a rich and openly partial account of a phenomenon that 
problematizes its own construction, highlights researchers' vulnerabilities and 
positionality, makes claims about socially constructed meanings, and reveals the 
indeterminacy of knowledge claims even as it makes them. (p. 4) 
 
Thus, crystallization is closely related to situational analysis, which Clarke (2005) 
describes as utilizing  
alternative approaches to both data gathering and analysis/interpretation 
[promoting] the analysis of extant narrative, visual, and historical discourse 
materials. [to enhance] capacities to do incisive studies of differences of 
perspective, of highly complex situations of action and positionality, of the 
heterogeneous discourses in which we are all constantly awash, and of the 
situated knowledges of life itself thereby produced. (p. xxii-xxiii) 
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Crystallization relies primarily on a middle-ground approach outlined in 
Ellingson’s (2009) qualitative continuum, with goals of "troubl[ing] the taken-for-
granted" and "generat[ing] pragmatic implications for practitioners" (p. 8). This middle-
ground approach generates questions related to how participants understand and co-
construct their world; implements a case study method that includes interviews, focus 
groups, and thematic analysis; acknowledges that the investigator’s positionality actively 
informs the findings; and grounds studies in social constructionist and postpositivist 
vocabularies. However, this middle-ground approach is greatly informed by such 
impressionistic questions as what other ways can be imagined and what is unique about 
an individual’s experience, as well as by applying autoethnographic methods, 
incorporating personal reflections into the text, and situating the researcher’s experience 
as an equally valid focus as that of other participants (pp 8-9). 
Richardson (2000) describes crystallization as providing "a deepened, complex, 
thoroughly partial understanding of the topic" and goes on to state that we "know more 
and doubt what we know [but] we know there is always more to know" (p. 934). Such a 
perspective aligns well with Clarke’s (2005) argument for research methods "to be recast 
in ways that allow the explicit acknowledgement and incorporation of the complexities of 
situatedness, variation, and difference(s) rather than promoting their erasure through 
various assimilations or hopes for transcendence through shared education or shared 
beliefs" (p. xxx). As Ellingson (2009) notes, "Crystallization does not depart radically 
from other recent developments in the wide field of qualitative methodology, but rather 
offers one valuable way of thinking through the links between grounded theory (and 
other systematic analyses) and creative genres of representations" (p. 5). 
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Whereas the more traditional social scientific methodological approach of 
triangulation rests upon the premise that an independent truth exists that can be revealed 
and corroborated by employing multiple research methods, crystallization recognizes 
truth as contingent and situated, describing phenomena through the metaphor of a many-
faceted crystal that can never be viewed simultaneously from all angles. As Ellingson 
(2009) puts it, "Unlike triangulation, crystallization is informed by postmodernism, 
meaning that it presupposes that no truth exists 'out there' to discover or get close to, but 
only multiple and partial truths that researchers (and others) co-construct" (p. 22). 
Crystallization, therefore, permits researchers to use multiple methods to reveal multiple 
truths that help elucidate complex phenomena with the realization that all possible truths 
will not be captured by a single situated researcher, thus meeting Clarke’s (2005) call for 
"methods…that go beyond 'the knowing subject' as centered knower and decision maker 
to also address and analyze salient discourses within the situation of inquiry" (xxix-xxx).  
Ellingson (2009) delineates the principles for conducting crystallization, which 
include: 
• Offer deep, thickly described, complexly rendered interpretations 
• Represent ways of producing knowledge across multiple points of the 
qualitative continuum 
• Utilize more than one genre of writing and/or other medium 
• Eschew positivist claims to objectivity…embracing knowledge as situated, 
partial, constructed, multiple, embodied, and enmeshed in power relations (pp. 
10-11) 
 
This crystallized approach, coupled with a theoretical grounding in sensemaking 
and symbolic interactionism, allows me to use both emic and etic analyses (Lindlof & 
Taylor, 2002). As facilitator of the focus groups that comprise one of the four datasets 
and as the sometimes-subject of blogs that comprise a second dataset, I bring to this study 
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the emic perspective of a participant-observer. I am able to explore this perspective 
through narrative vignettes woven around excerpts from field notes and blogs, allowing 
me to present my lived experience as an outside communicator in a risk-laden 
community, using narrative inquiry to better understand both my own experience and 
how a community member perceived my role as Other within his community. As a 
researcher, I also bring five years of engagement with Paducah stakeholder groups, a 
theoretically-informed analytic lens, and training in the conduct of qualitative data 
analysis to this project. These abilities contribute to more traditional grounded analyses 
of study data, which work in tandem with the narratives to provide a rich, multi-faceted 
picture of communication-related phenomena at the site. 
 Ellingson (2009) asserts that "[c]rystallization provides one mode 
for…reveal[ing] knowledge as fragmentary, contingent, and irreducibly complex" ( p. 
30). By contrasting the voice of social science researcher that dominates constant 
comparative data analysis with narrative vignettes that reinforce my own positionality, I 
remind both the reader and myself that my perspective, although informed by 
communication study and practice, is still but one view among many. 
Data Collection 
Selection and Sampling 
 
This study incorporates four extant datasets: 1) Paducah Sun newspaper coverage 
of topics related to the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant published during Calendar Year 
2005; 2) written and verbal public comments from a 2006 U.S. DOE-funded economic 
study of property surrounding the plant; 3) transcripts from focus groups related to the 
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U.S. DOE-funded PGDP Stakeholder Future Vision study; and 4) subsequent blog entries 
by a local activist regarding the Stakeholder Future Vision study.  
Each of these datasets was collected during a three-year U.S. Department of 
Energy-funded project designed to assist the greater Paducah community in determining 
acceptable and unacceptable future uses for the PGDP environs following the plant’s 
eventual closure and decommissioning. Upon learning in early 2008 that I would be 
involved as a co-investigator in the Future Vision study, I began gathering background 
materials to improve my own understanding of community perspectives about the site. I 
subsequently conducted two degree-related studies: 1) a media content analysis of 
previous local newspaper coverage and 2) an evaluation of the sensemaking processes 
evident in public comments made during a previously-conducted U.S. DOE-funded 
study. In addition to these two datasets, this study incorporates as a third dataset focus 
transcripts gathered during the Stakeholder Future Vision Study itself. Finally, the fourth 
dataset consists of blogs written about the Stakeholder Future Vision Study by a local 
stakeholder and environmental activist. Taken in combination, these datasets present a 
multiplicity of perspectives about the PGDP, spanning a period of six years.  Specific 
data collection practices and their rationale for incorporation follow.  
Paducah Sun Newspaper Coverage, 2005 
 
The news media plays a complex part in the social construction of individual and 
community risk perceptions related to environmental health concerns. Although media 
outlets play an explicit role as providers of risk information (McCallum, Hammond, & 
Covello, 1991), coverage tends to privilege human interest above detailed analyses of 
public health issues (Spencer & Triche, 1994; Ader, 1995). Whether dramatizing stories 
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for maximum emotional impact (Kasperson et al., 2000), providing forums in which the 
credibility of technical hazard experts is questioned (Mazur, 1981), or relying upon 
inaccurate sources (Beckett, 1995), media can amplify risk perceptions within a 
community. Journalists' tendency to frame messages on the bases of their own personal 
beliefs and commitments further problematizes the media's role in risk construction 
(Wakefield & Elliott, 2003). Thus, specific media outlets -- and even specific journalists -
- can play a complex but pivotal part in the ways in which communities think about 
specific environmental and health risks. 
Exposure to local media coverage of relevant issues influences both social 
interactions and resulting community sensemaking processes. As Blumer (1966) 
describes, role definition involves "conveying indications to another person as to how he 
is to act," while interpretation is the act of "ascertaining the meaning of the actions or 
remarks of the other person" (p. 537).  Meaning is developed not only through 
independent assessment of how one is or should act, but also through reflection about 
how others perceive one is or should act. The media thus can be quite influential by 
presenting specific viewpoints of how individuals should react to PGDP issues. 
In terms of sensemaking, media coverage can greatly affect individual definitions, 
role assignments, and interpretations. To describe this phenomenon, Semmler (2007) has 
created a theory of parasocial symbolic interactionism, which examines the ways in 
which symbolic interactionist processes and media cultivation inform each other. 
According to this theory, individuals extend their own consciousness into the 
consciousness of others as presented through media, thus impacting beliefs about norms. 
As Semmler (2007) puts it, "The parasocial symbolic explanation of cultivation proposes 
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that [media extend consumers'] common sense, understood as one’s taken for granted 
assumptions about what is right and what is wrong" (pp. 3-4). Weick (2001) states that 
"[t]he basic idea of sensemaking is that reality is an ongoing accomplishment that 
emerges from efforts to create order and make retrospective sense of what occurs" (p. 
106). Thus, meaning negotiations in the present can be impacted greatly by the processes 
and outcomes of meaning negotiations that took place in the past, including those that 
were presented by the media.  
This study analyzes the local newspaper’s contributions to community 
sensemaking about the PGDP. Because local newspapers must selectively determine 
what topics to cover and how to cover them (Wakefield & Elliott, 2003), specific stories 
contribute to the larger community-constructed narrative about the PGDP. As Bakhtin 
(1981) puts it, communities are engaged in a "living discourse" (p. 259), which is 
heterogeneous, dynamic, and cumulative. In this study, I analyze articles from the 
Paducah Sun, the local newspaper of record with a circulation of approximately 25,000, 
to determine how PGDP communication efforts are presented by the media, as well as 
how stakeholders publicly characterize those communication efforts and each other.  
I selected calendar year 2005 as a rich period for analysis due to the occurrence of 
several "newsworthy" events that year, many of which required agency-driven public 
information exchanges. These events included: 1) the transfer of sick worker health 
benefits administration from U.S. DOE to the US Department of Labor, 2) the public 
release of a federal report on employee radiation exposure at the plant; 3) negotiation of 
new environmental cleanup subcontracts; and 4) Department of Homeland Security drills 
at the plant. In searching for 2005 Paducah Sun coverage of the PGDP, I carefully 
70 
 
examined 364 editions. [The December 13th issue was unavailable through the 
University of Kentucky Library archives and therefore was not included in the study.] 
Eighty-five articles related to the PGDP were identified and analyzed. 
Property Study Public Comments 
 
In 2006, U.S. DOE distributed to the PGDP Citizens Advisory Board, community 
stakeholders, and federal and state regulatory agencies a proposed "statement of work" 
describing a potential property acquisition study for the PGDP. According to the 
statement (U.S. DOE, 2006), the study would "evaluate a range of remedial alternatives, 
their impact on protection of public health and the environment, and their cost of 
implementation relative to the purchase of properties impacted or potentially impacted by 
contamination from the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant" (p. 1). The statement of work 
further indicated that the study would be conducted in compliance with a dictate from the 
Energy and Water Development Appropriation Bill, 2006, mandating that U.S. DOE 
evaluate whether the potential purchase of property or easements of land near the plant 
would be in taxpayers’ best interest. The dissemination of the statement of work was 
followed by media coverage (Walker, 2006a; Carroll, 2006; Walker, 2006b), multiple 
U.S. DOE project presentations to both the PGDP Citizens Advisory Board and the 
general public, and the solicitation of public comments for the record (U.S. DOE, 2007). 
Ultimately, the property study itself was carried out through the auspices of the Kentucky 
Research Consortium for Energy and the Environment at the University of Kentucky.  
This study employs etic analysis (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002) of the public 
documents generated during the eighteen months of this property acquisition study. The 
dataset, much of which was included in the final property report appendices, includes the 
71 
 
content of study-related mailings and presentations made by U.S. DOE, media coverage 
of the study process, public comments drawn from meeting transcripts, and letters, 
emails, and other communications exchanged by stakeholders. These data provide 
multiple perspectives about the relationships between the agency and its stakeholders, as 
well as perspectives about federal communication efforts related to the site. 
Focus Groups 
 
Following the conclusion of the property study, the Kentucky Research 
Consortium for Energy and the Environment was again tasked with supporting a U.S. 
DOE effort that required broad-based engagement activities. The Stakeholder Future 
Vision Study, as it came to be known, attempted to identify community values and 
preferences related to the final disposition of the PGDP site following the plant's 
anticipated closure [KRCEE, 2011]. To achieve this goal, the KRCEE project team 
developed a unique methodology that integrated qualitative approaches derived from 
Community-Based Participatory Communication with quantitative approaches from the 
field of Structured Public Involvement. What ultimately emerged was a four-step process 
that involved: 1) iterative stakeholder interviews; 2) stakeholder-specific focus groups; 3) 
interactive public information sessions; and 4) large-scale community meetings (KRCEE, 
2011).  
In this study, I analyze transcripts from Stage Two, the stakeholder-specific focus 
groups. Butler-Kisber (2010) points out that "in dialogic exchanges, having verbatim text 
is invaluable" (p. 30). This study incorporates such verbatim text from each of eight focus 
group sessions that brought together individuals with similar commitments and 
perspectives to discuss PGDP-related issues. The eight focus groups were: PGDP/USEC 
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Employees; U.S. DOE Employees/Subcontractors; Water Policy District Residents; 
Ballard County Citizens; Environmental and Health Advocates; Economic 
Development/Local Government; Wildlife/Recreation Enthusiasts/Tourism; and 
Healthcare Professionals/Educators.  
The IRB-approved focus group protocol [#10-0086-P4S] (see Appendix A) 
attempted to elicit community values, perceptions about the plant's future, and 
information gaps related to the site’s future disposition. During the course of these 
discussions, conversations often turned to stakeholder perceptions of other stakeholder 
groups, as well as to their evaluations of U.S. DOE's past risk communication efforts and 
overall trustworthiness. Given the diversity of stakeholder groups involved, these 
transcripts provide an incredibly rich dataset for analysis. 
Blogs 
 
During the Stakeholder Future Vision focus group session with environmental and 
health activists, the protocol went awry, with one participant strongly objecting to a 
particular visual discussion trigger. This trigger was one of twelve computer-generated 
images depicting hypothetical future scenarios for the site. In this instance, the 
visualization portrayed a nuclear power plant on the current PGDP site. Attempts to 
clarify the image's role as a discussion trigger rather than a proposal were unsuccessful. 
Over the course of the two-and-a-half hour session, relations between the participant, the 
research team, and other stakeholders taking part in the meeting became increasingly 
strained, eventually devolving to the point that police were nearly called to the scene. 
Following that session, there was a great deal of communication traffic between the 
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participant and the University of Kentucky's legal department regarding demands for the 
release of both research materials and the names of other research participants. 
The dissatisfied participant regularly writes a blog about local and national 
political and environmental issues. He has used this blog as a forum to write extensively 
about his perception of the events that transpired that evening. A total of nine blogs to 
date have addressed the specific focus group session and/or the project for which the 
focus group was created. These blogs provide a wealth of information regarding how the 
participant made sense of the research team, the project, and the focus group itself 
through the lens of his past interactions with U.S. DOE and its contractors. This dataset 
provides an additional perspective on the broader communicative issues related to the 
PGDP. 
Data Analysis 
 
The analyses of media coverage, transcripts, and blogs began with an iterative 
coding process using QSR NVivo 8 qualitative data analysis software. During early 
analytic stages, I engaged in individual provisional coding (Saldana, 2009) of each 
dataset, identifying first broad topic categories. During secondary coding, I identified 
occurrences of sensemaking constructs. In third cycle coding, I examined emergent 
within-dataset patterns, grouping related codes into broader categories and examining the 
relationships among them. By crystallizing this traditional qualitative analytic approach 
with narrative inquiry into my field experiences, I explicitly foregrounded the 
situatedness of both my initial interpretations and my subsequent analyses. I then created 
a detailed, yet necessarily incomplete, understanding of risk-related communicative 
phenomena in Paducah. 
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During final stages of data analysis, I explored the datasets as an aggregated set, 
identifying where similar themes have emerged across channels and stakeholders and 
noting differences that appear. As my understandings of PGDP communicative 
phenomena have deepened, I have shared preliminary findings with key Superfund 
stakeholders to determine whether my explanations resonated. Among the stakeholders 
who have provided feedback on this study are federal and state agency personnel, 
community organizers, and members of the community-based pilot stakeholder group 
who consulted with the PGDP Stakeholder Future Vision Project research team on 
protocol development. While these member checks have provided additional insights into 
my conclusions, forcing me to question my assumptions and contributing new 
perspectives to the analysis, they have not been used as validity checks in the traditional 
sense. Rather, the crystallization framework has encouraged me to embrace the fact that 
different stakeholders with different commitments hold different opinions about study 
findings. Instead of pointing to a central and indisputable truth, stakeholder responses 
have assisted me both in providing thicker analyses and in acknowledging additional 
perspectives as they have emerged. The crystallized study findings subsequently have 
informed the creation of the convergence-building, community-based model for 
governmental risk communication activities described in the final chapter of this 
dissertation.  
Coding 
 
The development of the codebook closely reflects Butler-Kisber’s (2010) 
description of the transition from etic, literature-driven codes to emic, content-driven 
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codes. As Butler-Kisber (2010) notes, the first analytic phase of qualitative research 
involves  
close readings and rereadings…playing with some broad categories in which 
different portions of the field texts can be placed, at least temporarily [including] 
assigning names to these categories and working back and forth across the 
categories expanding and contracting them as the analysis proceeds. (pp. 30-31)  
To this end, I read through newspaper articles, written records, transcripts, and blogs 
multiple times, both prior to and after entering the data into NVIVO software files for 
analyses. Using a grounded theory approach, I then engaged in open coding of data units, 
identifying key concepts that appeared within the written data (Strauss, 1987; Lindlof & 
Taylor, 2002). I subsequently created a first cycle codebook centered around three themes 
that emerged across all the datasets: communication, othering, and U.S. DOE. I created 
definitional criteria for placement of data units within each category, as reflected in Table 
3.1, and entered this into the project codebook. 
 
Table 3.1. First-Cycle Coding. 
Code Criteria 
Communication Discusses specific activities or materials related to 
agency-provided information and/or public involvement 
Othering Instances of us/them binaries 
U.S. DOE Specific mentions of the agency or its activities 
 
After identifying these broad topic areas, I then conducted a secondary analysis of 
the data, looking explicitly for constructs previously identified as tied to enactment in the 
sensemaking literature. I created codes and criteria for data related to capacity, 
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commitment, and expectations. I then added this information, as seen in Table 3.2, to the 
codebook. 
Table 3.2. Second-Cycle Coding: Enactment 
Code Criteria 
Capacity: Number of Actors Discussion of number of people involved in plant-related 
activities and/or decisions 
Capacity: Diversity of 
Actors 
Discussion of homogeneity or heterogeneity of individuals 
involved in various plant-related activities and/or 
decisions 
Commitment: Blind Spots Language indicating an inability to see alternate 
perspectives 
Commitment: Tenacious 
Justifications 
Language indicating an unwillingness to consider 
alternative explanations 
Expectations: Roles Discussion of who does (or is perceived to do) what 
within plant-related activities or decisions 
 
Finally, I conducted thematic analyses and axial coding, a process of identifying 
"connections between categories" (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 220) and integrating the 
categories into broader themes that run both within and across the datasets. As Butler-
Kisber notes, an important goal of coding is "moving from a descriptive categorization of 
the accessed field texts to a more conceptual and interpretive level" (p. 31). I 
subsequently created a third set of codes and criteria, as seen in Table 3.3, and entered 
these into the codebook. This third phase was integral in teasing out some of the complex 
meaning-making related to the PGDP.  
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Table 3.3. Third-Cycle Coding: Themes. 
Code Criteria 
The Government Blurring of the lines regarding the roles and/or goals of 
various federal- and/or state-level agencies 
The Public Blurring of the lines among the roles and/or goals of non-
agency personnel 
Delays Discussions of postponements and bureaucratic 
constraints on action 
Secrecy, Manipulation, and 
Deception 
Discussions of slow- or non-disclosure; related concerns 
about misuse or falsification of information toward 
unknown ends  
Competing Risk Perceptions Discussions regarding perceived risk levels related to the 
site 
 
Challenges for Qualitative Research 
 
Richardson (2000) describes the central dilemma for the postmodernist, 
qualitative researcher as claiming a "position [that] allow[s] us to know 'something' 
without claiming to know everything" (p. 928). Within scientific inquiry, the choice of 
this approach, rather than seeking to develop predictive theories, is sometimes criticized. 
According to Butler-Kisber (2010), "Qualitative inquiry [focuses] on what, how, and 
why, using participant voices and experiences to interpret and explain (or in other words 
to present a small ‘t’ theory) about a phenomenon…" (p. 26). By employing multiple 
qualitative methods toward these ends, I situate this study within what Patton (2002) calls 
"the pragmatist paradigm," in which the selection of methods is centered around choosing 
the best tools for the task. However, this methodological choice brings with it numerous 
challenges that are common to qualitative study in terms of my selection of the case study 
approach and in terms of meeting responsibilities both to the communication field and to 
study participants. Ellingson (2009) expands upon Fitch (1994), noting that "rigor, depth 
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of analysis, and reflexivity constitute important criteria for evaluating middle-ground 
qualitative research quality" (p. 32). 
Transferability versus Generalizability 
 
This project relies upon a case study of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant 
National Priorities List Superfund site. Although case studies occasionally are cited as 
methodological approaches in and of themselves, the case study does not provide specific 
guidelines for data collection or analysis and, thus, is not a true method. Rather, a case 
study relates specifically to the boundary conditions of the study and, subsequently, to the 
kinds of theories and methods that could be applicable within those boundaries. As 
Tinker (1996) notes, a case study "defines topics broadly and not narrowly, covers 
contextual conditions, and relies on multiple and not singular sources of evidence" (p. 
202). VanWynsberghe and Khan (2007) argue that a case study is "a transparadigmatic 
and transdisciplinary heuristic that involves the careful delineation of the phenomena for 
which the evidence is being collected" (p. 80). Thus, according to VanWynsberghe and 
Khan (2007), case studies typically: 1) have a small number of subjects and a great deal 
of contextual detail; 2) rely upon natural settings; 3) provide detailed and explicit 
temporal and spatial boundaries; 4) utilize working hypotheses; 5) develop lessons 
learned; and 6) use multiple data sources for triangulation.  
Any approach that recognizes the essentially situated nature of communication 
and meaning-creation must value context above prediction. As Cossette (1998) writes, 
"[S]ituations must be studied from within, on the basis of the representations of the 
individuals concerned" (p. 1368). Therefore, I have selected a case study approach that 
permits me to integrate multiple qualitative methods to produce a rich description of the 
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target phenomena (Scholz & Tietje, 2002). While the results of such a case study cannot 
be generalizable, the insights gained can be transferrable to similar communities and 
circumstances (Baxter & Eyles, 1999; Wakefield & Elliott, 2003). Gulbe (1981) 
addresses the case study dilemma when he discusses the characteristics of the naturalistic 
researcher, who "does not attempt to form generalizations that will hold in all times and 
in all places, but to form working hypotheses that may be transferred from one context to 
another depending upon the degree of 'fit' between the contexts" (p. 81).  
Central to an audience’s ability to make effective determinations about 
applicability of findings to other settings is the effective use of "thick descriptions" 
(Geertz, 1973), which Guba asserts "will permit comparison of this context to other 
possible contexts to which transfer might be contemplated" (p. 86). According to Butler-
Kisber (2010), "Trustworthiness is enhanced when there is clear evidence that a length of 
time has been spent in the field and there are multiple forms of field texts that can help to 
corroborate explanations" (p. 14). Thus, case study researchers must commit themselves 
to thorough descriptions of the scene, players, and interactions to ensure clear 
assessments of case-by-case transferability. 
Reliability and Validity 
 
Addressing issues of reliability and validity is sometimes considered the greatest 
challenge for qualitative research. However, as Butler-Kisber (2010) notes, "From the 
point of view of qualitative inquiry, [the] realist notion of defining and describing a 
‘truth’ to demonstrate validity has very little meaning" (p. 14). As Mischler (1990) notes, 
"Focusing on trustworthiness rather than truth displaces validation from its traditional 
location in a presumably objective, non-reactive, and neutral reality, and moves it to the 
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social world – a world constructed in and through our discourse and actions, through 
praxis" (p. 420). 
 Maxwell (1992) identifies three kinds of qualitative validity related to this 
construct of trustworthiness: descriptive validity, interpretive validity, and theoretical 
validity. Descriptive validity addresses whether an account is factually accurate (Butler-
Kisber, 2010). This criterion can be met by utilizing numerous sources and conducting 
member checks, both with participants in the study and with those who have some 
knowledge of the situation itself. My use of multiple datasets, including newspaper 
accounts, is one way in which I have attempted to address the issue of descriptive validity 
in this study. In addition, I have engaged in direct dialogue regarding preliminary 
findings both with citizens of Paducah and with federal and state agency personnel. As 
Guba (1981) notes, such "member checks" are the "single most important action inquirers 
can take, for it goes to the heart of the credibility criterion" (p. 85). 
Interpretive validity is concerned with whether findings reflect a multiplicity of 
participant perspectives. As Guba (1981) asserts, "naturalistic inquirers are most 
concerned with testing the credibility of their findings and interpretations with the various 
sources (audiences or groups) from which data were drawn" (p. 80). I have relied upon 
multiple datasets and extensive member checks to address this criterion, as well. This 
approach aligns well with Richardson’s (2000) conceptualization of qualitative validity, 
for which "the central image is the crystal, which combines symmetry and substance with 
an infinite variety of shapes, substances, transmutations, multidimensionalities, and 
angles of approach" (p. 934). 
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Theoretical validity is tied to whether findings actually explicate the phenomenon 
under investigation. In the background, rationale, and epistemological commitments 
portions of this study, I explicitly set forth the sensemaking underpinnings of the project, 
a choice informed both by several years of engagement at the site of study and by a 
career rooted largely in conducting research translation and engagement activities at 
Superfund sites. I further strove for theoretical validity during second cycle coding by 
looking specifically at whether the constructs identified in the literature were reflected 
within the transcripts, articles, and blogs themselves. 
Credibility versus Objectivity 
 
Butler-Kisber notes that "[a] rigorous or trustworthy study indicates its 
persuasiveness by including a coherent and transparent research process and illustrating 
an adherence to researcher reflexivity and reflection" ( p. 14). Guba (1981) asserts that 
this is brought about, in part, by "triangulation, member checks, providing an audit trail, 
and employing researcher reflexivity" (p. 88). As Butler-Kisber states, such 
"[t]ransparency permits a clear understanding of the inquiry process which persuades the 
reader/audience of the trustworthiness or rigor of the study and allows other researchers 
to build on or adapt processes that are revealed in the work" (p. 16). 
According to Golden-Biddle and Locke (2007), the construction of a qualitative 
account is problematized from the beginning.  
The very act of developing theorized storylines from the field story generated 
through our engagement with particular social settings automatically raises the 
question of whether we ‘were there,’ and while there, whether we were able to 
experience and learn enough to allow us to understand and interpret what went 
on… Did we engage the research setting sufficiently intensively and extensively 
to understand the events, situations, and people we engaged? Did we observe and 
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record in sufficiently fine detail to warrant an insightful and competent 
understanding of the situation studied? (pp. 76-77) 
 
These questions are central to the credibility of study findings. As Butler-Kisber notes, 
key factors that support credibility include "prolonged engagement in the field or 
interviews that take place over time; persistent inquiry that produces rich field texts; 
triangulation or the convergence of field texts from different sources; the search for and 
explanation of negative cases or outliers; referential adequacy or interpretation that is 
grounded in the field texts; the inclusion of insider/emic perspectives; and participant 
checks and debriefings" (p. 46). To the extent possible, I have attempted to make these 
factors central in the design and conduct of this study while also embracing my own 
positionality within the scene. 
Researcher Reflexivity 
 
Nightingale and Cromby (1999) describe researcher reflexivity as "awareness of 
the researcher's contribution to the construction of meanings throughout the research 
process, and an acknowledgment of the impossibility of remaining 'outside of' one's 
subject matter while conducting research" (p. 228). Thus, it is key for qualitative 
inquirers not only to recognize but, as necessary, to foreground their biases in recognition 
of the ways in which individual experiences influence all aspects of the research 
endeavor. Medved (2011) notes that "[r]igorous and worthwhile qualitative research begs 
meaningful and, at times, uncomfortable self-analysis" (p. 109). The extensive use of 
such self-analysis is particularly important for studies that employ crystallization. As 
Ellingson (2009) notes, "[C]rystallized texts feature a significant degree of reflexive 
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consideration of the researcher's self in the process of research design, data collection, 
and representation" (Ellingson, 2009, p. 12). 
Having spent five years working on site-related issues, nearly three of those 
interacting directly with stakeholders in and around the Paducah community, I recognize 
explicitly my own positionality in relation to the generation and analysis of the datasets in 
this study; however, my interest in the issues I investigate in Paducah was formulated 
long before I knew of the PGDP. A native Appalachian, I am familiar both with the 
exploitation of local resources by external entities and with the marginalization of local 
populations in decision-making. As communication liaison for the University of 
Kentucky Superfund Research Program for nearly ten years, I also have had opportunities 
to work with stakeholders to address social justice issues professionally. Through these 
experiences, I have repeatedly noted high levels of stakeholder distrust of government 
agencies and their associates, including universities. Such perceptions can be particularly 
problematic in communities like Paducah, where a federal agency has been designated 
the potentially responsible party (PRP) in a major contamination incident.  
As a communication practitioner embedded within an academic setting, I also 
have listened at length to researchers and agency personnel discuss their own work. At 
times, these discussions have pushed riskbearing communities to the margins, making 
assumptions about what should be most important in a community based almost 
exclusively on scientific risk assessments, with little consideration given to the values or 
wishes of residents.  
Clearly, these experiences have affected my perception of governmental risk 
communication policies and procedures, as well as my assessment of their 
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implementation in Paducah. During extended periods of formative research and data 
collection, I have written numerous reflective memos, have composed personal notes, and 
have even made audio recordings of my reflections about field experiences during the 
long drives between Paducah and Lexington, Kentucky. These reflections, in addition to 
field notes and transcripts, have been valuable in helping me select key events to 
incorporate into the narrative inquiry portions of this dissertation. What moments made 
the greatest impact upon me in the field? What moments have stuck with me through 
time? Why these moments and not others? What can these recollections tell readers about 
the contested role of researcher, about field relationships with stakeholders, about 
stakeholder perceptions of the complicated relationships between researchers and the 
government agencies that fund them? By practicing reflexivity throughout the study, I am 
better equipped, as Ellingson (2009) puts it, "to show rather than tell" (p. 65) readers 
about PGDP-related communicative phenomena, depicting the multivocality involved 
when stakeholder perceptions compete, and ultimately contributing to a richer, more 
nuanced picture of the challenges stakeholders face in trying to make collective sense of 
the issues.  
After more than decade of working in academia, I have come to understand that, 
sometimes, the very people who live with risks have been pushed to the periphery of 
decision-making processes. While these stakeholders have been informed as applicable 
laws require, they rarely are truly engaged in determining their own fates. It is my sincere 
hope that this study and the proposed convergence-building, community-based model of 
risk communication will help bridge these gaps, providing a starting point for improving 
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relations among the numerous stakeholders impacted by environmental contamination.   
 
  Barriers 
I drove back to Paducah to prepare for the Environmental/Health Focus Group, 
stopping to check my email for additional RSVPs. I was very concerned that we had 
only one RSVP accepting the invitation; however, I was hopeful that individuals from 
the listening tour would attend... Unfortunately, there were no additional RSVPs in my 
inbox... When we arrived onsite, the room was arranged with tables and chairs facing 
the front, classroom style. To promote dialogue, we immediately set about 
rearranging things into a u-shape. We arranged the table so that the opening of the 
"u" faced the computer screen. There was a table with a podium in the front left. I 
hoped that our team wouldn't use the podium. The last thing I wanted us to do was 
introduce real or perceived barriers between ourselves and the participants. 
--Field Notes, May 4, 2010 
Even before our KRCEE Future Vision research team arrived in Paducah for 
the first time, I was keenly aware that some members of the community already held 
perceptions of us as "other." Colleagues from the university's Superfund Research 
Program had shared stories of some Paducah constituencies -- particularly 
environmental and health activists -- angrily opting out of activities. I also knew from 
prior public meeting comments, official reports, and our own listening tour that some 
stakeholders resented monies being spent on university-led studies rather than on 
either site cleanup or compensation for those who felt they had been sickened through 
PGDP-related hazardous exposures. As a participatory researcher, I wanted to ensure  
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that the voices of these segments of the community were included in our work, but I 
feared that our research team would inherit some existing frustration. 
My field notes throughout the project depict my internal struggle to dissociate our 
research team from these pre-existing frustrations while also achieving specific 
personal goals. Because this was my first time in the field, I wanted badly to do things 
"right" from a methodological perspective, particularly as my doctoral committee 
chair also was a member of the research team. As a long-time university employee, I 
also wanted to do my job well, particularly as my supervisor was the project's 
principal investigator. Finally, as a native of a community near the Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee, Department of Energy facilities, I had deep empathy for the people of 
Paducah and genuinely wanted to serve them well.  From painstakingly drafting focus 
group invitations to laboring over slide content to trying to ensure that the physical 
focus group space was as open and collaborative as possible, I nervously tried to 
remove any and all barriers to constructive dialogue and full participation. Little did I 
know that one of the greatest barriers to effective communication would arise from 
blind spots formed through my own commitment to the research. 
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Chapter Four: Results 
Talking about the PGDP 
 
According to Congressman Ed Whitfield, "From the anticipated closure to public 
safety to expedited cleanup, the issues surrounding the [Paducah Gaseous Diffusion 
Plant] are complex and endless" (Paducah Sun, Dec. 2005). Such complexity poses 
difficult challenges for sensemaking processes that attempt to construct understandings of 
a phenomenon, often through simplification to its most basic parts. As Weick (2010) puts 
it, "[T]here are...times when, despite or because of that simplification, situations become 
less comprehensible, more interactively complex, and harder to control" (p. 538). As 
numerous constituencies have attempted, through their own prisms, to understand the 
complicated statutory, political, risk, interorganizational, and interpersonal facets of the 
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant story, they have interacted with each other, staking out 
positions, forming and disbanding alliances, and jointly adding to a body of actions and 
events that require additional sensemaking efforts to interpret.  
The data gathered through this study exist at the intersection of these sensemaking 
processes and help to identify areas in which communicative actions are implicated in the 
development of relationships. As Palenchar and Heath (2007) note, "It is becoming 
increasingly clear that the main product of risk communication is not informed 
understanding as such, but the quality of the social relationship it supports" (p. 127). 
Through an exploration of both the sensemaking processes and the relational outcomes of 
PGDP risk communication, this chapter directly responds to the study's first research 
question, i.e. how does the enactment of accepted agency risk communication practices 
affect relationships among stakeholders?  
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The strength of building this study's methodological approach on crystallization 
lies in the researcher's ability to approach these complex issues from myriad directions, to 
continually turn the problem back on itself, and to find new ways of exploring the ever-
emerging angles. While intellectually invigorating, such an approach brings with it the 
inherent challenge of knowing that all angles can never be explored fully. Situating the 
researcher within this puzzle, determining starting points and -- of practical necessity -- 
ending points, is both time-consuming and doubt-reinforcing. However, the process also 
provides numerous opportunities to realize the linkages among data and how they inform 
each other.  
To begin answering the research questions posed in this and the next chapter. I 
examined four extant datasets: 85 Paducah Sun newspaper articles about the Paducah 
Gaseous Diffusion Plant that were published in Calendar Year 2005; the assembled 
public comments collected by the Kentucky Research Consortium for Energy and the 
Environment [KRCEE] during its 2006-2007 PGDP Property Study; eight focus group 
transcripts generated in 2010 during the KRCEE Stakeholder Future Vision Study; and 
nine online blogs published by a local activist during the latter study. Through constant 
comparative analysis, I identified emerging themes across the datasets. Throughout this 
chapter, these findings are complemented by narrative interludes that depict the ways in 
which the themes interact to create communicative barriers that inhibit the possibilities 
for convergent communication among site stakeholders.     
The findings in this chapter illustrate how the ways in which people and agencies 
talk about and describe previous interactions with each other in Paducah point to 
sensemaking challenges that have been erected over decades. More specifically, capacity, 
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commitment, and expectations are constrained, as exemplified in each of four emergent 
themes that dominate the discourse: 1) The Government, 2) The Public, 3) Bureaucratic 
Delay, and 4) Secrecy, Deception, and Manipulation. Stakeholder sensemaking about 
these themes further complicates existing disagreements about probabilistic risk at the 
site, creating a fifth theme, Competing Risk Perceptions.  
The Government 
 
In Paducah, as at other Superfund sites, conceptualizations of "the government" 
are fraught with complexity. Numerous federal, state, and local agencies take on diverse 
roles, most of which are statutorily compelled. Among the federal actors currently or 
previously involved in some way with the PGDP site are the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, the United 
States Department of Energy, the United States Department of Labor, the National 
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, and the National Institute for Environmental 
Health Sciences. At the state level, the Kentucky Energy and Environment Cabinet, 
through the Superfund Branch of its Department for Environmental Protection, and the 
Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services, through its Radiation Control Branch, 
also have some presence at the site. Locally, both the McCracken and Ballard County 
governments are implicated in plant-related decision-making, as are such government-
business coalitions as local chambers of commerce, the Paducah Area Community Reuse 
Organization, and the Paducah Uranium Plant Asset Utilization Task Force.   
At various times, all of these organizations have issued official statements and 
press releases, have conducted or participated in public meetings, and have been featured 
in local newspaper coverage of PGDP-related issues. The sheer number and variety of 
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organizational actors can generate difficulty for those trying to understand which 
agencies or agency-related organizations are responsible for which actions. Thus, plant-
related discourse frequently groups all government-affiliated organizations into one 
overarching, monolithic organization, generally referred to as The Government. This 
simplification problematizes sensemaking greatly by: 1) reducing the perceived, if not the 
actual, number of actors, 2) rhetorically establishing adversarial us/them 
community/agency binaries that fail to distinguish roles and positions within and across 
groups, and 3) supporting erroneous conclusions about one agency's motives or actions 
based on retrospective sensemaking that draws on an unrelated agency's past actions. 
Capacity: The Number and Diversity of Actors 
 
As Atkinson (2005) notes, "In the social arena, group identity negates 'that which 
it is not,' by creating false unities among group members which deny the complex 
multiplicities of which 'the group' is composed" (p. 81). Thus, when diverse organizations 
are grouped under a single term like The Government, sensemaking is threatened through 
a reduction in the perceived number of distinct actors and viewpoints.  In the case of 
Paducah, the blanket term The Government is used by a number of sources across 
multiple channels as a proxy for diverse agencies. Such rhetoric encourages non-agency 
stakeholders to assume that there is, in fact, a single Government point of view on plant-
related issues rather than numerous viewpoints that differ based on a specific agency's or 
individual's role. Therefore, stakeholders who view The Government as representing a 
lone, distinct perspective may expect little benefit from engaging multiple agencies in 
dialogue. 
91 
 
Examples of this reductionist terminology abound in both local media and 
interpersonal discourse. Textual analysis of 85 Paducah Sun articles published in the year 
2005 identified 21 instances of the conflation of agencies under The Government 
signifier, often with accompanying confusion about agency roles and responsibilities. 
One area in which this approach proved particularly problematic was the transition of a 
backlogged worker compensation program from the Department of Energy to the 
Department of Labor. Although the transition and subsequent program implementation 
involved at least three federal agencies, references to a singular Government abound. 
An excerpt from a front-page Paducah Sun article illustrates this dilemma. 
"Robert Pierce has always believed that exposure to deadly substances while working at 
the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant robbed him of his health and livelihood. Now the 
government confirms it" (Walker, 2005h, p. 1A). The program under which Mr. Pierce 
had first applied for compensation was administered by the Department of Energy. After 
a backlog of more than 25,000 claims had built up, with some remaining unaddressed for 
more than four years, Congress passed legislation to transfer program administration to 
the Department of Labor. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, a 
division of the Centers for Disease Control, was charged with evaluating individual 
worker exposures and determining whether compensation was warranted. Some of the 
data used for those evaluations came from decades-old DOE reports. Thus, a complex 
array of agency actors were involved at various stages, from processing to evaluating to 
paying specific claims. The Paducah Sun's statement that "the government confirms" that 
Mr. Pierce's illness is work-related presents a tidier but far less accurate image of the 
process. 
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Such simplification contributes to confusion about the number of governmental 
actors and the possibilities for varying perspectives among them. In an article two months 
later, the adult child of a deceased nuclear worker questioned the motives of all of the 
agencies involved, perhaps inadvertently, by stating, "I think the government is trying to 
get out of paying what it owes" (Walker, 2005m, 2A). In a follow-up article the next day, 
the adult child of another worker appeared perplexed by the claims process. The 
newspaper reported that "she doesn't understand how the government can pay some 
people and not others in compensation for essentially the same diseases" (Walker, 2005n, 
1C). Again, the complex process involving legislation passed by Congress and its 
subsequent impacts on policies, procedures, and payments involving three distinct 
agencies is clustered under a single motive attributed to a single entity, in this case The 
Government attempting to "get out of paying what it owes" by inequitably, perhaps 
arbitrarily, making decisions that benefit itself. The resulting connotation is that all 
agency employees, regardless of department or division, are working toward a clearly 
defined, shared goal that disadvantages a portion of the affected population. Thus, the 
perceived capacity for sensemaking dialogue among stakeholders and agencies is greatly 
constrained. 
At other times, agencies themselves invoke the image of The Government, often 
as a means of contextualizing their own actions as driven by forces outside their control. 
In one situation, DOE elected to rebid a cleanup contract in response to several 
competitors protesting an announced contract award. In justifying its actions, the agency 
stated that it was determined to act in "the best interests of the government to take 
corrective action and reopen the competition" (Walker, 2005j, 1A). As Brinson and 
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Benoit explain, "[W]hen a reputation is threatened, individuals and organizations are 
motivated to present an image defense: explanations, justifications, rationalizations, 
apologies, or excuses for behavior" (p. 30). For DOE, the involvement of other 
governmental entities in site-related decisions has sometimes been invoked to explain or 
justify an action, particularly an action that might prove unpopular with various 
stakeholders. Thus, in addition to media and stakeholder attempts to simplify the multi-
actor web, agencies themselves sometimes intentionally blur the lines. 
Another example of DOE's use of this strategy took place during a federally-
funded Property Acquisition study to evaluate the costs of buying private property 
adjacent to the PGDP.  From the earliest stages of the study, the Department of Energy 
attempted to define and assert its role in the process: the agency was Congress’s servant – 
no more, no less. The initial "statement of work" draft that stakeholders received clearly 
stated, "This project will be performed in order to meet the requirements established in 
Energy and Water Development Appropriation Bill, 2006 (Senate Report 109-084)" (U.S. 
DOE, 2007, p. H-10). The first bullet on the first slide of subsequent U.S. DOE 
presentations to the PGDP Citizens Advisory Board reinforced that the study responded 
to a Congressional mandate (U.S. DOE, 2007, p. H-32). During two separate public 
meetings, multiple introductory slides featured the following statement in boldface type: 
"The study is being conducted in accordance with a Congressional Directive to DOE in 
the 2006 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act" (U.S. DOE, 2007, p. H-
53-H-55; U.S. DOE, 2007, p. H-129-H-132). Repeatedly, DOE attempted to 
contextualize itself as an executor of, rather than a leader in, The Government’s decision-
making.  
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In other circumstances, The Government is accompanied by a key modifier and 
becomes The Federal Government. When this juxtaposition occurs in the Paducah Sun, 
the word "federal" becomes almost a pejorative term. Among non-media stakeholders, as 
well, The Federal Government is an object of disapproval. The most frequent and fervent 
criticisms relate directly to agency communications, with stakeholders citing excessive 
use of confusing acronyms. For instance, when asked about the kind of information 
stakeholders require to make sound decisions about the plant, one focus group participant 
recommended that the Future Vision research team "try not to use those acronyms that 
DOE uses -- spell it out." Another participant quickly interjected, "The federal 
government is notorious about doin’ that. If you’ve ever tried to read a federal 
government document..." Thus, The Federal Government is perceived as an ineffective 
communicator, which subsequently colors stakeholder perceptions of all related agencies 
and their employees. 
The reality, however, is that federal agencies often perceive themselves as 
operating at cross-purposes and, therefore, send very different messages. In 2006, as the 
Department of Energy discussed the Property Acquisition study during a PGDP Citizens 
Advisory Board meeting, Environmental Protection Agency representatives registered 
concern about past attempts by other federal entities to use property purchases as a means 
of circumventing regulatory statutes. According to one U.S. EPA staff member,  
This issue is not new to EPA. It is an issue that we have gone around with various 
federal facilities and projects for years. The question is if I never sell this property 
then that means I do not have to remediate the plume and the answer is no. You 
still have to remediate the plume. This is just a land use control. (U.S. DOE, 2007, 
p. H-41) 
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Community members directly associated with the plant by employment -- whether 
through DOE, USEC, or a contractor -- espouse a more nuanced view of government that 
recognizes multiple players. In one Future Vision focus group, a contractor described his 
experiences trying to influence Congressional action: "I spent a year and a half working 
on Capitol Hill with legislation to try to re-feed a large segment of those higher asset tail 
cylinders... And we could not get Congress to move those... [T]here were just too many 
competing interests as to who was gonna get the money, and what—how the money was 
gonna be dispersed..." 
Within the PGDP discourse, Congress holds an interesting position as a potential 
bridge between the perceived conformity of The Government and a diversity of 
state/local interests. While Congress, as a whole, often is rhetorically grouped within The 
Government, individual elected officials frequently are portrayed as separate and distinct, 
thus expanding the perceived field of participants for sensemaking activities. Whether a 
function of the geographic proximity of congressional field offices or attributable to close 
political alignment with the Paducah Sun's editorial board, Senators Mitch McConnell 
and Jim Bunning, along with Congressman Ed Whitfield, tend to be portrayed favorably 
by the local newspaper as public servants who are doing their best to control the 
perceived shortcomings of The Government. For example, the newspaper asserts that 
Kentucky's "congressional delegation has been scrutinizing the elongated Paducah 
contract situation" (Walker, 12/28/2005, p. 12A). Bunning is explicitly recognized for 
convening Senate oversight hearings to investigate PGDP cleanup delays; he is quoted as 
saying that "those living and working in and around Paducah deserve a better 
environment" and that he wants to "bring accountability to the process" (Walker, 2005x, 
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p. 12A). Similarly, Whitfield is acknowledged for his "ongoing concerns about cost 
increases and delays in Paducah plant cleanup" (Walker, 2005c, p. 8A). 
While newspaper coverage tends to present the involvement of the Kentucky 
Congressional delegation as positive, other constituencies in the community disagree. A 
blog authored by a participant in a Future Vision focus group noted, "At the beginning, it 
was explained that this study was the result of a 'federal earmark facilitated by Sens. 
McConnell, Bunning, and Rep. Whitfield.' That said a lot to me" (Donham, 2010a, para. 
2). Regardless of the way in which these elected officials and their actions are framed, 
both the newspaper and the blog rhetorically separate these specific actors from The 
Government. 
Similarly, the newspaper sometimes segregates state government from federal, 
often depicting state officials as criticizing The Federal Government, whether for its poor 
environmental practices or for attempting to avoid its cleanup responsibilities.  For 
example, in an article about the Property Acquisition study, the Paducah Sun notes that 
"[t]he proposal has critics, including those who say a buyout would limit the 
government's future liability for cleaning up the contamination"; the article then quotes 
an assistant director of the Kentucky Division of Waste Management, who says that he 
cannot see how a federal government land buyout would be "fitting into any type of 
remedy" for getting rid of the contamination" (Associated Press, 2005, p. 12A).  
Whether depictions of individual government officials at either the federal or state 
level are positive or negative, segregation of the actors points to important implications 
for sensemaking. When the "The Government" is broken down into its constituent parts, 
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a convergent space is made in which individual efforts can be acknowledged and 
appreciated, as well as criticized. For example, the sick nuclear worker who "doggedly 
called and wrote government officials about his case" also "thanked the local Labor 
Department claims staffers for their help" (Walker, 2005h, p. 14A). Thus, while 
increasing the number of perceived actors available to participate in joint sensemaking, 
the rhetorical separation of The Government into its component parts also personalizes 
the actions of the individuals working to implement agency policies and procedures. 
Commitment: Adversarial Binaries 
 
Unfortunately, the depersonalization that occurs through the use of blanket terms 
like The Government can exacerbate already-tense situations by contributing to binary 
thinking. Were a stakeholder to make negative public statements about an individual or 
agency, that public commitment could contribute to blind spots and tenacious 
justifications about that specific targeted individual or agency. However, when the 
negative public statements extend to The Government, numerous actors involved in site 
decisions are rhetorically implicated, thus creating the possibility that negative opinions 
of one actor are transferred to others. This is particularly problematic when the negative 
opinion relates to distrust of an agency, as often happens at Superfund sites. 
During the Future Vision study, the research team asked the same basic question 
of eight focus groups: who is considered a credible source of information for issues 
related to the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant? While answers varied across the groups, 
a common response was that the Department of Energy is not a trusted information 
source for many stakeholders (KRCEE, 2011). While such a perspective is 
understandable in light of DOE's historic role in site contamination and, according to 
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some, subsequent cover-ups, the distrust at times extended beyond the agency to 
encompass all governmental entities engaged at the site. As one focus group participant 
put it, "I would not want [information from] anybody affiliated with the government in 
any way... I wouldn’t trust anything that people that have been connected with that place 
have to say." In this way, use of the phrase The Government extends distrust of DOE to 
negatively affect relationships among stakeholders and other agencies, as well. 
Local newspaper coverage also plays an important role in the creation and 
reification of an adversarial view of The Government, and particularly of federal entities. 
The editorial page provides a key venue for promoting animosity, whether explicitly or 
implicitly. In one instance, a letter to the editor raises questions about the motives for 
delayed payments to sick nuclear workers by stating that "the federal agencies continue to 
miss the point…or do they" (Sparkman, 2005, 4A)?  The author describes a situation in 
which those deserving of compensation die before receiving it, leaving their adult 
children ineligible for benefits. Her implication is clear: The Federal Government values 
cost savings over fairness. 
In addition to such stakeholder acrimony toward The Federal Government, the 
Paducah Sun (2005) editorial board also promotes an intergovernmental adversarial 
relationship by rhetorically pitting state and federal agencies against each other, 
particularly on the editorial page, where it credits state officials with forcing federal 
cleanup action.  "Over the past six years," the editor writes, "the federal cleanup 
operation has moved in fits and starts [but the] cleanup seems to have gained momentum 
since the state imposed timetables in the 2003 cleanup agreement" (p. 4A). The editor 
adds that the site cleanup agreement is the state's "legal club in holding DOE to its 
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cleanup commitments" and urges Kentucky state officials not to "hesitate to take DOE to 
court, if the agency doesn't follow through on its obligations to Paducah" (p. 4A). 
Through such statements, the Paducah Sun reifies existing tensions between state and 
federal entities -- tensions that previously had threatened to erupt into multiple lawsuits 
and countersuits (Short, 2002; de Saillan, 2008). 
The newspaper also promotes intergovernmental hostility between Congress and 
the executive branch, often along party lines. For example, a series of articles frames 
federal policies that restrict contaminated nickel recycling as detrimental to both cleanup 
and the Paducah economy. The paper's editorial page discounts the restriction and places 
the blame squarely upon the executive branch under the leadership of former President 
Bill Clinton who was "swayed by such Democratic interest groups" as organized labor 
and environmentalists. However, one editorial anticipates "light at the end of the tunnel" 
for overturning the restriction, as "[i]t’s a logical assumption that the agency eventually 
will lift the politically motivated ban, given that a Republican administration is calling 
the shots in the executive branch of federal government." (Walker, 2005a, p. 4A). 
Ironically, the newspaper is joined in its reinforcement of negative images of The 
Government by stakeholders who hold vastly different political commitments. Local 
environmentalists, in particular, have a strained relationship with The Government. In 
one Future Vision focus group, a local activist expressed his anger by proposing that an 
acceptable future for Paducah would meet one key criteria -- it would "just get the 
government the hell out… I think Washington, D.C. would be a good place to store [the 
hazardous waste]." He continued, "I think we were doing a really good job before they 
came…in and disrupted everything." Another activist expressed his doubt about the 
100 
 
motives and potential outcomes of the Future Vision study, relating it directly to his 
dismay at existing stakeholder-governmental relations by stating, "I have spent a good 
deal of the last twenty-five years of my life going through the process with the 
government on environmental issues, so you know, I know some things about the 
process." Again citing his past interactions with The Government, he asserted, "I don’t 
feel like I’ve ever really had any real influence on a governmental decision unless I took 
some really strong action, like got involved in a lawsuit," before again questioning the 
research team's "real" motives. 
In this case, a stakeholder's very public distrust of governmental processes 
extends beyond agencies to include university-based researchers who had received pass-
through funding from an agency. The subsequent suspicion illustrates a central challenge 
related to rhetorical groupings of multiple entities under The Government construct. 
Specifically, stakeholders who have taken high-profile stances, and thus are deeply 
committed, against specific organizational actions can have tremendous difficulty 
separating the perceived at-fault agency from other entities that they also perceive as 
falling under The Government umbrella.  
This lack of organizational distinctions points to a significant shortcoming of 
Seven Cardinal Rules and other best practices approaches to risk communication. While 
encouraging cross-organizational collaborations, these guidelines do not explicitly 
recognize that, from a stakeholder sensemaking perspective, an individual organization 
may be perceived as part of a larger entity that comes with its own baggage.  Rather than 
understanding that a particular agency is addressing its specifically mandated activities in 
fulfilling its own defined role, independent of or loosely collaborating with other 
101 
 
agencies in the scene, some constituents see only a puzzling web of federal and state 
entities, making it difficult to parse just who is responsible for what -- a dilemma that has 
important repercussions for managing expectations. 
Expectations: Retrospective Sensemaking 
 
The depiction of The Government as a single entity in the Paducah discourse 
seriously constrains agencies that are new to the scene. Such constraints are particularly 
challenging for organizations whose roles involve assuming responsibilities formerly 
belonging to another entity. A particularly stark example of this type of difficulty in 
sensemaking arose in 2005, when the U.S. Department of Labor [DOL] assumed 
administration of a workers' compensation program previously managed by the 
Department of Energy. This program was designed to provide benefits to workers who 
had become ill due to work-related exposure to hazardous chemicals. Under DOE 
management, a backlog of approximately 25,000 claims had built nationwide, with some 
applicants waiting more than four years for responses. To address the situation, Congress 
passed legislation transferring program administration to DOL. According to the 
Paducah Sun, the law "gave the department 210 days to May 26 to issue regulations and 
have staffing and procedures in place to compensate workers sickened from toxic 
exposure" (Walker, 2005l, p. 1A). 
Unfortunately for the Department of Labor, the time required to set up these new 
policies and procedures became conflated with the long waits applicants had already 
experienced under DOE management of the program. In this way, the same sensemaking 
strategies that conceived of both entities as part of The Government quickly promoted the 
transfer of existing stakeholder frustrations from DOE to DOL. This relationship was 
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reified through numerous Paducah Sun articles featuring such headlines as "Frustration 
Grows as Sick Workers Wait for Benefits" (Walker, 2005s) and "Sick Workers Seek 
Responses to Their Claims" (Walker, 2005t), along with articles profiling the illnesses of 
both living and deceased claimants (Walker, 2005h; 2005m; 2005n). 
The Department of Labor responded to this situation with a letter to the editor in 
which it acknowledged frustration over previous U.S. DOE management of worker 
claims but stated that DOL was, in fact, ahead of schedule on many aspects of payment. 
"We honor the dedication of those who gave their service to our nation, and fully 
appreciate the frustration they may feel over the past years of delay," the DOL official 
wrote. "And that’s why we are working hard – and achieving great progress – in getting 
help to these workers and their families" (Lipnic, 2005, 4A). 
Another agency that dealt with problematic understandings of its specific site role 
was the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. After the PGDP was added 
to the U.S. EPA Superfund National Priorities List, ATSDR began developing a work 
plan and conducting its Public Health Assessment, visiting the community multiple times 
between 1994 and 2000, including participating in six DOE public meetings. The 
Agency's final report concluded: 1) that the site "currently poses no apparent public 
health hazard to the off-site community"; 2) that a future rupture of any of the more than 
33,000 depleted uranium cylinders on site "would create an urgent public health hazard 
for anyone" nearby; 3) that previous TCE exposure through consumption of water from 
four of the contaminated private wells had been "a public health hazard for children"; 4) 
that "future exposures to maximum concentrations of contaminants in the groundwater 
plumes" through new private wells would constitute a public health hazard; and, finally, 
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5) that the Agency did not have enough information to determine the levels or impacts of 
past acute uranium hexafluoride exposures. The Public Health Action Plan included 
recommendations for continued clean-up, emergency preparedness planning, and 
monitoring of the site, also offering the community ATSDR's support as a source of risk-
related information. 
As Tinker (1996) explains,  
ATSDR is faced with challenges in health risk communication in...subject 
[communities] on two major fronts: (a) explaining to local residents the complex 
nature of the health studies of their community; and (b) changing strongly held 
assumptions and attitudes in the community about alleged government 
malfeasance, the role of big business and environmental racism, the right to health 
and health care, and a host of related concerns. (p. 209)  
 
Entrenched distrust of the Paducah Public Health Assessment in some corners supports 
this contention. As one community member mentioned during the PGDP Future Vision 
research team's listening tour, "[T]here’s been recent testimony that the ASTDR [sic] 
report was biased. These people were intimidated by the past administration." Another 
community member further highlighted the ways in which role confusion can feed 
distrust by asking, "[W]hy didn’t ASTDR [sic] do an epi study? They [i.e., ‘the 
government’] never do any honest stuff." 
According to Tinker (1996), this type of reaction is not uncommon in Superfund 
communities responding to ATSDR health assessments. He cites a specific case in which 
both a preliminary ATSDR Public Health Assessment and a follow-on second study were 
met with community skepticism, largely because the investigations "were based primarily 
on environmental information provided to EPA by the manufacturer of the wood 
preservative" (p. 209). Even when the second study attempted to partner with the state 
department of health, distrust continued.  
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Despite distrust of the report itself, some local activists have found value in the 
ATSDR report, primarily in the Agency's collection of community comments during the 
Public Health Assessment process. Confirming McComas's (2003) assertion that 
"individuals sometimes base their opinions about government agencies on other people’s 
experiences" (p. 169), one focus group attendee who expressed some of the strongest 
doubts about the ATSDR report's accuracy also cited as fact an anecdotal comment that is 
archived on Agency's website. "[I]t’s all on the ATSDR/CDC site," he said. "And we 
even had a sick worker get up at one of the meetings and talk about some of this stuff. 
They never told anybody anything. And they’re still not doing it." 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government People 
 
There were…7 or 8 government people in attendance. They had all kinds of fancy 
technical stuff set up, and supposedly the entire evening was recorded. They had the 
process all planned on how they were going to guide us through getting our opinions. 
--Rural Thoughts Blog, May 5, 2010 
 
As I set the room for the May 4th Future Vision Environmental/Health Focus 
Group, I was aware that this set of stakeholders, in particular, might be somewhat 
distrusting of our research team. We were, after all, academics from a different part of 
the state with no direct vested interest in the site's future. The same qualities that could 
make us seem unbiased to some constituencies also could render our motives suspect 
to others. However, in considering our outsider status, it did not occur to me that 
someone might think of us as direct government operatives. After all, weren't we  
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The Public 
 
If The Government constitutes the first piece of a problematic rhetorical binary in 
Paducah, the other piece is The Public. Comprising myriad local and state interest groups 
and individuals, the concept is both omnipresent in site-related discourse and codified in 
risk communication best practices approaches like Seven Cardinal Rules. In fact, two of 
the first three Rules explicitly address agency relations with The Public: "accept and 
involve the public as a legitimate partner" and "listen to the public's specific concerns" 
(Covello & Allen, 1988). 
It is worth noting that a single bullet point embedded within the Rules narrative 
states that "[t]here is no such entity as 'the public'; instead, there are many publics, each 
with its own interests, needs, concerns, priorities, preferences, and organizations." 
opening every session reviewing detailed, IRB-approved informed consent documents 
that, I thought, clearly delineated our roles as university researchers?  
When I saw a focus group participant's blog on the morning of May 5th, I 
knew how wrong I had been not to consider the possibility that our work would be 
conflated with that of government agencies already at the site. Our team's commitment 
to the research -- our very embeddedness in the process of creating informed consent 
documents and promoting what we thought was an inclusive, participatory project -- 
had contributed to the development of our own gaping blind spot regarding how we 
might be perceived. When that blind spot collided with the focus group participant's 
tenacious justifications about The Government based on prior Department of Energy 
activities at the site, the stage was set for confusion and antagonism.  
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However, this statement exists as one of several "Points to Consider" in the document 
and is both graphically and textually marginalized in relation to the bright, bold rules that 
employ language specifically addressing The Public as a single entity. Further, while the 
Rules do include this lone mention of multiple publics, the singular phrase "the public" 
appears nine times, both in the rules themselves and in the accompanying narrative. The 
rhetorical balance, therefore, clearly points to The Public as a single audience. 
As with the blanket conceptualization of The Government, the whole-cloth 
grouping of numerous constituencies under The Public banner contributes to a number of 
challenges for sensemaking. These challenges have played out in various ways over the 
years in relation to the PGDP, further embedding The Public as the primary audience for 
risk-related information. An examination of interpersonal talk about and media coverage 
of the plant implicates this rhetorical simplification in three areas of sensemaking 
constraint: 1) contested membership in and responsibility to The Public that creates 
challenges for capacity; 2) adversarial binaries and resulting commitments that foster 
blind spots; and 3) expectations rooted in a discourse of deficiency.   
Capacity 
 
In contrast to the homogenized depiction of The Public outlined above, the 
KRCEE (2011) PGDP Future Vision research team identified at least 16 groups with 
distinct stakes in plant-related decisions: 
• Water Policy District Residents 
• Economic Development Representatives  
• United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) Employees 
• Environmental/Health Advocates 
• Healthcare Providers 
• Educators 
• Media 
107 
 
• Religious/Spiritual Community Members 
• Wildlife/Recreation Enthusiasts 
• Tourism Interests 
• Ballard County Stakeholders 
• U.S. DOE 
• U.S. DOE Subcontractors 
• McCracken/Paducah Government 
• PGDP Citizens Advisory Board 
• Regulatory Agencies 
With the possible exceptions of U.S. DOE, McCracken/Paducah Government, and 
Regulatory Agencies, all of these groups could be seen as components of The Public; 
however, real-world communications belie such an assumption and indicate disputes over 
both the make-up of The Public and the construct’s implications for PGDP decision-
making. 
For some local activists, inclusion in The Public seems to relate inversely to one's 
perceived economic status in the community. One environmentalist who participated in a 
Future Vision focus group later blogged that he had requested a list of project "advisory 
board" members and that he was certain it consisted of "a bunch of names of 'influential' 
folks in Paducah. I certainly wasn't on it. But I think it's important for the public to know" 
(Donham, 2010d, para. 1).  As expressed, the author's assumptions about "advisory 
board" membership implied that group was other-than-public, a conclusion underscored 
by his belief that The Public was in need of information about the board. In this way, the 
sentence structure seems to support a vision of "influential" members of the community 
as being outside of, rather than members of, The Public. 
A similar issue of authenticity in relation to membership in The Public arose 
during two separate studies funded through DOE. The Property Acquisition study, which 
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evaluated potential costs and benefits of DOE purchasing private properties adjacent to 
the plant, was recommended to the Kentucky congressional delegation by local business 
leaders during an annual Chamber of Commerce visit to Washington, D.C. (KRCEE, 
2007). Similarly, the Stakeholder Future Vision study was first recommended by the 
PGDP Citizens Advisory Board to support decision-making related to the site's future 
(KRCEE, 2011). In both cases, local stakeholders exhibited concerns about the 
origination and expense of the studies. During a public meeting for the property study, 
one attendee submitted the written question, "Who started all these studys [sic] and went 
to Congress to ask for these studys [sic]" (U.S. DOE, 2007, p. H-67), while another 
attendee asked, "Don’t you think it is a waste of taxpayers [sic] money to study the 
studies that has [sic] already been done by DOE" (U.S. DOE, 2007, p. H-67)? Later, 
during the Future Vision study, a local activist complained on his blog, "God only knows 
how many hours, paid for by the public, went into these graphics" (Donham, 2011b, para. 
6). 
Such concerns about public monies often are included in Paducah Sun coverage 
of site-related matters, particularly through various government officials' repeated 
invocation of a subset of The Public -- The Taxpayers. Frequently, The Taxpayers and 
their "interests" provide a rhetorical foundation upon which to justify or explain specific 
agency actions. For example, Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman defended changing plant 
cleanup plans as representing "a reasonable stewardship to the taxpayers' money that 
we've been given to spend" (Walker, 2005d, 1A); he subsequently commented that DOE 
would make contract decisions that "provide value to the taxpayers and contribute to the 
cleanup of our Cold War legacy" (Walker, 2005g, 11A). This stance was adopted across 
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the agency, as illustrated by a DOE spokesman's comment that the agency continued "to 
believe that this contract represents the best value for both the taxpayers and the 
community" (Walker, 2005k, 1A). 
Later attempts by the agency to situate the Property Acquisition study similarly as 
an activity designed to benefit taxpayers, however, were rejected by some local 
stakeholders.  One resident interviewed by the Paducah Sun (Walker, 2006b) called the 
study "another example…of a waste of money" (p. 11A), while the vice-president of 
Taxpayers for Common Sense remarked to Louisville's Courier-Journal that "[the study] 
sounds…like cut and run" (Carroll, 2006). In a letter to the House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, the Active Citizens for Truth 
president flatly rejected the taxpayer-as-client construction, reminding members of 
Congress that 
I am a taxpayer along with other families who are United State citizen’s [sic] and 
have been living on top of these plumes for over 50 years, paying tax dollars for 
companies and federal agencies that were allowed to dump hazardous waste down 
drains, through the air, and operate in a shroud of secrecy. When you talk about 
best interest of tax payer dollars, then we need to consider the enormous amount 
of monies that the tax payers have paid for clean-up of contaminated groundwater 
at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, which cannot be cleaned up. Let’s talk 
about the $300,000 the University of Kentucky received to do this study which 
shows there was never any intention to buy private property that the PGDP 
contaminated… So you see monies are not being wasted on the residents, but 
millions have been wasted by the DOE to contractors knowing there was not an 
effective technology that would clean-up contaminated groundwater. (U.S. DOE, 
2007, p. H-160) 
Nearly identical concerns were raised during the Stakeholder Future Vision Study. 
In a blog post that followed one of the focus group meetings, a local participant wrote,  
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They sure know how to spend money. And let's not forget, this money came from 
one of those infamous 'earmarks' by non-other than now 'earmark' killer U.S. Sen. 
Minority leader Mitch McConnell. This is public money - not private money - 
funnelled through DOE. (Donham, 2011b, para. 3)  
Such arguments concerning both which individuals may claim membership in The Public 
and how The Taxpayers' money should -- or should not -- be spent constrain the 
possibility for dialogue among those with competing perspectives, thus reducing the 
capacity for joint sensemaking. 
Commitment 
 
As in-group/out-group lines get drawn in reference to membership in The Public, 
stakeholders commit themselves to very distinct positions related to their perceived 
inclusion or exclusion. For example, one USEC staffer reminded the Future Vision 
research team that they were "not talking to the public right now. We all work here, and 
we know what’s out here, but the general public still has a very vague idea of what’s out 
here." He continued, "The general consensus is it’s already at nuclear power plant levels 
of contamination. That’s what the general public already thinks. So no matter what 
scenario you go with, that’s going to be a factor with the general public." In this way, the 
employee not only separated himself and his colleagues from The Public, he also 
committed a key act of othering by defining The Public as a group that tenaciously clings 
to misinformation. However, he failed to recognize his own blind spot about non-
employees' ability to understand and interpret relevant risk information. 
Non-employees also make this distinction regarding The Public. During a 
different focus group, a plant subcontractor and an environmentalist engaged in dialogue 
about the site. In a subsequent exchange in the comments section of an online blog, the 
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environmentalist firmly drew membership lines for The Public: "I found you in the know 
about things that have public interest, and I think you should make more efforts to share 
what you know with the public in general" (Donham, 2010c, para. 6). Thus, in the 
environmentalist's view, the subcontractor's relationship with the plant precluded his 
inclusion in The Public construct. 
Interestingly, the environmentalist in this case falls into the same rhetorical trap as 
Seven Cardinal Rules and other best practices-oriented guidelines. He portrays The 
Public as ignorant of particulars and in need of information it does not have. Just as The 
Public needs protection from misspending of The Taxpayers' dollars, so The Public needs 
outside entities to educate it about key facts that it lacks. Both assertions build 
expectations of The Public that are based, by definition, on its perceived deficiencies. 
Expectations 
 
The portrayal of The Public as lacking both control and information is pervasive 
in the PGDP discourse. Rather than promoting an image of stakeholders as diverse actors 
within the situation, this construction situates The Public as an object. In some situations, 
it is depicted as an audience for information. In others, it is described as a group to be 
persuaded. Often, The Public indicates a faction to be protected, whether from The 
Government or from itself. These images arise through a discourse of deficiency. 
The Department of Energy's approach to public communication is grounded in 
best practices guidelines that strive to fulfill statutorily-mandated responsibilities. This 
often is done by hosting public meetings at which information is shared with The Public. 
Such meetings are designed to help address suggestions that agency personnel 
"[d]emonstrate your respect for the public and your sincerity by involving the community 
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early, before important decisions are made, and return to the public often" (Keystone 
Center, 2005, p. 21). The statement that DOE should "return to the public" underscores 
an asymmetry in which the public involvement process is led entirely by the agency, 
which chooses the points of communicative intervention. 
Some stakeholders feel that this process is flawed, with the agency sharing only 
the information it absolutely must and citizens having little to no input in decision-
making. As one Future Vision focus group participant stated,  
Those meetings they had two or three years ago, I felt like I was just sitting there 
waiting for them to put a big ol’ pacifier in my mouth. That’s all in the world they 
was doing. We had to stare at the goofy guy from up yonder. Whatever his name 
was. I just felt like a total idiot because he was up there doing that, sticking that 
pacifier in my mouth, and I’ve been out of that stage for a long time. 
 
This assertion echoes the concerns of social scientists who note that most public meeting 
implementation strategies actually minimize stakeholder influence on agency decisions 
(Berry, Portney, Bablitch, & Mahoney, 1997; McComas, 2003; Bailey, Blandford, 
Grossardt, & Ripy, 2011; KRCEE, 2011).  
Such public meetings often are conducted in adherence to Seven Cardinal Rules 
or similar best practices documents. As Heath and O'Hair (2010) note, "Prescriptive 
guidelines such as those by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Chemical 
Manufacturers Association [seem] to feature what the source in the risk communication 
process wanted to say rather than what the receivers wanted to know and say" (p. 13). 
When participants recognize this dynamic at play, their frustration grows. As the 
Keystone Center (2005) notes in its risk primer for DOE personnel,  
In the United States, government agencies and private companies tend to anger 
the public by not involving them in decision making when the stakes or impacts 
are perceived to be high... However, there is one thing that is guaranteed to anger 
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the public even more than not involving them—involving them with no real 
intention of listening. (p. 31) 
 
An upshot of public involvement activities that are not perceived as truly 
engaging stakeholders has been the popular conceptualization of The Public as a target of 
persuasion and grudging appeasement. This portrayal echoed throughout the PGDP 
Stakeholder Future Vision focus groups. In evaluating a particular hypothetical scenario 
for the site's future, one participant stated, "This [scenario] seems to be one of the easier 
ones for the public to swallow," while a participant in another focus group remarked, 
"We thought it was one of the easier ones for maybe the public to accept." During another 
session, a local business leader remarked that the addition of recreational facilities to the 
site would "be a tough sell for the public." Again, The Public plays a passive role, but it 
also is vulnerable to persuasion under the correct set of circumstances. 
This perceived vulnerability is, perhaps, one of the driving motivations behind 
discourse about protecting The Public. Following a Future Vision focus group, one 
participant depicted himself as offering just such protection. In the comments section of a 
blog entry, he wrote,  
A heck of a lot of public money has been spent out there, but the biggest, most 
expensive problems still remain. A lot of people in the community know that I 
had paid attention to these issues for decades, and they count on me to give them 
an oversight view of what I think is going on. (Donham, 2010c, para. 5)  
He also used the blog to assert that "[p]eople who deal with the public need to know the 
laws and regulations. You can't just make them up as you go, and you better be able to 
answer relevant questions that the public has" (Donham, 2010a, para. 14). By 
homogenizing stakeholders as The Public and rhetorically positioning that Public as 
being in a chronic state of deficiency, the discourse lowers governmental expectations of 
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stakeholders' ability to interpret complex information and, consequently, places these 
same stakeholders in a defensive position that further constrains sensemaking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demarcating The Public 
There was only one other person from the "public" who turned out not really to be 
from the public... He was from one of the DOE cleanup contractors, Paducah 
Remediation Services, who, according to his own statement, was there "at the request 
of the congressional delegation." He had some interesting comments over the course 
of the evening, but he spent a lot of the night texting, especially when I was talking. I 
wonder what was going over those text messages.  
--Rural Thoughts, May 5, 2010 
Whether an actor is recognized as a member of The Public has important 
implications for his or her credibility with others in the room, and the identities of the 
others in that room matter tremendously. If The Public is widely seen by government 
officials as lacking information or the ability to sufficiently process information, then 
not being perceived as a member of The Public can be beneficial for those dealing 
with agencies, legislators, and other government personnel. Thus, explicitly 
connecting one's self to such entities can be important for building credibility in those 
interactions.  During the Future Vision Environmental/Health focus group, a PGDP 
contractor did exactly this, offhandedly mentioning his connection to Kentucky's 
congressional delegation and later describing lobbying activities he had undertaken on 
behalf of the plant. 
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Delays 
 
Although contaminated private wells near the plant were first discovered in 1988, 
the subsequent investigation and public comment process lasted almost six years, ending 
with the site's addition to U.S. EPA's National Priorities List of Superfund sites in 1994. 
In the nineteen years since, the community has continued to see numerous delays -- 
delays in providing process-related information to stakeholders, delays in awarding 
contracts, delays in cleanup activities, and delays in compensating sick workers. Such 
delays have helped create and sustain a pervasive narrative of governmental sluggishness 
and disinterest in the Paducah community. Consequently, the embedding of this narrative 
within the discourse has negatively affected sensemaking in three distinct ways: 1) the 
lack of timely information has limited the number and diversity of truly informed 
stakeholders available to jointly make sense of process-related challenges; 2) contract 
setbacks have created confusion for numerous constituencies within both the community 
This governmental connection, which might have helped establish his 
credibility in a focus group for employees, regulators, or even economic development 
officials, had the opposite effect in the Environmental/Health focus group session. It 
marked him as an object of distrust and suspicion, as other than The Public, for one 
local environmentalist. Despite the contractor's roles as a citizen of the community 
and a former labor union officer, his acknowledged relationship with elected officials 
fed directly into the Government/Public adversarial binary that dominates PGDP 
discourse and contributed to further devolution of the meaning-making process. 
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and the government, leading to very public criticism of DOE; and 3) cleanup and 
compensation delays have prompted both stakeholder frustration with the agency and 
doubt about its motives. 
Capacity 
 
Delays at Superfund sites affect a variety of stakeholders. While postponement of 
contract execution creates uncertainty for individual employees and can negatively 
impact the broader economy, prolonged cleanup also causes environmental groups to 
question an agency's commitment to repairing past damage. Such cleanup delays also 
contribute to longstanding health concerns among residents who live near sites. Similarly, 
slow or non-existent compensation for sick workers can put families in difficult financial 
and emotional binds. Unfortunately, all individuals affected by such delays do not 
necessarily receive timely or adequate information about causes or potential remedies, 
thus reducing the number and diversity of knowledgeable stakeholders available to help 
identify actionable solutions.  
According to the Paducah Sun, DOE delays in bidding and awarding contracts 
"baffled public officials and local firms competing for the contracts" (Walker, 2005a, 2A). 
These confused officials were not restricted to local or state government offices. Even 
Kentucky's Congressional delegation found itself in the dark, prompting Senate, House, 
and public hearings to help understand and address the causes of the holdups.  At one 
point, Senator Jim Bunning acknowledged that official policies and procedures can 
negatively impact timelines but also attempted to personalize the problem. He reminded 
DOE, "I have a community, workers and an environmental cleanup program that have 
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been waiting in limbo for over two years for something to happen. I want this fixed 
quickly" (Walker, 2005j, 1A). 
Concern about lack of available information related to delays also existed within 
the sick workers compensation program, which was transferred from the Department of 
Energy to the Department of Labor in 2005. Just three months after DOL established new 
policies and procedures for administering the program, local workers who had waited 
years for DOE to address their claims expressed concern that DOL was continuing the 
pattern of slow response without explanation. As the Paducah Sun reported, "Bill 
Boucher and other sick former Paducah nuclear workers are still waiting, three months 
after the U.S. Department of Labor announced it was ready to start processing toxic 
exposure claims. 'I haven't heard a thing,' said Boucher, of Paducah" (Walker, 2005s, pp. 
1A, 15A).  
Commitment 
 
The compensation delays were accompanied by public expressions of high levels 
of claimant frustration. Some continued to question the motives of the original program 
administrator, the Department of Energy. As the Paducah Sun reported, one claimant 
battling bone cancer "said he’s glad the Energy Department was replaced because it had 
no reason to expedite claims, considering that the agency owns the plant and covered up 
past worker exposures" (Walker, 2005i, 1A). 
As the Department of Labor worked to assemble staffing, policies, and procedures 
to begin processing the existing backlog of more than 25,000 claims, the newspaper 
continued to cover "sick worker" frustration, as expressed in public meetings (Walker, 
2005t) and through media interviews (Walker, 2005h). Most of these articles were 
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accompanied by photos of elderly, ill claimants, further personalizing the disappointment 
and concern. Such coverage prompted DOL leadership to defend the agency's efforts in a 
September letter to the editor, noting that the Department not only had met all deadlines 
since assuming program administration but also had completed some tasks ahead of 
schedule (Lipnic, 2005, 4A). In response, the adult daughter of a deceased worker 
submitted her own letter, in which she remarked that "[t]he delay and transfer to a more 
efficient agency still results in workers dying before anyone looks at their claims" 
(Sparkman, 2005, 4A). Thus, through retrospective sensemaking about an incredibly 
time-sensitive issue, the Department of Labor's efforts were conflated with years of DOE 
compensation delays.  
The same year, another media narrative was driven by Department of Energy 
delays. In this case, the long-awaited awarding of a multimillion dollar cleanup contract 
experienced a setback when numerous bidders protested the process's outcome. By filing 
complaints with the Government Accountability Office, these potential contractors set in 
motion bureaucratic procedures that included extensive process reviews by both GAO 
and DOE, led to the re-bidding of the contract, and ultimately held up transfer of cleanup 
responsibilities for nearly a year. 
Although these events were instigated by private companies who filed formal 
protests, Paducah Sun coverage laid the blame squarely at the feet of the Department of 
Energy, publishing such headlines as "DOE Again Delays Plant Cleanup" (Walker, 
2005j). In light of such tenacious justifications, DOE struggled to mount a defense. 
Battling a media narrative that portrayed the agency as overly-bureaucratic and prone to 
delays, DOE asserted that it was, in fact, expediting the process by rebidding the contract. 
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According to agency spokesman Mike Waldron, when faced with a formal GAO hearing, 
the Department "decided to re-evaluate the bids in an effort to make a selection as 
quickly as possible...to ensure that quality cleanup continues" (Walker, 2005j, 1A). 
Despite this assertion, frustration with the continued delays eventually led Senator Jim 
Bunning to protest a nomination for the agency's new undersecretary from the Senate 
floor (Walker, 2005k, 10A).  
Businesses and elected officials were not the only stakeholders angered by the 
cleanup delays. In a March 2007 letter collected during the public comment period of the 
Property Acquisition study, one resident wrote to U.S. DOE:  
We need this fiasco over with. I personally, [sic] do not wish to leave my 
daughter a contaminated piece of crap… I’m old, uneducated and perhaps don’t 
comprehend all that’s being considered, but I do recognize gobbledegoop when I 
hear it. (U.S. DOE, 2007, pp. H-195-H-196) 
 
Such statements reflect the high levels of distrust and anger that had accumulated during 
years of delays.  
Expectations 
 
The cleanup contractor procurement protests exemplify the ways in which lack of 
information can combine with frustration and negative prior experiences to affect 
sensemaking. According to the Paducah Sun, bidder protests provided only "the latest of 
several delays since DOE announced in 2003 that it would seek bids... With little 
explanation, the bid process was twice delayed before [the contractor] was selected" 
(Walker, 2005b, 1A). As the newspaper pointed out, such postponements can "breed 
[economic] uncertainty" (Walker, 2005v, 1A); however, the Sun also noted that prior 
cleanup contract changes had resulted in employees from the old contractor simply 
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transferring to the new, indicating that the same outcome would be probably occur when 
a new contract was finally awarded. In this way, the newspaper explicitly promoted 
retrospective sensemaking to help readers make determinations about the employees' 
future.  
Of course, the Sun also was careful to point out that the procurement delays did 
not occur in a vacuum. One editorial flatly stated, "For the bureaucrats at the U.S. 
Department of Energy, time is a very elastic concept," further explaining that "[i]n the 
world of DOE, a time frame could last for years, perhaps even decades." The author 
based this conclusion on a history of slow cleanup progress at the PGDP site. He went on 
to explain the context:  
Officials at DOE clearly are in no hurry to help Paducah or to remove 
contaminated material from the plant. In the late 1980s, DOE began studying and 
categorizing contaminated waste at the plant. A decade passed before the agency 
removed a single barrel of waste... The Paducah area is trapped in DOE’s 
bureaucratic time zone, which is years behind even the normal pace of 
government work. (Paducah Sun Editor, 12/28/2005, 4A) 
 
Interestingly, this hard-hitting editorial was published in response to a news article that 
had run the previous week in which state regulatory officials remarked that DOE's 
cleanup efforts had markedly improved during the preceding two years (Walker, 2005v); 
thus, the Sun editor invoked prior experiences to discount public reports of more recent 
agency progress. 
Similar levels of frustration were expressed by claimants awaiting compensation 
through the federal sick workers program. With information slow to reach individual 
applicants directly, some relied on anecdotal evidence to determine the extent of 
continued delays. In one example, a claimant suffering neuropathy induced by exposure 
to lead-based industrial cleaners told the Paducah Sun, "I talked to someone at the union 
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hall and he said he knew of four or five [employees] who have lead poisoning and haven't 
been paid" (Walker, 2005s, 15A). At public meetings, a number of program applicants 
expressed additional concern that their claims were being evaluated through exposure 
reconstructions developed by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, 
which relied on old, inaccurate, or incomplete DOE records. After years of waiting for 
compensation under DOE administration, one sick worker remarked, "I'm really going 
downhill and all they can do is think up different ways to postpone things" (Walker, 
2005s, 15A).   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Problems Still Remain 
 
I'm not worried at your view of my credibility. But if I was a "cleanup contractor" at 
PGDP, I'd be very careful about statements of credibility. A heck of a lot of public 
money has been spent out there, but the biggest, most expensive problems still 
remain... [Q]uestions about my credibility from one of these "cleanup contractors" 
rate really low on my scale of concerns.  
--Rural Thoughts, May 9, 2010 
As the tension between the environmentalist and the plant contractor in the 
Environmental/Health Future Vision focus group spilled over into the blogosphere, 
the activist raised the specter of delays in plant cleanup to further question the 
contractor's credibility. By constructing his argument around the incomplete plant 
cleanup process and a history of delays, the environmentalist attacked the contractor's  
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Secrecy, Deception, and Manipulation 
 
According to Heath and Palenchar (2007), "Research has demonstrated that 
industry and government regulatory officials are not considered the most trusted sources 
of risk information" (p. 124). In the face of long-term adversarial binaries pitting The 
Government against The Public, relational deterioration therefore should not be 
surprising. However, lengthy delays coupled with a history of slow- or non-disclosure by 
DOE and other agencies have created additional opportunities for accusations of secrecy, 
deception, and manipulation to become embedded in the PGDP discourse. Such 
accusations are deeply problematic for risk-related sensemaking. As Heath and Nathan 
(1990) note, "When publics believe they lack access to information, they are prone to 
seek it and interpret it idiosyncratically as well as evaluate risk conditions negatively" (p. 
18). 
competence directly. By invoking the expenditure of public money without adequate 
results, he also implied that the contractor was complicit in wasting taxpayer dollars. 
Positioning himself as the hero of his narrative, the author took a stance 
directly opposing ongoing cleanup delays and the perceived misuse of public funds. 
Unfortunately, this also laid the groundwork for personal animosity with the 
contractor, whom the author rhetorically implied was directly involved in the negative 
aspects of the cleanup process. Rather than establishing a basis for building 
convergent discourse, this adversarial relationship became part of a broader narrative 
that centered on incompetence and dishonesty. 
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Lack of disclosure can adversely affect trust in ways that are difficult to 
overcome.  As Fischhoff (1995) puts it, "[I]n risk (or other) communication, the damage 
can be irreversible if relations with one's communicants are poisoned. A shadow of a 
doubt can be difficult to erase" (p. 137). Low levels of accessible information over a 
prolonged period of time can combine with minimal lay expertise in technical areas to 
reduce sensemaking capacity within a community. Continuous exposure to angry 
comments about both agency motives and competence can create blind spots that 
promote assumptions of duplicity while impeding communicative convergence. Past 
experiences indicating an agency's reluctance to disclose can leave stakeholders 
wondering what is being "hidden" from sight. As Dunsby (2004) puts it, "[T]he short-
term benefit of suppressing negative information may be outweighed by the long-term 
costs of a loss of trust in the institutions" (p. 286). 
Capacity 
In a situation fraught with high levels of uncertainty, PGDP stakeholders are 
aware of their need for information to support decision-making. As one Future Vision 
focus group participant put it, "I’m not a nuclear physicist or an engineer; you know. 
What’s the life expectancy of that stuff? How is it affecting the environment? [I]s there 
severe contamination out there?" Recognizing the potential sensitivity of site-related 
information for national security, a participant in another session noted that  
you don’t have to get specific, but give generals -- hey, this is what you’re really 
dealing with in actuality, you know... Just a better idea of what’s there, so you 
know better what they could and couldn’t do with it. Physically, what’s there?  
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Many stakeholders, however, feel that even such general information frequently is 
unavailable, with one focus group attendee asserting, "DOE’s not very good at keeping 
you informed." 
Distrust of the Department of Energy is compounded in some sectors by distrust 
of local media. Numerous Future Vision focus group participants from the environmental, 
health, and education sectors emphatically criticized the Paducah Sun for promoting a 
distinct editorial stance that, they felt, stood in direct opposition to the free flow of 
information. Skepticism about the newspaper's credibility bubbled over when one focus 
group participant remarked, "There’s memos that prove that local media would not allow 
[exposure-related] information to get out until it finally broke in the, was it the 
Washington Post or something?"  
With a limited number of sources perceived as credible, some stakeholders have 
elected to disengage entirely from formal communication processes. At one point, several 
members of the statutorily-mandated PGDP Citizens Advisory Board -- including the 
chair -- resigned, "claiming DOE was not listening to members and was withholding 
information" (Walker, 2005d, p. 12A). Later, members of the local advocacy 
organization Active Citizens for Truth also opted out of both the Property Acquisition 
and the Future Vision studies. By disengaging from the formal discourse, these 
constituencies have further reduced the number and diversity of perspectives available to 
jointly make sense of site-related matters.  
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Commitment 
As more and more stakeholders have withdrawn from communication activities, 
perceptions of DOE and other agencies have continued to deteriorate in some segments 
of the community. Newspaper coverage has described a federal whistleblower lawsuit in 
which former DOE contractors were charged with deliberately underreporting employee 
exposures to maximize contractor performance fees from the agency. Many sick workers 
and their families thus have laid blame for the incomplete and erroneous exposure data 
primarily at DOE's feet. According to the Paducah Sun, claimants felt that the NIOSH 
exposure assessments on which compensation decisions were based were "flawed" 
specifically because they relied "heavily on exposure data, or lack of it, from the U.S. 
Department of Energy and its partner contractors that ran the plant until six years ago" 
(Walker, 2005e, pp. 1A, 10A).  
The newspaper reported that claimants attending a NIOSH-led public meeting 
described the DOE documentation as "incorrect, inaccurate, and incomplete," citing 
recently-declassified memos that describe such previously-unreported events as the 1974 
dumping of worker radiation-monitoring badges into a landfill. Such reports prompted 
emotional responses in some corners of the community, with one public meeting 
participant calling the exposure of workers to hazardous substances without their 
knowledge "a human rights violation"  (Walker, 2005e, 10A). This anger was echoed by 
a local educator who participated in a Future Vision focus group and remarked that 
"[t]hose responsible for doing this should be held accountable. So far I don’t think 
anybody’s ever been held accountable for what went on out there." The educator 
explicitly linked DOE's perceived culture of secrecy to negative environmental and health 
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impacts from the PGDP, saying, "When it was built, it was a top secret facility. It was 
built. Never mind the contamination and the disease and everything else that facility’s 
caused." 
Discoveries of agency non-disclosures have continued to fan stakeholder concerns 
about deliberate exposure-related misinformation and the consequences for 
environmental and public health. Some individuals have attempted to allay these fears 
through the use of humor. As one Future Vision focus group participant remarked, "[T]he 
local joke around here is all the deer and animals on that wildlife refuge glow in the 
dark." However, other stakeholders see no humor in the situation. Instead, they see a 
troubling pattern indicating that both DOE's motives and its information should always 
be questioned. According to one local environmental activist, "DOE has a sordid history 
of experimentation on people without their knowledge or consent. Who knows what is 
really going on" (Donham, 2005b, para. 7)? 
Once committed to a perception of DOE as duplicitous and manipulative, some 
stakeholders extend that assessment to any organization or individual seen as connected 
to the agency. Even university-based research teams are not immune to this guilt-by-
association phenomenon. For example, the "real" motives behind the Stakeholder Future 
Vision Study were questioned extensively and repeatedly by one local activist, who 
believed that the hypothetical site scenarios were designed to trigger and document 
support for pre-determined options that served DOE's secret "plans" for future site use. 
Upon contacting the university's Office of Research Integrity to register his concerns, he 
was read an excerpt from the narrative that the team had submitted to the Institutional 
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Review Board describing, in part, the Community-Based Participatory Communication 
[CBPC] methodology on which portions of the project protocol were built: 
CBPC thus favors decentralization and democracy, people involvement and 
dialogue, interpretative, horizontal, and bottom-up perspectives. It posits an 
alternative and, to some, a complementary conceptualization of communication 
that does not model the process as a linear, one-way, top-down transmission of 
information and persuasive messages. (Appendix A) 
Already believing the study to be corrupt and deceptive, the activist tenaciously grasped 
on to one word in the description: "persuasive." He later wrote a blog  asserting that a 
staff member at the Office of Research Integrity had told him that the study "was about 
using these 'visualizations' and how they worked in persuading people, at least that's how 
I remember it" (Donham, 2010b). He went on to argue that 
one thing is clear - this is an attempt to get a lot of momentum to build a nuclear 
power plant at the PGDP site - without making much of an effort to involve the 
community at large. And, Mitch McConnell's name is all over it. But it's all over 
now, because they have been "outed." So, the best thing these folks can do is 
come clean about what they are really up to in their so-called "study" in Paducah. 
I'm pretty sure that the whole project is based in serious deception, secrecy, and 
manipulation. (para. 5) 
Thus, existing negative perceptions about and distrust of DOE were extended to include 
even newcomers to the scene. 
Expectations 
When Paducah and the nation learned about DOE's lack of disclosure regarding 
past worker exposures, both at the PGDP and nationally across the nuclear complex, the 
agency's credibility was seriously damaged (Bruce & Becker, 2007). Even after 
Department of Energy Secretary Bill Richardson issued a public apology on behalf of the 
agency in 1999, investigative articles in the New York Times and the Washington Post 
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continued uncovering evidence of prior DOE bad acts, including refusal to compensate 
former employees for their work-related illnesses. It is on this shaky foundation that 
stakeholders must engage in PGDP-related sensemaking. 
In such an atmosphere, anecdotal evidence can be very important for making 
credibility judgments, and public meetings have provided opportunities for workers to 
share such anecdotes. At one NIOSH meeting, a former employee described using "white 
lead" lubricant at the plant, saying, 
It slung the oil all over everything, including the operators. You might as well say 
we took a bath in it... But they didn't tell us it would cause health problems. 
(Walker, 2005l, 11A) 
In late 2005, breaking news seemed to confirm suspicions about continued DOE 
secrecy when a memo from the agency’s Inspector General's Office warned that the 
hazardous chemical phosgene could be present in some depleted uranium cylinders stored 
at the PGDP site. This news was particularly troubling to many in the community as 
construction had just begun on a uranium hexafluoride recycling plant that would be 
charged with reopening the cylinders. According to the Paducah Sun, the memo notes 
that the "introduction of phosgene into the recycling process could be 'catastrophic'"; 
however, DOE had not advised the recycling facility of the issue, although the 
department had been aware of the potential problem for five years (Walker, 2005u, pp. 
1A, 10A). Yet again, the agency seemed to have put its own interests ahead of health and 
safety concerns. 
In view of such developments, low agency credibility in the community is 
understandable. During the Future Vision study, the research team asked participants in 
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eight different stakeholder focus groups to identify trustworthy organizations and 
individuals who could serve as sources of site-related information. With the exception of 
one session conducted with PGDP employees, the answer almost across the board was 
"anyone but the Department of Energy" (KRCEE, 2011). A participant exchange during a 
focus group for residents who live near the plant perhaps best captures the feeling, as one 
attendee stated that she would accept "[n]othing from DOE because the community 
around here isn't going to trust a single solitary thing they say." Another participant 
commiserated, "Well, we’ve been lied to a lot over the years. We don’t know who we can 
trust." 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One of the Worst Abuses of Government Manipulation 
[A]fter over 2 ½ hours of discussion...the meeting started to come to an end. I picked 
up a notebook which had been provided, a couple handouts, and the white envelope 
with the three graphics of scenario 2, build a nuclear power plant at the site, and 
started to turn to walk out of the room. 
At that point, a large government/university man...stood up and physically blocked me 
from leaving. He asked me for the envelope with scenario 2. I said, politely, no, I want 
to take it with me. He said, no, that I had to give it back, that it was a "research 
instrument." I said, "but this is a public meeting, funded by federal dollars, and you 
have given out this document in a public meeting, and I want to take it with me." He 
said, very threateningly, still blocking my way, that I couldn’t take it, and if I tried to, 
they would call the police. I said, "are you claiming this is a privileged document?  
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Documents lose their privilege when they are handed out in public." He said that they 
needed it for their research... 
 [A]fter thinking about it over night and after having been physically intimidated and 
basically mugged for the documents which were rightfully mine, I have to say that this 
process is one of the worst abuses of government manipulation of the public that I 
ever experienced in my 25 or more years of public involvement in environmental 
issues.  
--Rural Thoughts, May 6, 2010 
Weick (2001) has written extensively about what he calls "cosmological 
episodes" that occur in crisis situations. During these episodes, "people suddenly and 
deeply feel that the universe is no longer a rational, orderly system" (p. 105). As 
structures and role frameworks deteriorate, a cascading effect occurs in which 
meaning is lost, causing additional deterioration of role frameworks, which leads to 
further loss of meaning, and on and on.  It can be incredibly difficult to re-establish 
order in the midst of such a spiral. 
On May 5, 2010, I learned first-hand that the principles of cosmological 
episodes not only apply to forest fires and terrorist attacks but also can wreak havoc 
within an event as seemingly simple as a research focus group. The existing 
Government/Public binaries, and the manner in which others situated our research 
within that discourse, destabilized role structures in a way I did not foresee. At the 
beginning of the evening, I simply could not have envisioned a situation in which 
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Competing Risk Perceptions 
 
In the midst of role confusion promoted by adversarial binaries, frustration 
regarding slow-moving processes, and anger related to absent or erroneous information, 
individuals can find it difficult to make sense of technical risks. Further complicating 
matters at Superfund sites, the risks are chronic and often multi-faceted. National 
Priorities List sites can require decades for thorough cleanup. In addition, the 
environmental, public health, and economic risks often compete in decision-making.  
Paducah provides a prime example of just such a site. First posted to the NPL in 
committed participatory researchers would be perceived as threatening governmental 
puppet masters. However, our team found itself in the midst of a cosmological episode 
without the necessary contextual knowledge to escape.  
Our attempt to protect focus group discussion triggers from being 
misrepresented and biasing the study was perceived as just another Government-
supported manipulation. As subsequent exchanges between the activist and the 
university’s legal department dragged on for months and expanded to include requests 
for the release both of visualizations and of the names of research participants, 
institutional barriers ensured that the study – at least for this activist – became  
embedded in the existing discourse of delays and secrecy. While we had entered the 
field with a tremendous amount of knowledge about PGDP-related technical and 
statutory matters, our research team lacked insight into the communicative context 
that might have helped avoid this cosmological episode before it spiraled out of 
control. 
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1994, the site is years – if not decades – from being thoroughly remediated. As the 
Paducah Sun noted in 2005, "The cleanup will take at least 14 more years and additional 
work will be needed after that to make the site suitable for reuse" (Walker, 2005w, p. 
4A). DOE site management has publicly recognized the challenges and has tried to 
manage remediation expectations, describing extensive groundwater cleanup efforts by 
saying that "[y]ou can't guarantee treating every nook and cranny"(Walker, 2005r, p. 1C). 
Some in the community doubt that the PGDP environs can ever fully be 
remediated. One Future Vision focus group participant argued for complete site closure 
and the implementation of institutional controls, stating,  
It doesn’t matter what you do to it. It’s going to be contaminated. It can’t be 
cleaned up… You’re not going to be able to remove those materials in any way 
that will leave it clean… I think we ought to admit we’re never going to be able to 
clean this up. I don’t know what you do to it. Glass, concrete, iron, lead. 
Whatever you have to do to try to just hold it there. 
 
At the same time, some plant employees hold a very different perspective that 
heavily weighs such recommendations against the economic risks of implementing them. 
These individuals cite the plant’s history as a major regional economic driver as reason 
either to continue operations or to remediate the site for future industrial use. According 
to one employee focus group participant, people need to 
learn the history of what’s been done here, gaseous diffusion. There’s not just 
negative spin towards that. I think generally most people think that’s negative… I 
think also they need to understand the billions of dollars that’s put into the 
economy here, and the homes and families it’s created here... It started as the 
secret city behind the fence, and that secret city’s now a lot of nice homes. So I 
think they need to understand the history, positives and of course the negatives, of 
why this is no longer virgin dirt. 
 
Such competing perspectives, often expressed in the pages of the local newspaper 
or verbally in public meetings, further problematize risk-related sensemaking across the 
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community and leave some stakeholders confused. As Heath, Bradshaw, and Lee (2002) 
note, "Scientific uncertainty…exacerbates risk communication problems, creates conflict, 
and heightens cognitive uncertainty" (p. 321). In Paducah, the lack of opportunities for 
convergent discourse, high levels of public anger and animosity, and a history of 
balancing and addressing different kinds of risk have left the communicative space 
dominated by competing risk perceptions. 
Capacity 
A key challenge for sensemaking can occur when individuals choose to 
communicate only with those who have similar opinions and commitments to their own. 
This form of self-selection not only reduces an individual’s direct access to conflicting 
information but also deprives other sensemaking groups of his or her perspective. 
According to Weick (2001), "A partner makes social construction easier [and] enlarges 
the pool of data that are considered" (p. 114). However, the development of sensemaking 
factions encourages polarization and, depending on the context, can marginalize some 
points of view. One Future Vision focus group participant alluded to such a situation in 
Paducah when she declared that the ideal community would be "a city or town where all 
the communication…was not controlled by one group of people." 
One sensemaking group in Paducah assumes general ignorance about technical 
hazards and places its focus on better defining such hazards for others. These individuals 
typically are more directly connected to the plant, to local government, or to the 
economic development community. When asked about the kinds of information other 
stakeholders need to make the best decisions about the site’s future, many members of 
this group cite education. One plant employee participating in a Future Vision focus 
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group stated that the community needs "an educational process of what has or has not 
been done out here through the years," while another noted the need  
to have a very clear and very frank statement of the absolute worst level of 
toxicity and…maybe even get into just letting people know the difference…that 
it’s not the radiation that’s gonna get ‘em, it’s the toxicity of things. You know, 
maybe folks can handle some level of conversation about that. 
When federal agencies have attempted to provide such technical information, 
however, some community stakeholders have questioned their findings. The ATSDR 
Public Health Assessment has particularly come under fire. During the Future Vision 
study listening tour, one local health activist remarked that,  
What you’re seeing in their ASTDR [sic] reports is a lot of good information, and 
they do capture a lot of things in the buildings. But then it’s almost like I’ve got 
the real facts of the workers, and it’s not matching what you’re assessing here… 
When one of the investigating officials, a federal level investigator, looked at this 
very issue he said, "There’s something weird here." He goes, "There’s just too 
much sickness in this area." 
 
In this way, technical information provided by federal agencies is trumped by anecdotal 
evidence from other constituencies. This phenomenon was made explicit in a Paducah 
Sun letter to the editor in which the surviving child of a deceased plant employee 
remarked, "During public meetings, sponsored by DOE and DOL, the most informative 
data came from workers or family members who relayed stories of exposure. Meetings 
were a reunion for many and validation of the exposure-related illnesses" (Sparkman, 
2005, 4A).  
Such conflicting sources and types of information render sensemaking 
challenging for those stakeholders who sit in the middle. As one local physician noted in 
a Future Vision focus group,  
You hear all kinds of war stories around here. I hear them in the emergency room 
about the contaminated water out there and the amount of cancer that we see, and 
we do see a lot of cancer in the Paducah area. I think it’s kind of a high risk area 
135 
 
for cancer. To say that’s causing it, I’m not sure we can say that, but it certainly 
makes you nervous about it. 
 
In a community that sees myriad plant-related public meetings conducted by 
numerous federal, state, university, and local actors, such confusion may reflect what one 
PGDP employee calls "low turnout and public involvement" regarding site issues. 
Several stakeholders have noted that only individuals directly invested in making a 
specific argument participate in most of the meetings. Consequently, the foregrounding 
of discord at public meetings has encouraged some more moderate community members 
to opt out of the process, leaving them to note, as the physician did, "I guess I’m not 
really aware of how dangerous all that stuff is out there, except I just hear the scuttlebutt 
around the community about it, and I hear…talk about how it’s just awful, and it may be 
just awful." 
Commitment 
As disputes about risk levels have continued through the community over more 
than two decades, some stakeholders have very vocally asserted that hazard levels are 
higher than reported assessments have indicated. Via interpersonal interactions, blogs, 
and community meetings, these individuals have acted as modern town criers, trying to 
keep the community informed of perceived threats to its well-being and to urge protective 
and compensatory actions. Meanwhile, other interests have been equally vocal in 
promoting perceived economic advantages provided by the plant and in attempting to 
avoid feared fiscal devastation from its pending closure. Such tenacious public 
justifications of positions have potentially contributed to blind spots that ignore 
competing perspectives, particularly in the areas of environmental stewardship, public 
health threats, and economic risks. 
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According to some stakeholders, billions of dollars and more than twenty years of 
cleanup activities have yielded little in terms of environmental restoration. As one local 
activist and blogger notes, "Unfortunately, the worst problems at the site, which are 
numerous, are yet to be addressed" (Donham, 2011a). Another local activist is equally 
concerned about plans to dispose of future site-related waste, stating in a Future Vision 
focus group discussion,  
Twenty million to build a hole—to dig a hole, and get it ready for waste. So, even 
the waste of the federal government, if they can’t make a hole safe for radiation 
with twenty million dollars, you gotta wonder. 
 
In addition to waste disposal, this stakeholder also expressed concern about suggestions 
by some in the community that, upon ceasing operations, the PGDP be replaced with a 
nuclear power plant. "When God built a nuclear reactor, he put it 63 million miles away," 
he said, adding, "That’s where they ought to be." 
Stakeholders who live near the site have questioned whether government agencies 
or their contractors can ever truly understand the nature of the site’s environmental 
impacts and the associated resident anger. One public meeting attendee during the 
Property Study put it this way: 
I’m just tired of people being run over in this area. And you know all of you other 
people you come in from other places. You all don’t live out here. Come and live 
in our houses. Come and live in our spots. Get out there for 35 years and drink 
and walk over the stuff that we’ve walked through. Then you go back and you 
bring your families. Would you…build a house out here and bring your family 
down here to live knowing what contamination is out here? Be honest. I know 
you wouldn’t… [N]one of you all. (U.S. DOE, 2007, p. H-157) 
Clearly, concerns about environmental cleanup are closely linked with concerns 
about the contamination’s potential effects on human health. During a March 2007 public 
briefing about the Property Acquisition study, one attendee explicitly linked health 
problems experienced by members of the community with DOE environmental practices:  
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"[A] lot of you people that I know have medical problems. I have medical problems… 
We are no closer to the plumes being cleaned up now than it was in 1988" (U.S. DOE, 
2007, p. H-157). Another attendee at the same meeting asserted, "All of us that live on 
Metropolis Lake Road, there’s, I would say, 80% all have cancer of one kind of [sic] 
another" (U.S. DOE, 2007, H-157). Such concerns have spilled over into litigation, with 
the filing of a class action suit against U.S. DOE (Walker, 2006a). As Gaetke, Gaetke, 
and Bowen (2008) note, such litigation can greatly constrain Superfund community 
members’ involvement in educational and capacity-building activities that could support 
improved sensemaking processes. 
As the media have pointed to the potential for higher-than-reported risk levels at 
the PGDP, some stakeholder fears have continued to grow. For instance, a 2005 report 
was filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by the Nuclear Information and 
Resource Service, "a networking center for citizens and environmental activists 
concerned about nuclear power" (NIRS, 2013). This report stated that "uranium may 
cause or contribute to genetic mutations, tumors, birth defects, neurological damage, and 
cellular level toxicity" (Walker, 2005f, p. 1C). Although PGDP personnel responded that 
the uranium stored at the plant "poses no risk to employees or nearby residents," the 
statement did little to allay the concerns of some stakeholders. 
Community members have continued to voice both these concerns and their 
dissatisfaction with previously-conducted health assessments. During a June 2006 public 
meeting, one attendee asked why "a health study of this area" had not been conducted 
(U.S. DOE, 2007, H-69). A former Citizens Advisory Board chair elaborated when he 
asked the Courier-Journal (U.S. DOE, 2007),  
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How do you value two decades or more of living in a toxic environment, having 
family members getting ill, and seeing the value and heritage of your property go 
downhill? (p. H-80) 
 
In response to the ATSDR health assessment, fifteen residents of the Water Policy 
district signed a statement to U.S. DOE that the report "lacks human health data. Even 
worker health data was not available at the time the document was published. Confidence 
in the document is very low" (U.S. DOE, 2007, p. H-202). The letter angrily asks, 
Who – is – kidding – who? Eloquent requests for Congressional funding to 
protect the health of residents immediate to PGDP are delivered on a near annual 
basis. Huge amounts of money is allocated [sic]. Studies abound, Removal [sic] 
actions (dumping their junk on others) ‘make it pretty and seem nice and clean.’ 
Congress should be as enraged as we are! WE WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT 
WE ARE SICK AND DYING OUT HERE AND NO RELIEF IS IN SIGHT. 
(U.S. DOE, 2007, p. H-201-H-202) 
 
Such skepticism about government risk assessments and subsequent cleanup 
actions bled over into Future Vision focus group meetings, where one participant 
remarked, "The government is payin’ the families a hundred and fifty thousand dollars a 
piece for workin’ in these jobs, so I guess there is some risk... You know, they’ve got 
these illnesses." He further asserted, "[I]t’s hard for me to listen to [former employees] 
telling those kinds of stories and not get emotional about it," adding,  
My God, I hate that that thing’s there, but what do you do? It’s there. I think the 
site ought to be made into a memorial, something like Auschwitz. It ought to be a 
reminder to hopefully prevent anything like that from ever happening again. 
 
Such emotional commitment and strong metaphors underscore the deep commitment of 
some stakeholders to an image of the PGDP as a lethal threat to their community. 
In contrast to these stakeholders, others see the plant primarily as a community 
economic asset that is being threatened with closure. With approximately 1,200 
employees and a $121 million payroll, plant operations play an important role in the 
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regional economy (KRCEE, 2011). Local business leaders have long recognized the 
importance of recruiting new industry to replace the employment vacuum that will be 
created when the plant closes, while also noting the danger of allowing blind spots to 
prevent such strategic planning efforts. As a former director of the Greater Paducah 
Economic Development Council told the Paducah Sun, "I, for one, would hate to think 
we just sat here and let these next five years go by on the basis of, 'well, that'll never 
happen’" (Walker, 2005p, p. 1C). 
One U.S. Senator, Jim Bunning, actually promoted this blind spot within the 
community by asserting that the PGDP "may well stay open longer than the projected 
five years" (Walker, 2005q). A subsequent Sun editorial warned the Senator and others 
against tenaciously justifying the plant’s continued operations in light of overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary. The Sun’s editor wrote,  
Sen. Bunning's assessment of the situation simply is not persuasive enough to 
sidetrack the community's efforts to prepare for the closing of the plant in 2010 or 
2011… No one in this area relishes the thought of losing such an important regional 
employer. But pragmatic concerns should take precedence [and] leaders should resist 
the understandable temptation to indulge in wishful thinking when they contemplate 
the eventual demise of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. (p. 4A) 
Expectations 
Risk-related expectations at the PGDP NPL site are rendered problematic on a 
number of levels. The Government/Public binary has constructed a legacy of 
confrontational communication concerning the plant. Delayed information and actions 
related to cleanup and compensation have confused and frustrated many stakeholders. 
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Historic lack of disclosure about exposures and risk has fostered a discourse rooted in 
suspicion and anger. It is in this environment in which people must make risk-related 
judgments to inform key decisions. 
One Future Vision focus group participant expressed his concern about trusting 
government and related assessments of technical hazard, stating there has been "an 
attitude about the environment, like, basically, that the risks that were real didn’t really 
exist, and so people were thrust into really high-risk areas and there wasn’t consideration 
given to it." However, the compensation of nuclear workers for job-related illnesses, 
along with the fact that the Department of Energy has spent approximately $70,000 a 
year providing free municipal water to residents who live near the plant, have proven this 
attitude erroneous in the past, leading stakeholders to question current DOE assurances 
about risk levels. As the Keystone Center notes, "Fear of potential dangers is a 
completely rational response to our survival instinct" (p. 17). 
On one level, U.S. DOE personnel have accepted responsibility for the agency’s 
lack of credibility with the public, with one plant manager telling the Paducah Sun that 
previous PGDP groundwater contamination "doesn’t speak well of DOE’s past practices" 
(p. Walker, 2006b, 11A). Rank-and-file employees, however, have expressed some 
concern that the ways in which previous cleanup management has contributed to 
erroneously-heightened risk perceptions. As one plant worker said in a Future Vision 
focus group,  
[B]y putting controls you’re giving the whole area such a stigma that, I mean we 
already see it already. We’ve got institutional controls and outlaws that to me 
greatly exaggerate the risks involved with them anyway when you go up Little 
Bayou and Big Bayou…You’re holding the stigma. 
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The communicative devolution from such drastically competing risk perceptions 
can occur in two stages. First, discord arises through legitimate disagreement about risk 
levels, which sometimes relate to the differential prioritization of personal and 
community values that help determine risk tolerance. Secondly, these disagreements can 
further escalate when "risk" becomes a secondary construct through which other battles 
are waged. As Fischhoff (1995) notes, "Often controversies over risk are surrogates for 
concern over process. People feel that they have been treated shabbily. However, they 
discover that being disgruntled does not have legal standing, while complaining about 
risks does" (p. 143) 
When the sensemaking environment has been constructed on adversarial binaries, 
frustration about bureaucratic delays, and anger over perceived secrecy and manipulation, 
the foundation is laid for conflict. As the Keystone Center (2005) notes, "[T]he causes of 
the controversy are often not the facts of the risk exposure, but rather what is being done 
(or not being done) to safeguard the public, and who is taking responsibility" (p. 26). In 
Paducah, threats to capacity, commitment, and expectations have made it difficult to find 
communicative space in which the joint identification of problems and the co-
construction of solutions can occur. To improve sensemaking at this and other Superfund 
sites, new processes are needed that increase the number and diversity of actors, 
minimize the effects of blind spots, and better define roles, responsibilities, and 
expectations in ways that promote communicative convergence. 
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Real Priorities 
I believe that this is a DOE funded study of how they can manipulate "public opinion." 
It is a mind control experiment in the guise of a scientific study. They are seeing if 
they can create these computerized images of the future and then get people to push 
certain buttons on their remote controls right after looking at these images.  
...Back when Hazel O'Leary was Sec. of Energy under Pres. Clinton, before 911, there 
was a push to open up the DOE and lots of information was released about things that 
DOE had done in the past. Among other things they had done, revealed by documents 
obtained by the Louisville Courier Journal, they had purposefully released UF6 gas 
on our region to see what it would do in the environment, among other things. I 
pointed out to the CAB that once again DOE is experimenting on our community... 
As I drove home, I thought, what an absurdity that this ridiculous, meaningless, non-
transparent, manipulative so-called "study" is getting well funded while actual on-the-
ground clean-up of the environment is being significantly cut. But that's DOE for you. 
It shows what their real priorities are. 
--Rural Thoughts, March 20, 2011 
Nearly a year after the cosmological episode in the Environmental/Health 
focus group, the local activist had become even more entrenched in his beliefs about 
study motives. As human subjects protections prevented the naming of research 
participants, he was even more certain that the project was managed by U.S. DOE, 
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along with other governmental and economic interests. Even as the research team 
prepared to move into the final phase of the study, which included public meetings 
featuring the scenarios that he had previously deemed the team deceptive for not 
releasing, he doubled-down on his assertion that the project was manipulative and 
designed to reach a predetermined outcome. 
For my part, I learned many important lessons during the Paducah Future 
Vision Study, but perhaps none more important than the complicated ways in which 
sensemaking strategies are negatively affected by capacity, commitment, and 
expectations. During the cosmological focus group episode, I found myself 
constrained by the homogeneity of my own life experiences; my commitment to my 
roles as researcher and employee blinded me to the idea that I could be seen as 
anything else; and my expectations of a positive, engaged experience rendered me 
tongue-tied as the events unfolded. I left the field asking myself two questions: If such 
a disintegration of relations can occur during an explicitly participatory process, what 
must more traditional communicative venues be like, and how can we improve 
communicative processes for Superfund communities to reduce the chances of this 
type of incident occurring elsewhere? 
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Chapter Five: Toward a New Model 
Synthesizing the Evidence 
 
By implementing sensemaking theory as a diagnostic tool, this study extends our 
ability to identify and address key challenges for sustained communication in chronic risk 
communities that require the intervention of multiple governmental actors. At this 
writing, agencies have relied upon The Seven Cardinal Rules and related best practices 
for more than two decades. During this time, the implementation of these practices has 
played an important role in the ways in which those most affected by contamination make 
sense of risk, not only through the explicit sharing of information but through ongoing 
interpretation of the processes by which that information is provided. Therefore, it is 
increasingly necessary to evaluate not only whether the approaches have been effective 
for information sharing but if, in fact, they have had consequences in terms of 
relationships among site actors. The novel application of sensemaking theory through this 
study provides one avenue through which such evaluation might occur. 
The myriad risks -- including environmental, health, and economic -- associated 
with the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Superfund site have affected numerous 
stakeholders for decades. These stakeholders rely upon complex sensemaking strategies 
that contribute to and are reified through enactment, an ongoing, iterative process through 
which people create and reify the very environments that then constrain them. As Weick 
(1988, 1995, 2001) points out, enacted sensemaking is constrained in three key areas: 
capacity, commitment, and expectations. When capacity is limited due either to a small 
number of individuals or to a homogeneity of perspectives, sensemaking is challenged. 
Further, an individual's or group's commitment to a specific perspective constrains 
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sensemaking through the formation of blind spots, which can contribute to attempts to 
tenaciously justify the correctness of the existing perspective, even in the face of 
evidence to the contrary. Finally, when prior experiences inform interpretations of current 
actions, retrospective sensemaking can lead to confusion regarding the motives of 
specific actors or the efficacy of potential solutions. In the case of the Paducah Gaseous 
Diffusion Plant, all three of these sensemaking constraints are implicated across five 
themes: 1) The Government; 2) The Public; 3) Delays; 4) Secrecy, Deception, and 
Manipulation; and 5) Competing Risk Perceptions.  
Within each identified theme, capacity is constrained in one of three ways. First, 
the perception of capacity is constrained by the reduction of diverse perspectives into 
overarching constructs, such as The Government or The Public. Second, actual capacity 
is constrained through the withdrawal of constituencies from the collaborative 
sensemaking field, as when activists opt out of public processes after making accusations 
of secrecy or deception. Third, capacity is constrained when the number of 
knowledgeable stakeholders is lessened due to lack of necessary information to support 
decision-making. Each of these capacity-lowering mechanisms reduces the number and 
diversity of actors available to contribute to the collective sensemaking that could 
promote convergent understandings of previously discordant concepts. Consequently, 
siloed sensemaking groups reaffirm their own distinct sets of risk perceptions, which then 
come into conflict in the broader discourse. 
Commitment is a sensemaking constraint that similarly appears across all five 
themes. Stakeholders sometimes commit to depictions of all agency personnel, and even 
those with only tangential relationships to agencies, as members of the monolothic The 
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Government. Conversely, agency officials – and even community members themselves -- 
sometimes group all non-agency stakeholders together as members of the homogenized 
The Public. Personal commitment to one or the other of these roles can contribute to 
blind spots regarding the motives of others. In addition, delays and lack of information 
can lead stakeholders to very publicly justify their specific stances for or against certain 
risk perceptions, which can make it difficult to engage in the kinds of convergent 
communication that could encourage stakeholders to build "some degree of agreement" 
about risk-related concepts (Sellnow, Ulmer, Seeger, & Littlefield, 2009, p. 14). 
Finally, expectations constrain sensemaking across the five themes by influencing 
perceptions of roles, responsibilities, motives, and actions. Past activities by The 
Government, including perceived delays and secrecy, have promoted distrust among 
some PGDP stakeholders. Similarly, stakeholder expressions of fear and anger, as well as 
risk perceptions rooted in values other than technical hazard, have colored agency 
interpretations of The Public. When combined across themes, these constraints contribute 
to a discourse that often is rooted in frustration and distrust, rendering convergent 
communication extremely difficult. 
In many ways, the constructs of The Government and The Public closely align 
with the Seven Cardinal Rules approach to risk communication, through which an agency 
must help a public fill some perceived gap, whether that gap is based in lack of 
information or lack of understanding. By conceptualizing the numerous governmental 
and community risk perspectives as simply The Government and The Public, the 
language encourages each "side" to view the other as having a far more limited range of 
points of view and potential responses than actually exist. Delays and perceived secrecy 
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subsequently are cited as affirming this relational divide, further inhibiting the possibility 
for multiple stakeholders to work together to create shared understandings. 
In light of these findings, this chapter directly addresses the study's second 
research question: what are the related implications for improving agency risk 
communication approaches? I suggest that a reconceptualization of risk communication is 
needed that moves stakeholders to the center of the paradigm. By acknowledging the 
multiplicity of stakes in site-related risks and decisions, this model increases the capacity 
for shared sensemaking while decreasing the likelihood of adversarial interactions that 
contribute to the formation of blind spots. Over time, this model should promote 
increased levels of trust, which would improve expectations and create a more positive 
framework within which to make retrospective sense of risk-related issues. 
This paradigmatic shift needs to occur on two levels: linguistically and 
processually. First, the language of Seven Cardinal Rules should be amended to highlight 
agencies’ collaborative roles as fellow stakeholders rather than asserting their dominant 
roles as regulators or potentially responsible parties.  Second, the context-specific 
operationalization of these new guidelines, along with subsequent risk communication 
activities, should take place within a new framework that builds specifically upon 
processes promoting convergent communication. To this end, I propose a stakeholder-
driven model that encourages participatory processes for designing, implementing, and 
evaluating risk communication activities at Superfund sites. This chapter closes with a 
discussion of model limitations and the identification of future research directions.  
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Implications 
Adapting Seven Cardinal Rules to Increase Sensemaking Capacity 
 
As Weick (1988) notes, "If action is the means to understanding, then the number 
and quality of actors available to do that acting and interpretation become crucial 
variables" (p. 312). Thus, increasing the diversity of sensemaking participants can help 
agencies avoid situations in which "[s]mall events are carried forward, cumulate with 
other events, and over time systematically construct an environment that is a rare 
combination of unexpected simultaneous failures" (Weick, 1988, p. 309). Unfortunately, 
the current language through which the Seven Cardinal Rules are explicated constrains 
the perceived number and diversity of actors available for sensemaking.  
Atkinson (2005) notes that "[i]n the social arena, group identity negates 'that 
which it is not,' by creating false unities among group members which deny the complex 
multiplicities of which 'the group' is composed'" (p. 81). Thus, when diverse individuals 
and organizations are grouped under a single term like The Public, sensemaking is 
threatened through a reduction in the perceived number of distinct actors and viewpoints.  
In the case of Paducah, the blanket term The Public is used by a number of sources across 
multiple channels as a proxy for diverse stakeholders. Despite a small aside within the 
Seven Cardinal Rules, the dominance of The Public phrasing encourages agency 
personnel to perceive a single non-agency point of view rather than recognizing that 
numerous viewpoints differ widely. Therefore, officials who view The Public as 
representing a lone, distinct perspective may anticipate little benefit from engaging 
multiple groups and individuals in dialogue. 
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In addition to decreasing sensemaking capacity, the binary of The 
Government/The Public that is reified through the Seven Cardinal Rules also promotes 
adversarial relationships through acts of othering. Johnson et al. (2004) have described 
othering as an identity construction device through which "one magnifies and enforces 
projections of apparent differences from oneself," further noting that "persons who are 
treated as other often experience marginalization, decreased opportunities, and exclusion" 
(p. 254). McCarthy and Dimtriades (2000) go even further, stating that by engaging in 
othering a "social actor consolidates his identity by a complete disavowal of the merits 
and existence of his social other. Here, one becomes 'good' by constructing the other as 
'evil'" (pp. 173-174). The Paducah case provides numerous examples of such processes at 
work, with The Government frequently portrayed as slow, bureaucratic, secretive, or 
even deceptive, while The Public is often depicted as lacking either technical knowledge, 
the ability to adequately apply technical information to decision-making, or the control 
that would allow The Public to bear real influence on governmental decisions. Such 
depictions underscore McCarthy and Dimitriades's assertion that "[r]esentment enters 
normatively into" such spaces, where alignment- and realignment-commitments are made 
(p. 174). 
To directly address this problematic binary, I suggest that the language of Seven 
Cardinal Rules be adapted to situate an agency as one among many stakeholders, along 
with residents, employees, activists, the media, and others. Such a change would 
foreground the diversity of perspectives rather than referring to a singular The Public. On 
the surface, this goal could be accomplished rather easily, simply by changing all 
appearances of The Public to "stakeholders," thus diversifying the frame within which 
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non-agency participants are viewed. In practice, however, potential implementation 
challenges will need to be addressed, as discussed later in this chapter. 
In addition to breaking down the existing Government/Public binary, the Rules 
should go beyond advising honesty to promoting transparency through participatory 
processes. As the data in this study reveal, agencies’ actions and public statements are 
interpreted through complex sensemaking techniques that color perceptions regarding the 
veracity of individual and organizational actors. Thus, the communication process that 
agencies support should be considered as part of the organizational messages being 
interpreted, in much the same way that non-verbal communication is recognized as 
central to the interpretation of verbal messages. To this end, the Rules should explicitly 
provide for engaged, participatory communicative processes that provide sufficient 
information for stakeholders to judge for themselves the levels of honesty and openness 
an agency is providing. 
Revised to reflect these adjustments, the Seven Cardinal Rules would become 
Guidelines for Superfund Site Communication and would read: 
1. Accept and involve other site stakeholders as legitimate partners in both 
the operationalization of these guidelines and the creation and evaluation 
of subsequent communication-related activities. 
2. Jointly plan and evaluate specific risk communication efforts with other 
stakeholders. 
3. Listen, respond, and incorporate stakeholder-specific concerns into 
messages and engagement protocols. 
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4. Engage diverse stakeholders to develop and implement open, transparent 
processes that affirm honesty and multiperspectivity as central tenets for 
communication activities. 
5. Coordinate and collaborate communication and engagement activities with 
relevant groups, including community-based, governmental, and media 
stakeholders. 
6. Work with stakeholder groups, including the media, to meet information 
needs in appropriate, targeted ways. 
7. Engage in clear, compassionate, respectful dialogue with diverse 
stakeholders. 
Operationalization  
 
Boholm (2009) has called for risk communication researchers to "stop bracketing 
context and systematically account for the role and importance of context in how risk is 
defined and communicated, and in how this communication is received" (p. 349). 
Similarly, the data in this study point to a need for agencies to engage those with the 
greatest contextual knowledge – i.e., a diversity of local stakeholders -- directly in the 
definition and evaluation of risk-related communication efforts. To involve disparate 
voices in this process, however, will require agencies to engage in formative research 
upon entering a Superfund community. 
As Palenchar and Heath (2007) note, such formative efforts allow "program 
planners to hear and learn from a myriad of stakeholders and stakeseekers, including 
local residents, employees, health care providers, government officials, emergency 
personnel, and vendors and contractors to name some major categories" (p. 123). During 
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the initial stages of the PGDP Stakeholder Future Vision Study (KRCEE, 2011, p. 18), 
the research team met with more than 80 individuals to help identify the multiplicity of 
distinct stakeholder groups in the area, ultimately recognizing sixteen distinct stakeholder 
clusters for the site: 
• Water Policy District Residents 
• Economic Development Interests 
• United States Enrichment Corporation Employees 
• Environmental/Health Advocates 
• Healthcare Providers 
• Educators 
• Media 
• Religious/Spiritual Community 
• Wildlife/Recreation Enthusiasts 
• Tourism Interests 
• Ballard County Stakeholders 
• U.S. DOE 
• U.S. DOE Subcontractors 
• McCracken/Paducah Government 
• PGDP Citizens Advisory Board 
• Regulatory Agencies  
 
The research team then recruited a representative from each of these 
constituencies to serve on a community consultation panel, helping ensure the relevance 
and context-appropriateness of subsequent communication efforts for their specific 
targeted groups. This panel pre-tested all focus group and public meeting protocols, as 
well as all specific communication instruments, working with the research team to create 
targeted activities that met the information needs of a variety of stakeholders. Ideally, a 
revised Superfund risk communication infrastructure would include just such formative 
activities, from listening tours to ensure that all constituencies are at the table to the 
recruitment of representatives to help inform both process and message development to 
the multi-level evaluation of subsequent activities. This formative work would result in 
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the establishment of a Stakeholder Consultation Core. Minkler (2005) notes that such 
groups are commonly used in community-based research projects to "improve 
measurement instruments by making sure that questions are worded in ways that will 
elicit valid and reliable responses" (p. ii3); In this case, the Core would play an even 
more central role in risk communication efforts, supporting context- and stakeholder-
appropriate activities at every stage. 
Among the first convergence-building duties for this Stakeholder Consultation 
Core should be the operationalization of specific terminology contained within the 
Guidelines for Superfund Site Communication. In its present form, Seven Cardinal Rules 
includes taken-for-granted terminology that can be problematic when expectations differ 
among stakeholders. For example, what do the words "accept and involve" mean to 
different individuals? Although existing mechanisms, such as agency-sponsored public 
meetings and PGDP Citizens Advisory Board activities, ostensibly support public 
participation and bidirectional communication between community members and 
agencies, these mechanisms do not appear to have been fully effective in Paducah. In 
some cases, these mechanisms instead have been used as evidence of exclusion, as when 
one local blogger wrote, "The thing that really is awful is they try to make it seem like 
they want your opinion, when in reality, it's the last thing they want" (Donham, 2011a, 
para. 5). 
Fischhoff (1995) argues that "[p]eople want to be treated respectfully, in addition 
to being leveled with" (p. 142). Moving stakeholders to the center of the risk 
communication process – making them an integral part of defining terminology and 
setting expectations – indicates such respect. For instance, the current Rules state that an 
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agency should "[a]ccept and involve the public as a legitimate partner"; however, the 
expectations for partnership are set by the agency itself, ignoring a key question – what 
are the qualitative and quantitative expectations for such partnerships? By working with a 
Stakeholder Consultation Core, the members of which simultaneously engage in dialogue 
with their own constituencies, agencies can better set both the parameters and the 
expectations for partnerships, thereby generating a more transparent, engaged process 
that promotes shared understanding. In addition to promoting convergent communication, 
such a process could help reduce the Arnstein Gap (Bailey, Blandford, Grossardt, & 
Ripy, 2011) between citizens’ ideal levels of public involvement, which participants in 
the Stakeholder Future Vision Study identified as partnership, and their actual 
experienced levels of participation, which the same participants identified as between 
being informed and being consulted (KRCEE, 2011).  
Further, through this process of participatory operationalization, the Stakeholder 
Consultation Core will play a key part in designing and implementing context-specific 
evaluation plans. As Heath and Nathan (1990) note, "[F]actors of evaluation entail power, 
uncertainty, understanding, and agreement" (p. 19) Thus, it is essential for stakeholders to 
be included in both process and outcome evaluations. During the Stakeholder Future 
Vision Study (KRCEE, 2011), two distinct, Likert-like evaluative tools were used. The 
Arnstein Ladder (1969) provided an instrument through which all project participants 
could gauge their desired levels of public involvement against their actual experiences, 
while a standard process evaluation presented an opportunity to assess the study itself. 
Other studies and efforts have used different evaluative tools. For example, the National 
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (2012) recommends the use of logic models 
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for community engagement to help "understand the expected goals and the activities that 
will move…toward those goals" (p. 6). By introducing stakeholder-centered language, 
the new Guidelines specifically provide space for negotiation regarding the most context-
appropriate evaluation strategy – or combination of evaluation strategies – for each site. 
Finally, by providing equal footing for all site-related stakeholders, including 
agencies, the new language explicitly supports increased coordination and collaboration 
among constituencies. As currently structured, agency-specific Superfund site risk 
communication efforts at times create confusion in affected communities. In addition to 
the various messages and activities generated independently by the myriad agencies 
involved at a site, agencies sometimes create challenges for themselves through their own 
competing messages and activities. For example, while the Future Vision Study worked 
with local communities to help define acceptable future uses for the PGDP site, part of 
which involved delving into questions regarding future waste disposal, U.S. DOE also 
conducted unrelated public meetings specifically addressing future site waste disposal 
issues, often without notifying Future Vision researchers of the activities. Some 
community members consequently became confused by the similarities and differences 
between the two sets of activities (KRCEE, 2011). Thus, by encouraging frequent, 
horizontal communication among a variety of stakeholders at all stages, the new 
Guidelines language reduces the possibility of commitment to an agency’s own activities 
creating a blind spot that negates the existence of simultaneous activities being conducted 
by other stakeholders, thereby creating opportunities for greater collaboration and clarity.  
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Implementation: Toward a New Convergence Model 
 
To implement the newly-formed Guidelines for Superfund Site Communication, 
agencies need to work with stakeholders to create a process that improves upon the 
current, largely siloed risk communication approach frequently taken at Superfund sites.  
While ad hoc approaches to risk communication might be more appropriate for 
addressing quickly-emerging risks, a more robust communicative infrastructure is needed 
to support stakeholders facing the kinds of long-term, chronic risks present at Superfund 
sites. As Heath, Bradshaw, and Lee (2002) note, "When risk communication 
infrastructures are not in place, citizens will have less knowledge, as well as feel less 
control, higher cognitive involvement (concern), lower behavioral involvement 
(information seeking and concern voicing), more problem recognition, and more 
uncertainty" (p. 346). In the long term, such lowered involvement and heightened 
uncertainty can problematize sensemaking through reduced capacity and tenacious 
justifications. 
In its present form, Seven Cardinal Rules encourages a fairly traditional, message-
centered approach to risk communication that relies largely upon the first three 
unidirectional models of public relations identified by Grunig and Grunig (1992): press 
agentry and two-way asymmetrical, both of which focus on persuasion to achieve 
organizational goals, and public information, which simply distributes organizational 
information to  an identified audience (Grunig & Grunig, 1992).  Such approaches often 
begin with the identification of information needs, progress through the prioritization, 
design, testing, and implementation of specific messages or communicative interventions, 
and end with an evaluation of the effort (see Figure 4.1). With this approach’s focus on 
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the message or intervention, individual actors – along with their disparate perspectives 
and commitments – are removed from the equation. 
Figure 4.1. Traditional Communication Process Model. 
 
 
Palenchar and Health note that "both the process and content of communication 
are integral factors in increasing awareness, knowledge, positive attitudes and positive 
behavioral intentions" (p. 123). Thus, a process is needed that promotes iterative, 
multilateral engagement among stakeholders, ensuring that the transparency of the 
process itself becomes embedded in understandings of specific messages. As the 
Keystone Center (2005) notes in its risk communication primer for U.S. DOE employees, 
"Participants should feel that they were adequately consulted and that they had adequate 
opportunities to offer concerns or ask questions" (p. 22).   
By pointing to challenges in sensemaking capacity, commitment, and 
expectations, this case study indicates a need to increase the number and diversity of 
perspectives at the table, to encourage constructive dialogue that informs while reducing 
blind spots, and to build trust among the numerous parties affected by Superfund sites. 
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Through dialogue, deliberation, and action, such a convergence-building approach would 
work toward constructing shared meanings by co-creating, implementing, and evaluating 
both risk messages and communication protocols. By moving stakeholders to the center 
of the process, the new model would help address the call for boundary spanning, 
collaboration, and shared management of risk knowledge (O'Hair, 2009).  
In practice, adapting the existing communication process to include stakeholders 
is deceptively simple, a matter of adding just one component, in fact. The new model (see 
Figure 4.2) moves toward Grunig and Grunig’s (1992) fourth model of public relations, 
two-way symmetrical, by placing the Stakeholder Consultation Core at the center of the 
process and providing for its input at every stage of risk communication. Under such a 
model, the Stakeholder Consultation Core would influence the development of needs 
assessment tools, help prioritize identified information needs, play a key role in designing 
and testing specific messages and engagement protocols, collaborate in adapting and 
disseminating messages or implementing protocols, and be central to both process and 
outcome evaluations.  
Admittedly, the recruitment, establishment, and maintenance of the Stakeholder 
Consultation Core could prove challenging, as agencies already are required to fulfill 
myriad statutory obligations with very limited staff and resources. Under most 
circumstances, an outside party deemed neutral by the majority of stakeholders, including 
agencies and community members, might best develop and facilitate the site-specific 
Consultation Core. This individual could serve as a catalyst communicator, whose 
primary role White (1999) describes as "[c]reating an environment for dialogue, learning 
and transformation" (p. 39). Given the complex statutory and fiscal constraints present at 
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Superfund sites, whether this embodied communicative bridge among stakeholders was 
recruited from a local college or university, an outside consulting firm, or another entity, 
she or he would need to meet the many competencies required of a catalyst 
communicator (White, 1999), including interpersonal communication, investigative 
reporting, facilitation, problem-solving, participatory action, mediation, and educational 
skills, while also holding particular expertise in the field of risk communication. 
Figure 4.2. Convergence-Building Communication Model. 
 
While this catalyst communicator would be charged with long-term coordination 
of the Stakeholder Consultation Core, a lead organization would be charged with 
requesting the Core’s involvement for specific areas of concern. For example, assistance 
with the design of cleanup-related information activities might be requested by U.S. EPA, 
while support for the development of engagement protocols concerning future site 
disposition might be requested by U.S. DOE; however, regardless of the specific area of 
informational need or the organization most able to fill that need, the Stakeholder 
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Consultation Core would be a central resource engaged for the design, implementation, 
and evaluation of the specific communicative projects.  
As Palenchar and Health note, "An organizational culture of transparency 
acknowledges and respects the information, communication and decision-making 
expectations and demands of all its stakeholders and stakeseekers, and does not stage-
manage them by limiting access to, propagandizing information about or manipulating 
decision-making regarding risk" (p. 124). By ensuring a multiplicity of constituencies is 
engaged in the risk communication process, the new model promotes exactly this kind of 
transparency. Such an approach breaks down the Government/Public binary. It provides 
broader understanding of processes related to bureaucratic delays, along with the distinct 
roles of specific agencies involved in such delays, which could reduce frustration levels. 
It supports open and honest communication among multiple constituencies, thus 
promoting regular information sharing and reducing perceptions of secrecy.  
Fischhoff notes that "avoiding all conflict is not a realistic, or even a legitimate, 
goal for risk communication," continuing that, "[t]he best-case scenario for risk 
communication (and, indeed, risk management) is having fewer, but better conflicts" (p.  
144). Similarly, while no process will ever create a situation in which all participants 
share a single perception of risk, a stakeholder-centered process can increase mutual 
understanding of differing risk perceptions, thus opening up a convergent space for 
dialogue, debate, and joint decision-making. By involving numerous participants with 
diverse perspectives at every stage, this model increases capacity for sensemaking while 
also building upon an iterative, dialogic approach intended to defuse adversarialism. As 
the Keystone Center (2005) notes, such "collaborative dissemination of knowledge helps 
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assuage fears that a particular locality is somehow being hoodwinked" (p. 25), thus 
decreasing distrust and laying the groundwork for improved future sensemaking. This 
model directly addresses Heath and O’Hair’s (2010) concern that "dialogue regarding 
risk sufficiently include all interested parties and deal productively with their concerns 
and suggestions" (p. 20). Thus, the model is designed to help stakeholders identify and 
develop points of convergence (Sellnow, Ulmer, Seeger, & Littlefield, 2009). 
Linking Risk Communication Approaches 
 
In addition to building communicative convergence among site stakeholders, this 
model brings together the four approaches to risk communication: research translation, 
policy-oriented, stakeholder-centered, and participatory. Each of these perspectives adds 
value to the process. Research translation promotes the sharing of information and the 
education of stakeholders, while the policy perspective acknowledges both emotions and 
political realities present in the discourse. Stakeholder theory provides suggestions for 
ensuring that the people who most need information receive it on their timetables, while 
participatory approaches emphasize the establishment or repair of trust and rapport, thus 
helping heal the contentious legacies of environmental mismanagement by and 
inadequate or nonexistent risk communication from responsible parties.  
With agencies included as fellow stakeholders, this convergence-building model 
provides directly for access to needed technical and scientific information. Explicit 
recognition of and respect for differing values and their impacts on risk perceptions 
provides an environment for productive risk policy discussions. By including 
representatives from a multiplicity of stakeholder groups in the Stakeholder Consultation 
Core, the model provides mechanisms for determining which stakeholders are most 
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affected by or most desire specific types of information and through which channels, thus 
opening avenues for distinct, targeted communication efforts. By involving stakeholders 
directly not only in the design, implementation, and evaluation of specific 
communication efforts but also in the operationalization of the Guidelines for Superfund 
Site Communication itself, the model provides transparent, open mechanisms to help 
build trust and rapport among diverse constituencies. 
Weick (1988) notes that "[a]ccuracy in perception comes from an expanded 
response capacity" (p. 311). When individual stakeholders engage in communication at a 
Superfund site, they bring to the table their own specific perceptions; however, when a 
multiplicity of stakeholders participate, each representing a different point of view, the 
capacity for diagnosing and solving emerging communication problems is increased. As 
Weick (1988) puts it  
If more people are in constant touch with the system, this will make it easier to 
detect and correct anomalies and also to implant more reliable environments. 
These outcomes should be especially likely when the people doing the enactment 
have diverse experience, novel categories and justifications, and diverse activities 
at which they are skilled and in terms of which they perceive the world. We are 
not talking about specialists isolated from one another. Instead, we are talking 
about heterogeneous teams of diverse people with sufficient mutual respect that 
they maintain dense interaction with one another. (p. 313) 
 
During the Stakeholder Future Vision Study, the importance of diverse 
perspectives for sensemaking was brought into relief following a particularly contentious 
focus group session. The meeting began with just two attendees, a plant employee and an 
environmental activist, both of whom were very knowledgeable about different aspects of 
the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. Shortly into the meeting, the group was joined by a 
third participant, a newcomer to the community who knew very little about the plant. For 
more than two hours, the employee and the activist debated the pros and cons of future 
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site uses for the plant, at times agreeing on key points and at other times disagreeing. 
Generally speaking, the discussion between the two was respectful. At the end of the 
evening, the late-comer told the research team, "I just learned a whole bunch." Thus, the 
back-and-forth between those with different site perspectives had been instructive, 
providing someone less familiar with the site with both facts and diverse opinions and 
helping him build a broader base on which to make sense of site issues. Providing support 
for such dialogic, collaborative sensemaking is the ultimate goal of this convergence-
building model. 
Limitations 
 
The many challenges of drawing conclusions and making suggestions based upon 
a case study are exacerbated when these conclusions and suggestions have been derived 
through a crystallized framework that "presupposes that no truth exists 'out there' to 
discover or get close to, but only multiple and partial truths that researchers (and others) 
co-construct" (Ellingson, 2009, p. 22). I recognize that, as a communication researcher 
and practitioner working at Superfund sites, my own positionality is implicated 
throughout this work. In fact, I have attempted to make this recognition explicit through 
the use of narrative inquiry to complement constant comparative analysis.  
However, given that one of the goals of this study is to develop an improved 
model for communication at these sites, I have attempted to ensure that study findings 
resonate with the people most affected by them. During the development of this 
dissertation, I have engaged in lengthy dialogues about emerging results and my 
subsequent conclusions with a number of constituencies, including participants in the 
Stakeholder Future Vision Study, personnel from both the U.S. Environmental Protection 
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Agency’s Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response and the National Institute of 
Environmental Health Sciences Partnerships for Environmental Public Health, leadership 
of the Kentucky Environmental Quality Commission, and university-based community 
engagement and research translation directors at other Superfund sites around the 
country. At each step, I have been reassured that the communicative dynamics identified 
within this study are experienced frequently at numerous sites, and I have received 
important feedback, including requests from multiple parties that the model explicitly 
involve stakeholders in developing and implementing communication evaluation 
activities. 
In addition to questions about the transferability of these findings to other 
Superfund sites, additional limitations relate to statutory and fiscal constraints for the 
model’s implementation. As has been noted, a number of governmental actors are 
involved at Superfund sites, including U.S. DOE, U.S. EPA, and ATSDR, along with 
state departments for environmental protection and health and family services. Under 
complex existing Superfund laws, which agency – if any -- should take the lead in 
formulating a Stakeholder Consultation Core? Would U.S. EPA’s Community 
Involvement Coordinators be best positioned to begin this work through the agency’s 
initial site investigations? Would it be a logical – or even sanctioned – role for the 
ATSDR site representative? Or would it be best to identify a local or regional 
stakeholder, such as a college or university, to undertake the necessary formative 
research? Are there specific statutory limitations that would stand in the way of model 
implementation? From where would the funding to support the prescribed interactions be 
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derived? These are questions that, in and of themselves, require extensive dialogue and 
negotiation to answer. 
A third limitation for model implementation relates to the significant amount of 
time it can take to engage stakeholders directly and to conduct the formative research 
necessary to ensure inclusivity. While the expanded timeframe might prove problematic 
in crisis situations, the long-term, chronic risk environments at Superfund sites provide 
more temporal flexibility for work that could reap long-term relational dividends. 
Although time-intensive, the effort put into ensuring both transparency of process and 
participation of multiple constituencies in the risk discourse could play an important role 
in increasing trust among diverse stakeholders.  
Future Directions 
 
This study raises numerous questions about complex risk communication 
processes at Superfund sites, and as such, it opens many doors for future studies. 
Superfund sites are heterogeneous in terms of contaminants, demographics, 
socioeconomic factors, and many other relevant components, all of which feed into 
varying communicative dynamics across different sites. Thus, an analysis comparing 
sensemaking in communities that feature some participatory communication mechanisms 
with sensemaking in communities that rely primarily on more traditional risk 
communication activities could help elucidate the potential efficacy of the proposed 
convergence-building model, as well as identify areas of concern prior to model 
implementation. 
A second area of particular interest is the community-based development of 
evaluation processes and instruments. While the Arnstein Ladder (1969) used in the 
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Stakeholder Future Vision Study provides a useful heuristic through which stakeholders 
can think about public involvement, the Ladder itself was created by an academic for use 
by academics. As such, the terminology has not always proven clear to stakeholders, with 
constructs like "therapy" particularly problematic for shared understanding. In the future, 
I hope to work directly with Superfund stakeholders to adapt and validate an evaluation 
instrument that more closely resonates with both their own experiences and language. 
Finally, a key area for applied research would involve working with federal 
agencies to determine the extent to which the convergence-building model could be 
implemented and tested at Superfund sites. How would agency communicators make 
sense of their own and Superfund stakeholders’ evolving roles within the new model? To 
what extent might agency personnel be constrained by their own organizational capacity, 
commitments, and expectations? Such potential research questions hold promise for 
future studies. 
Sensemaking at Superfund sites is a complex process that involves many actors 
representing diverse perspectives, at times leading to adversarial relations that render 
convergent understanding extremely problematic. Only by engaging in systematic 
research and evaluation of existing communicative constraints can we help site 
stakeholders move toward shared understandings of risk-related phenomena. I hope that 
this study has contributed, in some small part, to this process. 
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Focus Group Discussion Protocol 
PGDP Future Use Vision Project  
Expected Knowledge/Info Outputs 
 
1. The preferred and the unacceptable future use scenarios/combinations of scenarios for 
the PGDP and its environs among various community groups. 
 
2. How the various groups in the community name and frame the following issues related 
to future use scenarios/combinations of scenarios for the PGDP and its environs: 
 
• Opportunities, 
• Strengths,  
• Challenges, 
• Weaknesses, 
• Threats, 
• Fears, 
• Risks, 
• Concerns, and 
• Solutions. 
 
3. The overall quality of life goals, values of the community and, specifically, the priority 
quality of life goals and values that influence the decisions of various groups in the 
community regarding future use scenarios for the PGDP and its environs. 
 
• What is valuable to the community? 
 
4. Any additional information the various community groups need to make the best 
decisions about the future use scenarios for the PGDP and its environs. 
 
• The most accessible and trusted channels for receiving such information. 
 
PREPARATION 
 
Checklist of items to bring: 
 
To prepare facility for focus group: 
 
To conduct focus group: 
_ Digital Tape recorders _ Form A: Why are we here: Format for oral 
presentation of informed consent 
 
_ Blank name tents 
 
_ Form B: Informed consent form/project description 
 
_ Markers (various colors) _ Form C: Demographic survey forms 
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Prior to Arrival of Participants  
 
Arrive 20-30 minutes early to assure that the facility will be ready on time (you may be in the 
position of using the room directly after someone else) and to prepare the facility for your group. 
For instance, you may need to make adjustments to make the best use of the room and furnishings 
to facilitate discussion. (1) Put out signs to help the respondents find the appropriate room. (2) 
Arrange furnishings for discussion format, place blank name tents and writing materials for 
participants, reserve moderator and note taker locations with name tents. (3) Arrange how food 
service should take place.  (4) Set up tape recorders. (5) Set up laptop, screen and LCD system.  
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR RUNNING THE GROUP 
A. As Participants Arrive 
 
(1) Welcome participants and invite them to select some food/beverage and take a seat. (2) Tell 
them where the restroom is.  
(3) As soon as all the participants are done eating, explain the project and the Informed Consent 
form using Form A: "Why Are We Here?" Reiterate that participation is voluntary and that any 
participants who do not want to continue the study can leave  
(4) Distribute FORM B: The Informed Consent and Project Description  
(5) Briefly describe the project for participants using a PowerPoint of the Project Description in 
FORM B. 
(6) Ask participants to write their nicknames, first names or pseudonyms on both sides of the 
tent so that all participants can see each other's names or nicknames--this encourages 
discussion. 
(7) Ask participants to introduce themselves, 
(8) Request participants fill out FORM C: The Demographic Survey.  
_ Food _ Form D: Scenario preference polling questions 
(using keypads) 
 
_ Signs (directions to room) _ Form E: Evaluation of Focus Group Discussion 
process (using keypads)  
 
_ Pens/pencils 
 
_ PGDP Future Use Visualization packets & trigger 
questions 
 
_ Tape (to post signs) 
 
 
_ 
 
Copies of the executive summaries of "The Politics 
of Cleanup" and DOE "Risk-Based End State" 
 
_ Laptop, LCD projector, screen _ 
 
Keypads 
_ 
 
 
Minimum of 5 flip charts _ 2 easels for flip charts 
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(9) Administer the first page of FORM E using key pads; describe the Arnstein Ladder 
conceptualization of public involvement and ask participants to anonymously register where 
they feel their past levels of public involvement in PGDP-related issues has fallen. 
(10) Begin the discussion. 
B. Warm up  
 
1. First, please ensure that you’ve written your first name or a nickname on both sides of the 
tent so we all can see everyone's name.  Thanks.  I'd like to begin by finding out what you like 
and what you dislike about living in the Paducah area with PGDP as your neighbor. For example, 
what is your favorite thing about living in the area? 
 
Sometimes, you’ll need to prompt further by offering alternatives. This is a discussion training 
exercise. Call on people by first name, and ask one follow-up question about whatever they say.  
The follow-up question can be anything that makes it clear that you have been listening and that 
encourages the respondent to add something more. This helps get the respondents used to the 
idea of probing for more info.  As you conduct this exercise, also look for information that 
naturally leads into our discussion. 
 
Call on people in a seemingly random order, rather than moving around the table, because the 
randomness better approximates how discussions happen. Moving around the table sets a 
different tone and could lead to people patterning their comments only after their neighbor has 
spoken.   
 
2. If you go outside this building and ask someone "what is the temperature right now at this 
spot?" there is a right answer and a wrong answer that you can check with a thermometer. 
However, what we are discussing today is how you and your friends feel about things, and there 
could be as many different opinions as there are people in this room.  Guess what?  Every one of 
those opinions is right!  Remember, we aren't here to convince anyone of something in 
particular or to change anyone's mind. We are here to discuss things and to hear what each and 
every one of you has to say.   
 
Sometimes, you will find that many people in the room have your opinion, and other times you 
will be the only one with that opinion.  But it is important for us to learn about all the opinions 
because even if you are the only one in this room who holds that opinion, there may be 
thousands of other people in your community who feel just as you do.  Most importantly, every 
opinion counts -- so please feel free to share your thoughts. 
 
C. DISCUSSION OF PARTICIPANTS’ OVERALL QUALITY OF LIFE GOALS AND VALUES 
 
Participants’ descriptions of their ideal city of residence 
 
This activity is designed to elicit the overall quality of life goals and values of participants 
 
OBJECTIVE 
 
1. Identify what is valuable to participants 
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HOW TO CONDUCT THIS ACTIVITY 
 
Facilitator explains the objective of this activity.  
 
Now that we have discussed what makes this area a desirable place to live, let’s carry that a bit 
further and imagine the ideal place to live.  Try to visualize a community that would meet all of 
your needs and wants.  Now, let’s try to describe that community in as much detail as possible.   
 
Ask participants to describe in as much detail as possible three factors that would influence 
his/her choice of an ideal city of residence. These factors are written out on a flipchart. 
 
After listening to the individual descriptions, the facilitator asks the following questions to 
generate discussions: 
 
1. How does this region measure to these ideal regions we’ve heard about today? 
2. Which of the ideal city characteristics are the most important to you and why? 
D. Discussion of Visualizations of Sample future use scenarios  
 
The preferred and the unacceptable future use scenarios/combinations of scenarios for the 
PGDP and its environs among various community groups 
 
Visualizations of Sample Scenarios 
This activity uses computer-generated visualizations of sample future use scenarios.  
Objectives 
Seeing and discussing these visualizations can help the community members: 
• Think about the various possible future use scenarios. 
• Share their knowledge and experiences about additional possible scenarios.  
• Evaluate and appreciate the various issues related to various possible future use scenarios. 
 
The activity is most effective if focus group participants work in small groups to examine and 
discuss the visualizations that they receive. After each small group has examined their 
visualization, they should explain to the whole group what they think the visualization represents 
and the issues related to the visualization such as opportunities, strengths, challenges, 
weaknesses, threats, fears, risks, concerns, and solutions.  The group presentations can help to 
engage participants in a dialogue about various scenarios and their possible effects on their 
community. This activity is also an icebreaker that immediately engages the participants in 
sharing their ideas and perceptions at the beginning of the focus group. 
Materials: Visualizations of Sample future use scenarios (four scenarios to be Selected 
Randomly from among eight unmarked visualization packets) 
How to conduct this activity 
 
Introduce the activity by asking the participants to form small groups of 3 to 4 people.  
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Then assign one visualization packet to each small group. Display the three questions listed 
below on an easel pad that is visible to all participants: 
  
1. What do you think this represents? 
2. Do you think this is a good or bad future use scenario for the PGDP site? Why? 
3. What do you think the consequences of this scenario may be for you, your family and your 
community? Explain. 
 
Explain the scenario visualizations as just a sample of what is possible for the future use of the 
plant site. Give the following instructions to the participants  
 
"Please look carefully at the visualization that has been assigned to your team. Then discuss the 
questions listed on the easel pad. Make sure everyone in your group has a chance to look at the 
visualization and has an opportunity to express his or her ideas. When you finish, your group will 
be asked to make a two-minute oral report about your observations and ideas, while the 
visualization is shown to the rest of the group." 
 
After a maximum of ten minutes, ask each group to tell the whole group what they think the 
visualization represents and what the consequences will be for the community. As each group is 
presenting their visualization, you should also display the same visualization for the entire 
group.   
 
Probes: 
 
After each group has made its brief report, engage all present in a whole group discussion using 
the following probes 
 
1. What do these scenarios mean for the community? 
2. How do these scenarios relate to your lives? Your families? Your communities?  
3. What are the most important issues related to these scenarios: opportunities, strengths, 
challenges, weaknesses, threats, fears, risks, concerns, and solutions?  
4. What are the barriers to implementing these scenarios?  
5. In what ways can these barriers be overcome? 
6. What other scenarios/combinations of scenarios can we consider for the plant site and 
why? 
7. Think back to our earlier discussion about what makes this area a special place to live and 
what characteristics would define the ideal place to live.  (Review these on the flip chart.)  
Now, which of the scenarios discussed today would reinforce what makes this area special?  
Which would bring this region closer to the ideal characteristics described by participants?  
Why? 
 
Use keypads to poll participants’ scenario preferences. 
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E.   Identifying knowledge gaps and community trusted information channels 
 
OBJECTIVES 
This activity should help us to understand participants’ information-seeking behavior and 
information use, both of which are crucial to effectively meeting their information needs. This 
activity may also lead to the discovery of novel information behavior and user profiles that can 
be used to enhance existing information models or even develop new ones. 
 
HOW TO CONDUCT THIS ACTIVITY 
Use questions and probes to discover participants’ information needs and their sources of credible 
information about issues in general and specifically about the plant and its operations. 
 
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 
1. What types of information do you usually seek about the PGDP and its operations? 
2. What sources do you consult for this type of information? [Let people volunteer responses 
first then probe with these choices.]  Do you ask friends, neighbors, go to the library, watch 
television, read it in magazines, go on the Internet?  
3. Why do you use these sources?  What problems have you had getting information that you 
want (examples: hard to find, too technical, didn't relate to my situation, confusing navigation 
online etc.)? 
4. Which is the most credible source of information about PGDP?    
5. Which sources of information about PGDP are the easiest to understand and most helpful to 
you?  
6. Which sources of information about PGDP are the hardest to understand and least helpful to 
you?   
7. What information do you think is most important to the community about PGDP and its 
activities? 
8. What are the best ways of delivering information about issues related to PGDP to your 
community?   [Let people volunteer responses first then probe with these choices.]  Printed 
materials like brochures? Video?  Extension officers? Etc. 
9. If we could develop a web site where you could obtain information about the PGDP, what 
type of information would you like to have?  How would you like to see the information 
presented? 
 
Use keypads for evaluations of the focus group process Using Forms D and E (use both 
sides)  
 
Conclusion 
We have had a great discussion and you have offered very valuable insights and opinions.   
Is there anything we missed during this discussion on the future use of PGDP you would like to 
add? 
I want to thank all of you for coming and participating in our discussion.  Please remember that 
we agreed at the start of our discussion that everything that was said in this room is confidential.   
Once again, thank you.  
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Informed Consent Procedures for the PGDP Future Use Vision Meetings 
 
We are doing an interesting study for which we need your help. In order to proceed we need 
your verbal consent. 
 
I am going to ask 10 questions to explain the purpose of the study. I will then answer each of 
these questions. We will get into more detail about the project as we go through the evening; 
however, the University of Kentucky Institutional Review Board, which guides research projects, 
mandates that we cover this material and gain your consent to participate in this focus group 
prior to discussing the project in more depth.  Please feel free to ask questions about the focus 
group process at any time.  Your questions about the overall Future Vision process will be 
addressed later in this presentation. 
 
1. Who are we? 
 We’re a team of researchers from the Kentucky Research Consortium for Energy and the 
Environment located at the University of Kentucky. We are conducting this study to assist the 
local community in identifying a vision for the future use of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion 
Plant site.  
 
2. Why are we here? 
 We’re here to explain the study to you and to ask you to be involved in this important 
project. If you agree, you will participate in a discussion about what should be done with the 
plant and surrounding areas when the plant is decommissioned and about the best means of 
achieving the objectives for the greater benefit of your community. The information you 
provide to us today will help us learn more about what the community thinks and wants for 
the plant and its surrounding areas and how best to achieve these wishes. We also want to 
find out what additional  information you need about the process and what the best 
means of getting that information to you is. During this meeting, we will discuss the 
concerns and major issues that are important to your community in relation to PGDP and the 
best use of the plant in the future. I will guide the discussion, listen to, and record your ideas.  
 
3. What are we asking you to do and why? 
 During the past few years, several groups of people from your community and from many 
organizations, including the DOE, have suggested numerous future uses for the PGDP and 
the land surrounding it.   We’ll show you a sample of these suggestions and ask you to 
evaluate them based on what you think will be in the best interest of your family and the 
community 
• Which suggestions do you think make sense, are worth doing, and would you 
support and why?  
o Which suggestions do you think don’t make sense and why? 
o What are your recommendations and why? 
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4. Why were you asked to participate in this study? (ADAPT FOR OTHER CLUSTERS, e.g. 
EMPLOYEES OF THE PLANT) 
 You are members of the Paducah community and you and your family live close to the 
 Plant. You and people like you are the group most affected by the plant and its 
 operations. 
 
5. Why do we need your permission and how will you grant us permission to participate? 
All studies of this type require that the participants be told what the study is about and what 
they are being asked to do. That is what we are doing now. We will also give you a two-page 
description of the project goals and your role in the project. If you agree all you need to do is 
to take part in a discussion.. During the discussion you can choose to participate or not 
participate at any time, or to leave at any time.  
 
6. What are the risk/benefits for you if you decide to participate in this study? 
As far as we know there are no risks from participating in this study. There are a number 
of benefits. By participating in this study, your views may affect the decisions about what 
should be done with the plant and its environs, when current operations end. By sharing 
your ideas and experience with us, you will be part of a sample of about 90 community 
members from Paducah and surrounding counties who are working with the project 
team to ensure that the voice and opinions of all community segments are taken into 
consideration when a decision is made about the future of the plant and its 
surroundings. 
 
7. Will you receive any rewards for participating in this study? 
You will receive no rewards for participating in this study other than a free meal. You will 
receive the free meal whether of not you chose to participate in the study. 
 
8. What will it cost you to participate in this study? 
The only cost to you is the time required to travel to and from the meeting and the time 
involved for the discussion. 
 
9. Will your identity and statements remain confidential? 
Yes. No one outside of our group will know exactly what you said.  We never use names 
when we review your comments. We will also ask you to complete a two-page questionnaire 
about your connection to the PGDP. Do not write your name on the questionnaire. That way 
your comments and identity will remain anonymous. 
 
10. If you have questions, whom do I contact? 
 
If you have questions about the study you can ask them now or at any time during the 
meeting. You can also call Dr. Lindell Ormsbee, the principal investigator of this study at any 
time at 859-257-1299, or email Dr. Ormsbee at lormsbee@engr.uky.edu. You can also call 
the University of Kentucky Office of Research Integrity at 859-257-9428 or toll free at 1-866-
400-9428.  
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Consent to Participate in a Focus Group Discussion of PGDP Future Use Vision 
 
You are invited to take part in this study that will assist the local community to identify a vision for 
the future use of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant site. A Federal earmark facilitated by Senators 
McConnell and Bunning and Representative Whitfield supports the Study. The person in charge of 
this study is Dr. Lindell Ormsbee from the Kentucky Research Consortium for Energy and the 
Environment, located at the University of Kentucky.  The other people on the team are Drs. Ted 
Grossardt and Chike Anyaegbunam, Ms. Anna Hoover and Mr. Mitchael Schwartz, all from the 
University of Kentucky. 
 
You were selected to take part in this study because you are in some ways connected to the PGDP 
either because you live in Paducah, near the plant or work in the plant. You are one of about 90 
people to participate from the communities in Paducah and nearby counties. The group discussion 
will take about two hours of your time. 
 
By doing this study, we hope to learn what the Paducah community thinks should be done with the 
plant and surrounding areas when the plant is decommissioned, as well as the best means of 
achieving these objectives to the greater benefit of the community. The information you provide us 
today will help us to learn more about what the community thinks and wants for the plant and its 
surrounding areas and how best to achieve these wishes. We also want to find out what additional 
information you need about the process and the best means of getting that information to you. 
During this meeting, we will discuss the concerns and major issues that are important to your 
community in relation to PGDP, along with the best use of the plant in the future.   
 
The discussion will be audio recorded so that the researchers can review all of the comments more 
thoroughly.  This recording will be kept secure until information can be collected from it and then 
the recording will be destroyed.  You are encouraged to voice your opinions; however, your 
participation in the discussion is voluntary. Your opinions are very valuable to us, but you are free to 
leave the discussion at any time. Your responses will be added to the responses of other participants 
for reporting purposes, and every effort will be made to protect your confidentiality.  All the 
information you give us will be kept secure and will only be accessible to project personnel.  Several 
faculty members at the University of Kentucky will listen to the recording of this discussion. Of 
course, the other individuals participating in today’s focus group will know what was said and by 
whom during the session. 
 
There are no known risks to you or your family if you participate in this study. By participating in this 
study, your views may affect the decisions about what should be done with the plant and its environs 
when current operations cease. By sharing your ideas and experience with us you will be part of a 
sample of about 90 community members from Paducah and surrounding counties who are working 
with the project team to ensure that the voice and opinions of all community segments will be taken 
into consideration when a decision is made about the future of the plant and its environs. You will 
not be paid for your participation although a meal will be provided. There are no costs to participate 
other than the two hours you will spend with others in the discussion.  
 
If you decide to take part in the group discussion, it should be because you really want to volunteer.  
You will not lose any benefits or rights that you would normally have if you choose not to volunteer.  
You can stop at any time during the study.  If you do not want to be in the study, you may choose not 
to participate in the study.  
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If you have questions about the study, you may contact Dr. Lindell Ormsbee at 859-257-1299, or 
email lormsbee@engr.uky.edu.  If you have any questions about your rights as a volunteer in this 
research, contact the staff in the Office of Research Integrity at the University of Kentucky at 859-
257-9428 or toll free at 1-866-400-9428.  
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PGDP Future Vision Project: 
Brief Project Description 
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FORM C: DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY FOR PGDP FUTURE VISION FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANTS 
 
You are invited to take part in this study that will assist the local community to identify a 
vision for the future use of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant site. The information you 
provide us today is very crucial and will help us to learn more about what the community 
thinks and wants for the plant and its surrounding areas, as well as how best to achieve these 
wishes. 
  
1) In what ways are you connected with PGDP? Check all that apply 
  
Live in Paducah? ____  
 
Live near the plant?  ____  
 
Work in the plant?  ____ 
 
Have relatives who work/worked in the plant? ____  
 
Have clients or customers who work in the plant? ____  
 
Others (Describe) ___________________________________________ 
 
 
2) Your age _________   
 
3) Your sex   
____ M  
____ F   
 
4) Ethnicity/Race?  
 
__Hispanic or Latino  
 
__White   
 
__ Black or African American   
 
__American Indian/Alaskan Native   
 
__Asian  
 
__Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander  
 
__ More than one race  
 
__ Other 
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5) Occupation _________________________________________ 
 
 
Form D: Sample Scenario Preference Polling Questions (using keypads) 
 
Please make brief one or two line comments after each item below.  
 
 
1. Which scenario makes the most sense to you? Why? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Which scenario makes the least sense to you? Why? 
 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Which parts of the scenarios would you support? Why? 
 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. This fourth question is something we’ll like you to discuss with us now and also take 
home and share with people in your community. Here is the question: What would you and 
others in your community need to move forward on identifying the most optimal future use 
scenario for the plant site you feel should be implemented?  
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The Arnstein Ladder: Degrees of Citizen Participation in Planning 
(Arnstein 1969)
Manipulation
Therapy
Informing
Consultation
Placation
Partnership
Delegated Power
Citizen Control Degrees of citizen power
Degrees of tokenism
Nonparticipation
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
 
                       COMMENTS 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
 
Where are we now?
1. Manipulation
2. Therapy
3. Informing
4. Consultation
5. Placation
6. Partnership
7. Delegated Power
8. Citizen Control
 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
 
Where should we be?
1. Manipulation
2. Therapy
3. Informing
4. Consultation
5. Placation
6. Partnership
7. Delegated Power
8. Citizen Control
 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
 FORM E 
(DRAFT) 
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 How Satisfied Are You With the 
Meeting Processes Used Here?
1. Very Unsatisfied
2. Unsatisfied
3. Somewhat Unsatisfied
4. Slightly Unsatisfied
5. Neutral
6. Slightly Satisfied
7. Somewhat Satisfied
8. Satisfied
9. Very Satisfied
 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
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